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In this thesis, we present a set of motivations for studying security ex-ploits for software vulnerabilities and present numerous techniquesfor the automated synthesis of portions of the exploit-building pipeline.With cyberspace being increasingly embraced as the 5th domain of
warfare, in addition to land, sea, air and space, security exploits are finding
their role as important ingredients of cyber weapons. They are instrumental
in enabling the violation of fundamental security assumptions in target sys-
tems, which, in turn, facilitates the infiltration of an arbitrary payload. We
discuss the role that exploits play in offensive cyber scenarios and explore the
nature of its supply chain. In particular, we consider the differences in the in-
telligence requirements for the development, deployment and assessment of
physical and cyber weapons and discuss how concepts such as assurance, pro-
liferation and deterrence apply to such weapons. Furthermore, we delve into
technical reasons for the manifestation of security bugs and vulnerabilities,
and compose custom techniques for automating the exploit writing pipeline
for one class of vulnerabilities. Programming errors allowing the corruption of
critical portions of program memory, such as stack and heap buffer overflows,
remain a prevalent problem. Stack overflows are well-studied and archetypal
buffer overflows, with a long history of manual exploitation. Recently, even
automated bug-finding tools have succeeded in finding stack vulnerabilities
and constructing basic customized exploits according to pre-defined formulas.
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However, generation of heap exploits has been out of scope for such methods
so far. We investigate the problem of automatically generating heap exploits,
which, in addition to finding the underlying vulnerability, requires intricate
interaction with the heap manager. We identify the challenges involved in au-
tomatically finding the right parameters and interaction sequences for such an
attack, which traditionally has required manual analysis. To tackle these chal-
lenges, we present a modular approach that is designed to minimize the as-
sumptions made about the heap manager used by the target application. Our
prototype system is able to find exploit primitives in binary implementations
of heap managers and applies these to exploit real-world applications.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Software vulnerabilities are still prevalent in today’s cyber domain.They permeate the infrastructure of modern society. The emer-gence of computing technology in the past decades has been ac-companied by the ever-present desire to automate basic tasks. From
the crunching of big numbers to the retrieval of structured data fromdatabases,
the increase in processing speed and memory capacity of modern machines
have helped make this dream a reality. There is hardly an area of science or so-
cial life that does not stand to profit from the benefits of automation. From the
computational modelling of complex chemistry to the simulation of the hu-
man brain, automation helps us move faster towards our goals. One security-
related activity that has been the subject of automation attempts in recent years
is that of exploit development. Whilst initial steps have been taken in the direc-
tion of automation, the problem of automatic exploit generation as a whole is
far from solved. In fact, it is still far from even being practical or applicable to
real-world applications. The successes in automated exploit generation have
largely stood on the shoulders of more established techniques in software ver-
ification, such as symbolic execution and constraint solving. In this work, we
continue the effort of learning about the requirements of automated exploita-
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tion and to, at least partially, address some of the implicit problems along the
way. Perhaps one day we shall live in a world where we may find self-healing
software that will repair any code defects in itself. Equally, perhaps computer
worms will one day possess the ability to craft their own exploits, so as to find
new infection vectors. In either case, an increase in the amount of autonomous,
self-governing software will likely be observed in the years to follow.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing manner:
• in Section 1.1, we present our primary set of motivations for conducting
academic research into an instance of the automatic exploit generation
problem;
• in Section 1.2, we introduce the specific problem subset that is tackled
in this thesis;
• in Section 1.3, we detail the objectives that we initially formulated and
the reasons behind selecting particular discrete goals; we define a tech-
nical problem statement outlining the inputs and outputs of our auto-
mated process (Section 1.3.2); and we express the self-imposed limita-
tions enforced on our own project, in the interest of maintaining realism
and observing necessary practical considerations (Section 1.3.3);
• and in Section 1.4, we discuss the contributions that our work has made
and provide a useful reference for the structure of the rest of this docu-
ment (Section 1.4.2).
1.11.1 Project Motivation
This section provides a brief introduction to the project and its motiva-tions. While throughout this thesis we focus primarily on offensive ca-
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pabilities (exploit generation), the set of problems that underpins automatic
exploit generation, such as symbolic execution or constraint solving, is shared
amongst several orthogonal problem areas. Hence, novel solutions in this
problem area may contribute to the improvement of other capabilities. If a
trichotomy of capabilities had to be formulated, then we postulate it would
likely split the state space of capabilities into several categories (see 1.1.1).
1.1.1. . Flavours of Capability
We consider the concept of a successful automatic exploit generator to be asso-
ciated with a handful of strategic and technical capabilities. These capabilities
can be brought to bear on existing software development lifecycles, including
software product testing. We can broadly categorise these capabilities, accord-
ing to the nature of their output, as informative, defensive and offensive capa-
bilities.
For instance, an offensive action might involve the production of a proof-
of-concept (PoC) exploit for executing arbitrary code. A defensive actionmight
involve the formulation of a software patch that renders the aforementioned
exploit ineffective. Whilst the ability to ascertain whether a given vulnerability
is exploitable is clearly useful in providing security intelligence, without being
acted upon, it is neither a strictly defensive nor offensive action, and is therefore
classified as informative.
Historically, automated bug-finding and vulnerability scanners have been
passive systems in that they did not change the exploitability of the vulnera-
bilities they found. Informative capabilities merely involve the disclosure of a
bug or security vulnerability within the program under test. For example, an
automated test could reveal bugs in a product during the testing phase of the
software lifecycle, before a final release is due [35]. This mode of operation
is the most popular for automated testing tools, such as fuzzers. It is almost
4 Introduction
never necessary to produce a working exploit in order to recognise that a vul-
nerability is present and demands fixing.
For example, an automated patch generator [21] aims to shorten the vul-
nerability window that exists from the discovery of a vulnerability to the for-
mulation of a patch-based fix. While some degree of automation has been
achieved in academic literature, we have not yet witnessed the emergence of
end-to-end self-healing software for practical use. In general, autonomous de-
fensive and offensive systems have not yet reached the desired level of maturity
to provide a worth-while cost-to-benefit ratio. Advances in the fields of sym-
bolic execution [47, 12] and constraint solving [25] are likely to enable addi-
tional practicality in the future.
1.1.2. . Summary of Automation Benefits
We associate numerous benefits with the successful inception of an automated
exploit development pipeline. We have summarised the main benefits of ex-
ploit generation into a concise, easily-remembered and catchy principle called
SSS. The acronym SSS stands for Speed, Simplicity, and Scale. In a nutshell,
these are aspectswe consider to bemost important for current general-purpose
exploit generation systems. Let us elaborate further:
1. Speed: We seek the ability to generate exploits at computer speeds. It is
claimed that on average a zero-day vulnerability remains open for 300
days. Operating at computer efficiency, we can maximise strategic tech-
nical advantage by isolating the vulnerability quicker, and weaponizing
it sooner than a manual evaluation otherwise would.
However, there are many more advantages to out-sourcing tasks to ma-
chines besides the obvious aspect of having increased speed. Machines
are measurably better than human analysts at specific types of problem
solving. For example, their ability to carry out millions of repetitive and
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laborious calculations without loss of precision makes them ideal for ac-
complishing brute force enumerations of program state space.
2. Simplicity: Decreasing the system’s reliance on expert input would in
turn permit its use by non-expert operators. As such, it could become a
tactical point-and-shoot device by cyber warfare operators 1.
3. Scale: Decoupling a semi-automated process, consisting of a symbiosis
of a user’s contextual reasoning and machine logic, from its dependence
on human input paves the way to full automation. The ability to fully
automate is then a prerequisite for scaling the system ad infinitum to
a distributed set of processors. Systems based on symbolic execution
would proceed along the lines of distributing and balancing program
exploration trees among nodes [15].
1.1.3. . Generating Security Intelligence
Actionable Intelligence It should be an objective of modern AEG systems
to produce informative reports. Preferably, reports of such granularity and
specificity so as to constitute actionable intelligence. It can also be the case
that a system does not necessarily know enough to act. For example, the pro-
duction of a software patch requires sufficient insight into the root cause of a
vulnerability that undesirable program states can be precluded from execut-
ing, while other legitimate and benign states are permitted without injury. In
other words, defensive measures should not impede functionality. For exam-
ple, shutting down a vulnerable program to prevent exploitation is a feasible
defensive reaction, but not considered to be a satisfactory patch.
1DARPA’s foundational cyberwarfare program (https://www.darpa.mil/program/
plan-x)
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RestrictedModels In practice, automatic exploit generators are not equipped
with every possible technique for software exploitation. Furthermore, they
generally do not conduct exhaustive searches for exploitable techniques, but
tend to prioritise known techniques and vulnerabilities, and attempt exhaus-
tive searches (within reason) of the target set. Many types of vulnerabilities,
such as low-profile integer overflows, can only cause denial-of-service effects
in isolation. However, in combination with a subsequent buffer overflow, ar-
bitrary code executionmay be feasible. Thus, multiple low-impact vulnerabili-
ties can be chained together to create amore severe effect. Because current aca-
demic automatic exploit generators tend to focus on particular (usually novel)
classes of vulnerabilities, ascertaining the combined effect of multiple vulner-
abilities from different vulnerability classes might elude the authors.
1.1.4. . Software Intrusions
Strategic Effort AEG systems [42, 5] have demonstrated the ability to pro-
duce working zero-day exploits within seconds of processing a vulnerable bi-
nary [13]. Needless to say, such an offensive capability is a formidable force
in the hands of an attacker, or an ethical penetration tester with authorisation
to explore computer networks. Given no false positives, producing a proof-
of-concept exploit demonstrates beyond doubt that a vulnerability is real and
is practically exploitable. Advancing the field of automatic exploit generation
is a mandatory scientific step in the effort to ascertain an adversary’s future
theoretical and practical ability to mount attacks on computer systems.
1.1.5. . Goals of Software Protection
Defensive Efforts Developing functioning AEG systems allows us to plan and
test novel defensive counter-measures that thwart their effectiveness. Thismight
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assist in future attempts to defend software, and by extension perhaps entire
networks, against automated cyber assaults.
Severity Rating One of the benefits that AEG brings is the ability to auto-
matically determine whether a given vulnerability can be exploited . It is of-
ten desirable to know the severity level of a vulnerability. Such a severity rat-
ing would depend on whether an attacker is theoretically capable of crafting
a working exploit for the vulnerability. The severity or criticality of a vulner-
ability is a measure of the impact that its misuse could potentially cause. By
definition, the most severe vulnerability is one which leads to arbitrary code
execution.
Feature Prediction AEG systems have the potential to provide fine-grained
defences on a per-vulnerability basis. The structure of an output exploit re-
flects what an attacker’s packet could ormight have to look like. For example, a
header field in the packet may be necessarily malformed to trigger an underly-
ing vulnerability. This information could form the basis of a signaturewhich is
fed into intrusion detection and prevention systems that could then filter out
malicious packets.
Common Denominator However, attackers are known to create different
permutations of an exploit. This can be done for various reasons, for example,
using self-decoding alphanumeric characters instead of binary to pass through
a filter. In order to produce a decent IDS signature, the AEG system could gen-
erate all possible variations of an exploit and extract the essence by computing
the common denominator.
A common denominator could be considered a set of parts that are com-
mon to allmanufactured variations of the exploit, such as the usage of an exotic
flag in a header field which triggers the vulnerability in the first place. In that
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respect, the usage of the header field would not be optional when exploiting
the vulnerability in question and an attacker’s exploit would have to contain it
regardless of any payload encoding. Producing a description of exploit invari-
ants could be the subject of future work.
Limited Assertions Occasionally, exploit generators can determine through
the use of logical predicates whether it is theoretically possible to exploit a vul-
nerability in a particular way (whether conditions satisfy a model). However,
this fact alone does not establish whether this limitation extends to other sys-
tems that utilise different models.
The same methods are used to establish whether a particular algorithm
does not contain a bug, e.g. if the precondition for copying one buffer into
another contains a statement about a buffer’s limited length.
1.21.2 Heap Exploit Synthesis
This section presents a light overview of the specific problem subset that is
tackled in this thesis.
Heap managers The heap memory manager is a fundamental component
of modern software systems. It is responsible for the provision, organisation,
and optimisation of dynamically allocatedmemory. Applications can compute
their memory requirements based on user input and request memory at run-
time from the heapmanager using malloc() or HeapAlloc() calls. The heap
manager keeps track of free memory chunks and, upon receiving a request
for memory of a particular size, it services the request by searching its list of
free chunks and returning a chunk greater than, or equal to, that requested by
the client application. The application is then entrusted with respecting the
boundaries of the memory chunk. It is also entrusted with releasing it back
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to the heap manager by deallocating it, by invoking free() or HeapFree(),
once it is no longer required.
Security vs Efficiency The heap manager is a fundamental component of
modern operating systems, servicing dynamic requests for memory thousands
of times per second. Even a fractional decrease in the efficiency of this well-
oiled mechanism would have a dramatic knock-on effect on the efficiency of
all running applications. This incentivizes the design team to make the heap
perform as quickly as possible - and in computational terms, this in turn im-
plies performing as few operational steps as possible to achieve an objective.
Therefore, the argument for placingmetadata adjacent to user chunks is proba-
bly an efficiency argument. Since the client application keeps track of allocated
memory, and supplies a pointer to every heap call, the heap can always rather
conveniently compute the location of metadata relative to the pointer supplied
by the user. However, strictly from a security standpoint, the inter-mixing of
internal heap metadata with user-controlled content is fertile ground for the
potential corruption of critical heap data structures.
Buffer Boundary Violations If an application erroneously permits user in-
put to be written past the boundaries of an allocated chunk, there is a non-
negligible possibility of user input overwriting adjacent heap metadata. The
consequences of this action depend on the type of metadata positioned after
the chunk, as well as the subsequent set of operations that is performed on the
corrupted metadata.
Exploit Synthesis Our objective is to ascertain the necessary and sufficient
program conditions for conducting heap metadata attacks against arbitrary
heap managers and client applications. Every metadata corruption attack re-
volves around the creation or generation of metadata, and the invocation of
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heap operations that unsafely manipulate that metadata. Therefore, an at-
tacker, or an attacker-mimetic automated system, must ask the following ques-
tions to ascertain a valid attack technique:
• What metadata does a series of heap actions generate?
• Which metadata is sensitive and which is impervious to corruption?
• How does one reproduce a sequence of heap actions in the target?
Using the aforementioned ingredients, an exploit formula is created and
designed to be solved using SMT solvers. Any solution to the exploit formula
would constitute a concrete input to the program that upon instantiationwould
execute arbitrary code.
1.31.3 Project Solution
This section provides an overall description of the project as a practicalmanifestation of our attempt at solving the problem. We explore the
project objectives (Section 1.3.1), the problem statement (Section 1.3.2), and
the project scope (Section 1.3.3), which comments on properties such as gen-
erality.
1.3.1. . Project Objectives
This section presents our initial goals. We began by seeking to make a contri-
bution to the emerging field of automatic exploit generation. Previouswork had
analysed stack-based buffer overflows and string-format bugs. In this work, we
choose to explore heap vulnerabilities, as they are the next major type or class
of vulnerability that is still left unexplored.
At the same time, we recognise that previous work had mostly dealt with
smaller console applications, including the bin utilities. The vast majority of
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these were native to Linux and only a handful were cross-platform and ran on
Windows. We aim to support a new platform that may produce novel insights
into the exploit generation problem and could expand existing capability to
new territory. Taking that into account, we pursue the generation of exploits
for larger graphics-based Windows applications that more closely resembled
our idea of what real-world targets would look like.
1.3.2. . Problem Statement
Our objective is to ascertain thenecessary and sufficient programconditions for
conducting heap metadata attacks against arbitrary heap managers and client
applications.
Our problem statement can therefore be phrased as follows: 1) given an
arbitrary heap manager, find the set and order of heap calls that generate, ma-
nipulate into corruption and unsafely interpret metadata 2) recreate the set of
heap calls in a target application, which in conjunction with buffer boundary
violations, can result in arbitrary code execution.
1.3.3. . Project Scope
In this thesis, we restrict ourselves to read, write and allocation exploit prim-
itives. Therefore, we define a heap vulnerability as an application vulnerabil-
ity that allows an attacker to manipulate heap metadata into executing an ex-
ploit primitive for writing attacker-controlled data to an attacker-controlled
location, reading memory from attacker-influenced addresses and allocating
attacker-influences memory. Our goal is to design an algorithm that is com-
plete (or as complete as possible) for this subclass of heap-related vulnerabili-
ties, and that finds and uses these exploit primitives in heapmanagement code.
One of the self-imposed limitation of our work is that we do not deal with
explicitly overcoming exploit mitigations. In other words, we don’t construct
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logic to automatically convert exploits that work under relaxed conditions into
exploits that defeat mitigations. That being said, our algorithms for locating
new vectors leading to heap exploit primitives will, as a side effect, find paths
that bypass security checks. This is a consequence of the dynamic exploration
of a target.
We have tackled the issue of generality throughout our work. This is partly
due to the fact that the notion of a heap exploit problem suggests a unitary con-
cept of a heap, which in turn should have a single solution. Unfortunately,
this is a misrepresentation: there are in fact multiple diverse heaps and corre-
sponding implementations. The challenge in formulating a solution lies in the
difficulty of abstracting away the unique features of these heaps. Therefore, a
more straightforward solution might want to treat each implementation indi-
vidually, and merely automate the tasks involved in exploit generation. This
would make the system dependent on a user-supplied model and most likely
require the expenditure of effort on manual reverse engineering.
1.41.4 Project Result
This section introduces the results of the undertaken work, our uniquecontributions (Section 1.4.1), and the structure of this thesis (Section 1.4.2).
1.4.1. . Project Contributions
Our work has made the following contributions:
• Our work introduces the first formalisation of the heap exploit problem.
We begin by introducing heap-based vulnerabilities in the context of the
automatic exploit generation problem. We then explain the key chal-
lenges of the problem and analyse the steps required for any successful
exploit in this class of attacks.
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• We create working heap exploits automatically. We propose a modular
approach based on symbolic execution to automatically find (i) reusable
attack patterns against heapmanagers and (ii) instances of these patterns
in real-world applications.
• Do so against large real-world Windows applications. Unlike in related
research, we do not workwith applications reduced to an easier-to-parse
version of Linux system calls. We modelled existing and complex Win-
dows APIs to achieve symbolic byte injection.
• Present a systematic way to locate heap exploit primitives. By show-
ing how exploit primitives can be modelled as for example, the flow of
symbolic data to symbolic destinations, we demonstrate a method for
systematically enumerating a target for exploit primitives used in heap
attacks.
1.4.2. . Document Structure
The remainder of this document is organised in the following manner:
• Chapter 1 is this introductory chapter;
• Chapter 2 provides a collection of scenarioswhere security exploits (such
as those produced in later chapters) might find real-world applications;
this, in turn, provides motivation for the rest of our work;
• Chapter 3 provides a brief background to a number of preliminary top-
ics, such as symbolic execution, that underpin our work and help in un-
derstanding the remainder of our material;
• Chapter 4 presents the basics of dynamic allocation routines, heapman-
agers andhowmetadata corruption attacks seek to influence proper heap
manager behaviour;
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• Chapter 5 discusses how to formulate a set of ordered heap interac-
tions that facilitatemetadata attacks andmay provide guidance to search
heuristics;
• Chapter 6 covers a selection of existing heap metadata attacks against
the default heap managers used in various popular operating systems;
• Chapter 7 presents our empirical results and the parameters and limita-
tions of applying exploit construction techniques;
• Chapter 8 summarises the covered topics and provides a conclusion to
the document.
CHAPTER 2
Exploits in Cyber Warfare
Cyberspace is increasingly embraced as the 5th domain of war-fare, in addition to land, sea, air and space. Each of the fourphysical domains requires distinctweapons, whichmust be ca-pable of infiltrating enemy territory and deploying a payload.
Cyber weapons are, in principle, equivalent to physical weaponry, but the na-
ture of weapons in cyberspace is often poorly defined andmisunderstood. De-
spite several governments now stating that they are running cyber warfare pro-
grammes and actively developing cyber weapons, it is not clear exactly what is
meant by this. In this chapter, we consider the nature of cyber weapons, as
well as the differences and similarities to physical weaponry. In particular, we
consider the differences in the intelligence requirements for the development,
deployment and assessment of physical and cyber weapons and discuss how
concepts such as assurance, proliferation, deterrence, Collateral Damage Mod-
elling and Battle Damage Assessment apply to such weapons. We pay particular
attention to the role that software exploits play in cyber weapons and contrast
the properties of exploits, such as longevity and development costs, with those
of physical weaponry.
This section presents the role that exploits play in offensive cyber scenarios.
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Exploits are considered to be important ingredients of cyber weapons, as they
are instrumental in enabling the violation of fundamental security assump-
tions in target systems, which, in turn, facilitates the infiltration of an arbi-
trary payload. Furthermore, we explore the nature of the supply chain for cyber
weapons and consider the shift from the established leviathan of the defence
industry, which traditionally provides physical weaponry, to the shadowy un-
derground markets that are a rich source of cyber weapon ingredients. Finally,
we elaborate on the challenges of acquiring exploits from diverse sources and
discuss how the evolution of the vulnerability market may shape the future of
cyber weapons, cyber warfare, and in turn, all future conflict.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing fashion:
• Section 2.1 introduces the common denominators and differing charac-
teristics and properties of physical and cyber weaponry,
• Section 2.2 introduces military-theoretic concepts, such as intelligence
requirements and proliferation, and applies them to exploits in cyber
weapons,
• Section 2.3 explores the procurement of conventional physicalweaponry
and contrasts it with the wide variety of sources that supply exploit code,
• Section 2.4 discusses properties of cyber weaponry, such as longevity
and development costs, with that of conventional weaponry,
• and Section 2.6 outlines how an exploit generation system can be de-
scribed as an autonomous participant in cyber defence exercises.
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2.12.1 Introduction
In this section, we briefly introduce the basic concepts of cyberspace, phys-ical weaponry and the recent conjunction of the two, cyber weaponry.
2.1.1. . Cyberspace
There are numerous definitions of cyberspace [24], [62]. For the purposes of
this thesis, we define cyberspace as the virtual environment created and facil-
itated by computing devices. Cyberspace is the environment and medium in
which data is stored, e-mails are sent and commands are delivered. Documents
and photos, which exist as objects in this environment, can be manipulated,
destroyed or stolen just like their counterparts in physical space. Cyberspace
is also the 5th domain of warfare, in addition to land, sea, air and space. Cyber
warfare will be conducted through the domain of cyberspace and like other
forms of warfare, will not be conducted in isolation, but will merely constitute
one component of a grander, all-domain war.
2.1.2. . Physical Weaponry
Western countries have progressed frommeasuringmilitary strength by count-
ing weapons, a quantitative view, to focusing primarily on capability, a qualita-
tive view. An aircraft requires trained pilots, appropriate tactics, fuel, runways
and radars to be operated effectively. Thus, a model of military capability that
quantifies the number of aircraft in possession, but excludes from consider-
ation the aforementioned elements that are critical to its operation, is both
incomplete and inaccurate. A more sensible measurement would express that
a nation state has the capability to, for example, strike a hundred targets from
the air, every day for two weeks, whilst facing a semi-sophisticated adversary.
In addition, the important factor is the effect that can be delivered. A useful
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effect may be to disable an airfield for a period of time, rather than destroy it.
Superficial comparisons of weaponry across domains are too coarsely defined
to be meaningful. For example, is a soldier’s rifle more useful than an aircraft
carrier, or a piece of malware? Rather than comparing an aircraft carrier to
a piece of malware, the capability that can be delivered through each should
be considered. Cyber weapons might be less generic, more bespoke and have
a much lower shelf life than physical weaponry. However, they may in turn
be quicker and cheaper to generate. Ultimately, it is the capability that can be
utilised, the longevity of that capability, the effect that can be delivered and the
total economic cost that matters.
2.1.3. . Cyber Weaponry
A cyber weapon is the digital manifestation of the military’s traditional con-
cept of a weapon and is a tool for effecting cyber power. A nation’s cyber power
is defined as being its dominance and supremacy in cyberspace. In the event of
military conflict, it is likely that cyber warfare will not be conducted in isola-
tion, but rather in combinationwith, the other four domains of warfare. Strate-
gically speaking, it is more advantageous to temporarily disable and seize a tar-
get’s infrastructure by electronicmeans than to permanently damage it beyond
recovery using kinetic means. Cyber weapons are particularly suited for infil-
trating targets that are difficult to reach via conventional weaponry, such as air
strikes. They may also be chosen for political reasons: a cyber attack, unlike
a kinetic strike, could operate below the international threshold for officially
declaring war and may thus be perceived as a safer option. Cyber infiltration
may be performed prior to the conflict or upon the anticipation of a military
intervention. Jet fighters are used to establish air supremacy before a ground
invasion commences; cyber attacks may precede kinetic attack and will, as a
prerequisite to kinetic warfare, establish cyber dominance. NATOhas recently
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extended its Article 5, i.e., an “attack on one is an attack on all” rule, to include
the class of cyber attacks. The Tallinn Manual1, at least in theory, justifies the
use of military force as retaliation for cyber attacks, if deemed proportional.
Case Scenario Unfortunately, there have only been a handful of discoveries
of cyber weapons in the public domain. After in-depth analysis, the Stuxnet
threat is considered to be a cyber extension of the nuclear non-proliferation
effort against Iran [29]. While a number of instances of complex worms, such
as Flame2 or Duqu3, have been attributed to Stuxnet-related actors and opera-
tions4, Stuxnet differentiates itself by engaging in explicit sabotage activity. It is
the only piece of malware from the aforementioned group that is known to be
constructed for conducting a cyber-physical attack as opposed to cyber espi-
onage. This distinction is significant. Cyber espionage tools, used in suspected
government-sponsored campaigns, are structurally and functionally similar to
existing spyware families developed by profit-driven criminal organisations.
On the other hand, sabotage of critical national infrastructure has not been
sufficiently demonstrated or popularised to-date.
2.22.2 Military-theoretic Concepts
In this section, we examine military concepts, such as the intelligence re-quirements for weapon development and deployment, proliferation and
Battle Damage Assessment. We discuss how these concepts apply to cyber
weaponry.
1Tallinn Manual (https://ccdcoe.org/research/tallinn-manual/)
2Wired article about Flame (https://www.wired.com/2012/05/flame/)
3Symantec report onDuqu (https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/
docs/security-center/white-papers/w32-duqu-11-en.pdf)
4RSA Conference: Followers of Stuxnet (https://www.rsaconference.com/
writable/presentations/file_upload/br-208_bencsath.pdf/)
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2.2.1. . Intelligence Requirements
There is a debate to be had about the level of intelligence required to construct
a cyber weapon, which is motivated by the observation that Stuxnet contained
a detailed configuration of its target. All weapon systems require a level of in-
telligence to develop and deploy. However, it has been argued that the devel-
opment of cyber weaponry requires a level of intelligence beyond that which is
necessary and sufficient for physical weaponry. As is claimed in [67]: “Building
and deploying Stuxnet required extremely detailed intelligence about the systems
it was supposed to compromise, and the same will be true for other dangerous
cyber weapons.” This appears to be a short-sighted extrapolation. Arguably,
the intelligence which informed Stuxnet’s construction merely facilitated bet-
ter target recognition and effect assurance.
Specificity Hostile groups of actors, such as cyber terrorists, who are inter-
ested in developing their own cyber weapons, can abandon high requirements
for stealth and may place less emphasis on assurance. In this thesis, we argue
that cyber weapons are more bespoke in nature that conventional weapons. A
spectrum dictating the quantity of knowledge required about the target and its
environment for the construction of a weapon would place a cyber weapon at
the high end, but this fact alone does not fundamentally make cyber weapons
distinct from physical weaponry.
Requirements A rifle is fairly generic in that it is re-usable in multiple, dif-
fering scenarios and its development requires very little intelligence about the
adversary. Conversely, aircraft and Air Defence Systems (ADS) exist in a con-
stant arms race and their development relies on detailed information about
the adversary. ADS are designed to detect and engage aircraft and aircraft are
designed to avoid detection and engagement by an ADS. The threat from par-



























Table 2.1: Intel requirements for weapon and defence
ticular air defence missiles can be mitigated through manoeuvring, low radar
visibility (stealth), low infra-red signatures, flares, chaff or electronic counter-
measures, but each of these techniques needs to be tailored towards the pre-
cise nature of the threat. Table 2.1 shows an example of the intelligence re-
quirements for some physical and cyber weaponry and their corresponding
defences.
Reconnaissance Phase If the reconnaissance phase undertaken preceding
Stuxnet’s development is an absolute requirement for the construction of a cy-
ber weapon, then it implies that quick mobilisation of cyber weapons to un-
known targets is generally not feasible. However, it is more likely the recon-
naissance served to facilitate stealth and comply with legal requirements - a
high standard, not necessarily shared by all hostile threat actors. Nation states
will likely attempt to challenge this assumption by aiming to develop less spe-
cific payloads that can be deployed without a priori knowledge of the target’s
infrastructure. Thus, more automation on behalf of the cyber weapon will be
desired. In order to formulate an effective disruption procedure on-the-fly, a
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higher level understanding of industrial control processes would be required
than has previously been demonstrated by discovered cyber-physical weapons.
2.2.2. . Proliferation
Proliferation of physical weaponry is a key concern for governments and mil-
itary commanders. Although the defence industry is an important economic
asset for many countries, the fear of weapon proliferation means that restric-
tive laws on the export of sophisticated weaponry and participation in non-
proliferation treaties is still necessary. In physicalmilitary conflicts, such as the
domestic conflict in Syria, external parties are wary of supplying arms to par-
ticular sides, due to the likelihood that they will eventually fall into the wrong
hands.
Precision Strikes The reverse engineering of Stuxnet’s payload revealed at-
tack procedures which demonstrated that, at least in this particular case, the
physical equipment and configuration of the cyber weapon’s target was well-
known to the developers. Thus, the deployment of Stuxnet was likely pre-
ceded by extensive cyber-, or perhaps even human-espionage, aimed at gath-
ering technical information about the target. Acquired information was sub-
sequently directly incorporated into the cyber weapon to enhance its ability
to recognise the target. If such detailed information about a target is available
either prior to deployment or at the development phase, the developers may
attempt to hardcode the weapon’s payload against the target environment, in
order to bothminimise proliferation and achieve a greater degree of assurance.
Digital Non-proliferation However, the cyber nature of the payload brings
into question the effectiveness of non-proliferation safeguards. The usage of
an exploit in a cyber weapon potentially exposes, upon detection, the exploit
code to untrustworthy parties and this can even lead to its public disclosure.
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Exploits present in discovered cyber espionage tools, such as Duqu, have since
been reverse-engineered and integrated into popular exploit kits, including
Blackhole. The exploit kits are subsequently made available on underground
forums andhacker communities to any paying customer, including cyber crim-
inals. These kits are used for the propagation of profit-makingmalware, such as
spam- or ransomware. The principle of exposure extends to any other technol-
ogy present in the cyber weapon. For instance, Flame contained and exposed
a new variation of the chosen-prefix attack on the MD5 cryptographic hash.
2.2.3. . Battle Damage and Collateral Damage Assessment
The advancement of global media, rapidly improving communication tech-
niques, citizen journalism and a shifting moral landscape have all contributed
to an increased sensitivity to civilian casualties, especially in western coun-
tries. Militaries now invest a huge amount of time and expense attempting
to avoid collateral damage. These efforts take the form of precision targeting
and a shift towards attacks which temporarily disable rather than destroy the
infrastructure of a state. At the heart of this is the process of Collateral Dam-
age Modelling (CDM), which seeks to model expected collateral damage from
pre-planned actions, such as airstrikes. The results of CDM are assessed by
lawyers and commanders before an attack is conducted, in order to determine
if an attack is legal, proportionate, justifiable and militarily advantageous. In
a crude sense, CDM helps to determine if the positive effect of the attack is
worth the potential consequences. The calculations behind CDM are based
upon decades of military experience and advanced knowledge of explosives
and their effects on different materials.
Situational Awareness There is an ongoing effort to build systems that ab-
stract the intricacies of cyberspace from non-technical operators [20] in order
to make the problem of situational awareness and strategizing in cyberspace
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more tractable. The aim is to develop point-and-click interfaces for tools, such
as rootkits or file wipers, thereby requiring operators to possess little or no un-
derstanding for the underlying techniques. In the cyberspace realm, assurance
manifests itself as certainty about the effects of cyber-physical attacks, as well
as the second or third degree effects that follow. For example, if a cyber unit
is authorised to de-activate a network node used by a foreign military unit,
it must be determined that the network node does not, for example, service
sensitive parts of civilian infrastructure, such as a hospital. The prerequisite
to understanding the effects of potential cyber or cyber-physical attacks is the
construction of a detailed topology of the target network. Consequently, the
need for such mapping may be used as a justification for pre-emptive cyber
intrusions. Furthermore, cyber situational awareness demands that networks
of interest be monitored on an ongoing basis, such that each network node in
existence is discovered in near real-time.
2.2.4. . Cyber Deterrence
As is written in [70]: “the capacity to hurt another state is now used as a moti-
vating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state’s behaviour”.
The concept of deterrence embodies the effecting of negative consequences in
direct response to the action being deterred. Deterrence is often generated by
parading weapons or deploying aircraft carriers and does not merely revolve
around the possession of military hardware, but primarily around displaying
capability and intent to harm an adversary. A nuclear deterrent is only viewed
as a credible threat, and thus an effective deterrent, if the state in possession of
it has both the capability to deploy it and also thewillingness to do so. An argu-
ment is oftenmade against the applicability of cyber weapons as a tool of deter-
rence. Cyber weapons are difficult to parade and once exposed, a weapon may
quickly become redundant. An infiltration mechanism that exploits a zero-
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day vulnerability becomes ineffective once discovered, as the vulnerability in
question can be patched and the attack vector neutralised. As is argued in [68]:
“cyber weapons are hard to brandish.”
Capability-centric However, the argument against the effectiveness of cy-
ber deterrence over-emphasises the weapon itself and does not recognise the
capability that was demonstrated as being central to the deterrent. The Stuxnet
cyber weapon serves as a potential cyber deterrent, but not due to the various
specifics of the weapon itself, which are rather tangential to the deterrent, but
because it demonstrated that a nation state has the capability and the willing-
ness to launch sophisticated cyber attacks against other states in pursuit of its
political objectives. When former British Defence Secretary announced that
the UK was developing cyber weapons programmes [61], it is probable that
the aim of the announcement was to re-assure the UK populous of the UK’s
ability to defend itself after extensive cuts to the military. However, it is also
likely that his words were designed to act as a cyber deterrent to hostile na-
tions. Cyber deterrence is provided by the perceived capacity of one state to
hurt another state via cyberspace. The capacity is advertised not through the
threat of specific cyber weapons, but by the demonstration of capability and
intent through previously-conducted attacks or political statements.
2.32.3 Supply Chain
In this section, we explore the procurement of conventional physicalweaponryand contrast it with the wide variety of sources that supply exploit code.
2.3.1. . Physical weapons procurement
The supply chain for physical weapons is well-established and each procure-
ment falls into one, or a combination of, the following categories: 1) in-house
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development 2) outsourcing of development to defence contractors 3) pro-
curement on the open market 4) and procurement on the black market. The
more advanced military nations tend to develop weapons themselves or con-
tract out their specific requirements, whereas less advanced nations will pro-
cure what they can on either the open or blackmarkets. The cost and complex-
ity of physical weaponry makes their development the domain of big business.
2.3.2. . Cyber Weapon Ingredients
Procurement methods for cyber weapon ingredients, such as exploits, are sim-
ilar to that of physical weaponry. When it comes to cyberspace there are nu-
merous sources that can supply zero-day, one-day, private and public exploits
for use in offensive cyber operations, namely:
1. Well-resourced teams of security researchers can find and develop ex-
ploits in-house,
2. Government-grade exploits can be purchased from trusted vendors,
3. Many exploits are freely-available from security databases in the public
domain,
4. Privately-developed exploits can be purchased on the black market.
Covert Interdiction Avulnerabilitymay also be covertly inserted into a prod-
uct at the development stage, also known as supply chain interdiction. This per-
mits a party that is in-the-know an advanced knowledge of vulnerabilities that
will be present in the infrastructure of the target. This principle can be gener-
alised to the compromising of a supply chain, allowing for the covert insertion
of a vulnerability without the manufacturer’s knowledge or consent.
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Exploit Sourcing Firstly, well-resourced teams of security researchers can
find and develop exploits in-house. This is a costly operation and would likely
not cover the entire spectrum of vulnerabilities discovered in the public do-
main. Such efforts most likely exist, especially for specialist software, but are
likely not used as the sole source of vulnerabilities for cyber weapons pro-
grammes.
Secondly, government-grade exploits can be purchased from commercial
security outfits, such as VUPEN (nowZerodium5), that sell exclusively to intel-
ligence and law enforcement agencies. It is claimed that VUPEN’s motivation
to provide exploit code to government agencies stemmed from commercial
software vendors’ unwillingness to compensate security researchers fairly for
the disclosure of vulnerabilities. The immaturity of the vulnerability market
and possible methods for its augmentation have been the subject of much de-
bate in recent years.
Thirdly, public security databases, such as ExploitDB6 ormilw0rm, provide
public exploit codewhich is also often integrated into penetration testing tools,
such as Metasploit7.
And finally, security researchers or blackhat hackers may auction valuable
exploit code on the underground market. However, obtaining exploits from
questionable sources potentially limits the reliability and secrecy (exclusive
disclosure) of the cyber weapon ingredients.
2.3.3. . Exclusivity of Rights
It is in the interest of weapon authors to establish the identity of the researchers
responsible for the discovery of a vulnerability. A government will ideally want
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propriate security clearance. In particular, if Stuxnet developers purchased ex-
ploits from an untrusted black-market source, there would be an operational
security concern about the source reselling the exploits to other parties, in
breach of contract. If the intended target of the Stuxnet attack also maintained
a cyber weapons programme and thus managed to acquire and defend against
these particular exploits, it could lead to the early discovery of Stuxnet and its
subsequent analysis.
2.3.4. . Vulnerability Equities Process
Unlike conventional weaponry, such as assault rifles, exploit code is subject to
the principle of exposure and loss and thus mandates an equities process. It
is often claimed [66] that the dual role of signals intelligence agencies, such
as NSA, namely, the computer network exploitation (CNE) mission to infil-
trate foreign systems and the information assurance (IA) mission to protect
US government systems are at odds with one another with respect to vulnera-
bility disclosure. Official documents show8that there exists an equities process
to determinewhether a vulnerability discovered or disclosed to theUS govern-
ment should be released as a public security advisory or withheld for national
security purposes. The argument for full-disclosure of vulnerabilities states
that a vulnerability which serves the interests of the US intelligence commu-
nity can equally be utilised to break into the systems of US corporations to, for
example, exfiltrate data from the financial or defence sector. In effect, the in-
telligence community would be sacrificing those vulnerable systems in favour
of maintaining an advantage in offensive cyber operations.
8WhiteHouse report (https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/
files/images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF)
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2.42.4 Properties of CyberWeapon Ingredients
This section will contrast properties of exploits, such as longevity and de-velopment costs, with that of conventional weaponry.
2.4.1. . Longevity and Development Costs
The longevity of exploit code refers to the time-frame during which the exploit
is effective against a target. Generally speaking, the target is vulnerable until
a patch that closes the respective vulnerability is applied. However, in prac-
tise, the time-frame is slightly shorter: the disclosure of a vulnerability already
prompts users to, for example, shut down or limit the affected service, until a
patch is made available by the vendor. It is also not uncommon for vulnerabil-
ities to be independently discovered by analysts studying the same code. The
usage of exploits in cyber weapons has to be timely, i.e., the target must be vul-
nerable at the time of attack, and geared towards the application and platform
employed by the target, i.e., exploits are configuration-specific.
Whitebox analysis Theability to utilise exploits would be drastically affected
if the target used closed-source software that is not obtainable by the attack-
ers. Developing an exploit for a black-box piece of software, while theoret-
ically possible, would range from inefficient to practically impossible, even
under a relaxation of the stealth requirement that is up-held at infiltration.
Due to the ongoing technological arms race, many machines used to oversee
nuclear-related equipment or national critical infrastructure are running off-
the-shelf commercial software, such as the Windows operating system, rather
than custom-built operating systems. In the case of Stuxnet, the mere fact that
the Windows operating system was employed by the target helped to provide
a well-studied attack surface for which exploits are available from a wide va-
riety of sources - this blueprint may not necessarily hold true for future cyber
30 Exploits in Cyber Warfare
Devel Cost Longevity Procure Exposure &
Loss







20 years Defense sec-
tor
Moderate
Exploit11 $30,000 12 months Highly
diversified
High
Table 2.2: Properties of physical and cyber weaponry
attacks. Table 2.2 shows and contrasts the individual properties of cyber and
physical weaponry.
Hard Targets Attackers may suffer from a genuine lack of exploit diversity
for less-studied platforms, effectively granting security by obscurity to poten-
tially vulnerable systems. Thedevelopment cost associatedwith an exploit cov-
ers either the cost of discovering and crafting an exploit for a vulnerability or
the procurement of an exploit ready for fielding from one of the many avail-
able sources. Although there exists no standard protocol for quantifying the
monetary value of an exploit, its value is generally proportional to the product
of the number of affected computer users and the severity of the vulnerability.
2.4.2. . Fragility of Exploits
The reliance of cyber weapons on software exploits for infiltration makes the
method extremely fragile. Any changes to the target software, such as a reg-
ular update or even the enabling or disabling of program features, can render
the exploit ineffective. Minor changes to the target system might not affect
exploitability, but may nevertheless demand modifications to the exploit code.
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probability that a secondary attack vector will exist if the first vector expires.
Thus, in order to maintain the feasibility of attacking the target, the attacker
needs to maintain a pool of up-to-date exploits while the target’s system un-
dergoes updates, patches and configuration changes.
2.4.3. . Modularity of CyberWeapons
A dedicated team of people are most likely responsible for maintaining a pool
of current and working exploits for a range of target systems and a separate
team is in turn responsible for developing mission-specific payloads. Exploits
for zero-day vulnerabilities are fed into dropper modules that install the pay-
load of the cyber weapon. With such modularity, the exploits can be swapped
in and out without affecting the rest of the payload body. The modularity of
Stuxnet is highlighted in [29] and it is claimed that the payload code was writ-
ten by “more experienced” programmers and likely developed earlier, before
the addition of a dropper module. The modularity suggests that various com-
ponents, such as exploits, droppers, payloads and backdoors can be combined
in various ways to suit operational requirements. It hints at the possibility of
a larger development framework for government-sponsored malware. An ex-
piration date is suggestive of a continuous roll-out of new worm variants with
enhanced capabilities and improved features.
2.52.5 Implications for FutureWarfare
In this section, we examine the consequences of cyber weapons and theirinfiltration mechanisms being dependent on a continuous and live source
of exploit code for target platforms. Just as aircraft need a constant supply of
pilots and fuel, cyber weaponry requires a constant supply of vulnerabilities
and exploits.
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2.5.1. . Export Controls
Unlike conventional firearms, such as handguns or assault rifles, there are as-
yet no export restrictions on software exploits. This makes exploits generally
more accessible to any interested party than conventional weaponry. Further-
more, the digital-based nature of exploits, in contrast to the physical nature
of firearms, permits for easier and more covert trade across state boundaries.
Export restrictions have previously been proposed for exploits in academic lit-
erature in order to curb themarket for cyber weapons [79]. Arguments against
placing export restrictions on exploits can be likened to arguments for the re-
moval of US cryptographic export controls, involving PGP12, dating back a few
decades. In the near future, governments may attempt to shape the commer-
cial marketplace for exploits by placing restrictions on exports and offering
licenses to security researchers. It is debatable whether such a move will affect
the underground market, whether it will increase general security or simply
shift power towards cyber criminals.
Existing Efforts Recent unauthorised disclosures by Edward Snowden sug-
gest that the NSA has allegedly attempted to shape the commercial market-
place for cryptographic products in order to make the task of breaking cryp-
tographic codes more tractable. A parallel action against the exploit market
could, in theory, be undertaken.
2.5.2. . Stockpiling for Defense and Immunity
This raises the question of whether it is worth-while for governments to pur-
chase exploits for cyber defence reasons. Under the assumption that a cyber
weapon deployed against a nation state would make use of an exploit, the pur-
chase of exploits would present an opportunity for detecting the cyber weapon
12Original PGP (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy)
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at an early stage of deployment or an opportunity for disarming a cyber oppo-
nent preemptively. Companies such as VUPEN claim to possess exploits that
bypass all exploit mitigations, including the widely-deployed DEP, ASLR and
sandbox-security measures. Commercial vendors of exploits are known to be
partially stockpiling for business purposes. VUPEN is known to hang onto
vulnerabilities for years in order to profit from demonstrating exploitation of
popular products at bug-bounty competitions such as Pwn2Own.
Defense-in-depth The UK’s national technical authority for information as-
surance recommends that a defence-in-depth strategy should be applied to
avoid having a critical system compromised using an exploit for a zero-day
vulnerability [36]. Software verification tools are generally not sufficiently ma-
ture to guarantee correctness of execution for all inputs on large and complex
systems.
Formal Security The release of a micro-kernel [4] with a formal proof of
security presents a new challenge to security researchers. The design of the
kernel is secure with respect to a formal specification. Finding vulnerabilities
in the kernel would entail finding behaviours that are not classified as bugs or
vulnerabilities, but nevertheless permit an attacker to exercise arbitrary unin-
tended control over the kernel. For example, it may require the discovery of a
new class of vulnerabilities.
2.5.3. . Evolution of the Vulnerability Market
As the vulnerability market develops, it will inevitably be shaped by the prin-
ciples of supply and demand. If there is a demand for a particular exploit, eco-
nomic forces will see to it that it is supplied. The state monopoly on warfare
will be weakened as the barriers that normally restrict entry into this enter-
prise will be broken down. An adaptable and responsive vulnerability market
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will provide exploits to anyone matching the asking price, facilitating an influx
of non-state groupings into the business of cyber war. Warfare will become
increasingly balkanised as sub-state interest groups use cyberspace to pursue
their own agendas outside of state control. The outcome of this decentralisa-
tion ofwarfare is difficult to predict, but the inevitable rise of the exploitmarket
will ensure that warfare will never be the same again.
2.62.6 Future Vision
We prefer to formulate the solution to the problem as an autonomous partici-
pant in cyber defence exercises and capture the flag (CTF) competitions.
Cyber defence exercises Cyber defence exercises are live simulations of cy-
ber attack and defence scenarios. Typically, two or more teams of cyber spe-
cialists are pitched against each other to compete for control over individual
computers or networks of computers. The exercises are held for the purpose of
training and evaluating a cyber unit’s readiness, technical aptitude and effec-
tiveness at offensive and defensive strategy in the cyber domain. Participants
in defence exercises are logically divided into red teams and blue teams, whose
responsibility is to attempt attack in real-time and to defend against ongoing
attacks, respectively.
Military organisations, penetration testing companies and computer secu-
rity conferences, among many others, run annual cyber defence exercises and
competitions. A popular instantiation of cyber defence exercises is the attack-
/defence model employed by capture-the-flag competitions.
The CTF principium The CTF principium brings to the discipline of com-
puter security a competitive sharp-edge, wherein a developed understanding
of cyber security is effectively wielded in a time-sensitive context, and the
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motto “knowledge is power” is routinely materialised. The objective of CTF
competitions is to distill the present-day wide-spectrum computer security
work, involving vulnerability discovery, exploit synthesis, cryptanalysis and
tool tradecraft into short and objectively measurable exercises13.
Changing Landscape The likely future of CTF, however, lies not in its hack-
ers, but in their ability to formalise and mechanise an attack methodology, to
scale it successfully and operate it at computer speeds. The currently human-
dominated CTF domain, perhaps reflecting the evolution of other real-world
areas of computing, is becoming increasingly automated and less human-directed.
TheDefenseAdvanced Projects Agency (DARPA) has in the recent past invited
the US academic community to participate in amachine-vs-machine CTF-like
competition, depending solely upon automated program comprehension and
its ability to generate proofs of program vulnerability.
The spectrum of skills and the expertise level required from participants
varies according to a number of factors. This includes the realism and com-
plexity of deployed network- and system-level security measures, the scale and
diversity of equipment that forms part of the target infrastructure and the ex-
tent of knowledge given to attackers a priori about the topology of the target
network. A fine balance between cyber offence and defence ideally results in a
competitive but constructive co-evolution of attack methodology and security
technology.
2.6.1. . Automated Cyber Reasoning
In October 2013, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA14)
made a Broad Agency Announcement of an unmanned cyber defence tourna-
ment, dubbed the Cyber Grand Challenge (CGC15). The purpose of the chal-
13TrailOfBits blog (https://blog.trailofbits.com/)
14Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (https://www.darpa.mil/)
15Cyber Grand Challenge (http://archive.darpa.mil/cybergrandchallenge/)
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lenge is to encourage teams to develop and field Cyber Reasoning Systems ca-
pable of comprehending and protecting software during a live exercise [22].
The candidate solutions should, above all, be adaptive. Ergo, the systems
are not supposed to make assumptions about the Challenge Binaries (CBs)
or their environment that will be supplied during the competitions. For ex-
ample, details of networking protocols should be learnt automatically, rather
than hardcoded tomatch known, popular protocols used on the Internet at the
present time.
The systems should seek to automate the entire software security lifecy-
cle - they should find vulnerabilities in CBs, produce exploits for them, patch
insecure versions and verify the correct functionality of secure versions.
As part of the evaluation criteria that candidate solutions will be subjected
to, 5 distinct Areas of Excellence (AoE) have been defined, namely:
• Autonomous Analysis - unassisted and automatic comprehension of soft-
ware, e.g. network protocols that the target software communicates over.
Many existing fuzzers require some a priori knowledge base of software
or operating system features; in contrast, this knowledge base must be
deduced automatically.
• Autonomous Vulnerability Scanning - unassisted production of a test in-
put which when supplied to an insecure CB causes disruption of service
or compromise. The test input is considered to be a proof of vulnerabil-
ity.
• Autonomous Patching - unassisted production and fielding of a new, se-
cured CB, which unlike its predecessor, is immune to some vulnerabil-
ity. The pre-condition for the success of this phase is the finding of the
vulnerability in the first place.
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Figure 2.1: Classes of vulnerabilities in CGC dataset [50]
• Autonomous Service Resiliency - a newly secured CB must be shown to
exhibit the same behaviour as its insecure predecessor, with the excep-
tion of behaviour associated with the vulnerability that was patched. In
other words, the patching process should be minimally disruptive to the
functionality of the CB.
• Autonomous Network Defense - defending the network at the network
perimeter using data gathered from the previous stages, e.g. generating
vulnerability signatures and feeding them into a network filter to thwart
active attacks on CBs.
At the time of writing, proposal submissions for the CGC or the existence
of systems that even partially fulfil the AoE criteria have not been released to
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the public. Despite that, the announcement of the tournament provides, at
least partially, a motivation for research into automatic exploit generation and
patching.
2.72.7 Summary
Cyberspace is increasingly embraced as the 5th domain of warfare. In this the-
sis, we have introduced the basic concepts of cyberspace, physical and cyber
weaponry, as well as the differences in intelligence requirements for their de-
velopment, deployment and assessment. We have contrasted the properties
of cyber weapon ingredients, such as longevity and development costs, with
those of physical weaponry. Furthermore, we have explored the nature of the
supply chain for both types of weaponry and have elaborated on the challenges
of acquiring exploits from diverse sources. Finally, we have discussed how the
evolution of the vulnerability market may shape the future of cyber weapons,
cyber warfare, and in turn, all future conflict.
CHAPTER 3
Background
The phenomenon of software bugs and its impact on our realityshould not be underestimated. We live in a reality where soft-ware has become too large and too complex for a human analystand present-day so-called efficient computers to fully compre-
hend. As a consequence, we exist in a reality where we have lost assurance
about the correctness of our software. We actually never have possessed an
understanding of what our collective software, and in many cases individual
pieces, can do. This is disturbing given the continuing trend in society to sur-
render the actuating of more and more basic tasks to machines governed by
questionable software. We call this process of out-sourcing automation.
Thus, computer hackerswho strive to ascertain quanta of informationmore
about software can in turn learn to manoeuvre software into operations that
were previously deemed impossible. Impossible, one might assert, because the
known security rules prevent it. But those with a superior grasp of software
mechanics oft show that security rules regarded as firm and unsurpassable are
nothing but a fleeting set of security assumptions. These assumptions are based
on an incomplete set of discernible facts about your own software. They are




For a security exploit can, in principle, be pre-empted; it is not an indepen-
dent device that exists in isolation, sitting somewhere in the off-limits arsenal
of an unfamiliar attacker. To software vendors, exploits are more personal and
closer to home; a deeply-ingrained, and simultaneously inadvertent, encoding
of otherwise unsanctioned, and as yet, unexpressed behaviour that lies hidden
at the heart of modern software. Hidden from the very authors that crafted
the software’s logic; hidden from the users who make daily use of the software;
hidden until exposed by the discovery of input that stimulates it and brings it
into the visible foreground of exhibited and observable behaviour.
This chapters presents the background to a number of preliminary topics
that underpin our work. While standard symbolic execution is theoretically
complete, it does not scale well to larger software, making it incomplete and
impractical to use. The term weird machines refers to computations that os-
tensibly escape their specification and adequately captures the rogue nature of
exploit mechanics.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing fashion:
• Section 3.1 describes the ever-prevalent nature of software bugs and its
relation to special cases of unintentional computation, called exploits;
• Section 3.2 gives a basic introduction to a popular method of dynamic
program analysis called symbolic execution;
• Section 3.3 covers previous research into the area of automatic exploit
generation and its achievements to date;
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3.13.1 Software Bugs
This section discusses the ontology and causality, as well as the prevalenceand pervasiveness, of software bugs. The act of program specification is
discussed in Section 3.1.1. We explain how inadvertent deviations between an
author’s intent and the reality of compilation output create unknown, misun-
derstood and dangerous program states. In Section 3.1.3, we say that program
states that violate a security property are security exploits. Finally, an example
of a real-world exploit is given in Section 3.1.3, followed by a dissection and
analysis of its structure.
3.1.1. . Program Specification
Programming is the act of specifying a finite or infinite set of possible program
states and the set of possible transitions between those states. Running the
program on a given input transitions the program through some subset of its
possible states.
Definition 3.1 (program). We define a computer program P as a tuple (S,
T ): the finite or infinite set S of possible program states and a finite set T of
possible transitions between members of S.
Assume a human intends to author a programP withS1 possible states and
T1 transitions. After transcribing her intention into algorithmic form, written
in a programming language of her choice, and compiling the source code, the
program P ends up having S2 possible states and T2 possible transitions. So,
in reality, P = (S2, T2). The question of a program’s correctness is equivalent
to asking whether T1 ≡ T2 and S1 ≡ S2. It follows that any states in S2 but
not in S1, and any transitions in T2 but not in T1, are potentially software bugs.
Some of the states will be benign, some will be bugs, and some will be security
vulnerabilities (bugs with security implications).
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Definition 3.2 (software bug). We define a software bug as any program state
in S2 but not in S1, and any transitions in T2 but not in T1.
Formal Methods
Formal verificationmethods [16, 8] aim to tackle the problem at the first stages
of the software lifecycle, including the design phase. Tools based on mathe-
matics and formal logic can assume various forms and levels of rigour. The
Z notation [85] defines schemata using notation from axiomatic set theory,
lambda calculus and first-order predicate logic. Such tools can be used to spec-
ify and prove the correctness of algorithms and their properties. If successful,
this should pre-emptively eliminate the introduction of some bugs. There are,
however, practical drawbacks to using formal methods, which are likely re-
sponsible for the fact that formal verification is not employed as widely as it
would be useful [48].
Business Incentives Many developers of commercial software take the ap-
proach of writing code without formulating a design, let alone a formal proof.
For a profit-driven business, the additional effort and time that must be set
aside to create and verify the design of code may injure its competitive edge.
The business who is first to market instantly becomes the leader, and in some
cases, even a long-lasting dominant leader in the market. Thus, time is of the
essence. Thus, a profit-driven company may calculate that it is cheaper, both
time- and money-wise, to fix vulnerabilities by distributing patches, than to
slow down the development of a product.
Practical Challenges Under the assumption that formal methods have been
used to verify the functionality of a design, the design must then also be cor-
rectly translated into executable instructions - this results in the creation of the
final software product. However, as part of this translation process, implemen-
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tation-level errors might occur. This in turn might result in a buggy product
with a formal proof of its secure design. For example, consider the following
trivial example: a mathematical model of an algorithm may wrongly presume
infinite storage space for any given integer. In practice, if explicit safeguards
are not built into the algorithm, the integer value may overflow and subse-
quently wraparound. This may result in unpredictable behaviour or in safety
violations, such as the bypassing of a length-condition that is meant to prevent
buffer overflows from occurring [73].
Language-theoretic Security
Various classes of vulnerabilities exist that can be eliminated from programs
through the usage of safe languages [10]. Languages that provide safety, i.e.
prevent safety violations that occur in programs written in non-safe languages,
introduce additional abstractions and high-level concepts. For example, data
typing [64] prevents inadvertent misinterpretations of data by relating an in-
terpretation to a variable’s data type. However, even static or run-time safe
languages cannot encode safeguards against behaviours represented by notions
that the language itself cannot express. For example, a compiler with no notion
of run-time buffer boundaries cannot detect buffer overruns.
Practical Challenges A language-theoretic approachmaymiss bugs that ex-
ist beyond the native reasoning of the language itself. For example, the C pro-
gramming language makes use of data typing [64] to warn the coder of type
mismatches during assignment statements. However, it cannot detect non-
trivial buffer overruns that adhere well to syntactic conventions. Automated
software testing can also be checking for properties that are not strictly cate-
gorised as bugs. Thus, the challenges of exploring a program’s state space to
verify arbitrary properties persist even with the usage of safe languages.
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3.1.2. . Software Testing
Software testing, by means of fuzzing or execution, is a common method for
instantiating dangerous program states and demonstrating safety of execution
on any given number of concrete inputs. Software testing can be conceptually
divided into black-box testing and white-box testing.
Black-box Testing
Black-box testing [7] implies that no information about the program under
test is used in the formulation of test inputs. Hence, the test inputs are often
random and generalised to trigger well-known and widely-occurring bugs or
security vulnerabilities.
White-box Testing
On the other hand, white-box testing [38] has permission to analyse the pro-
gram under test to produce more surgical, program-specific inputs. Further-
more, white-box testing may be divided into two categories: static analysis and
dynamic analysis. The behavioural properties of software, or dynamic proper-
ties, are far more computationally inefficient to reason about thanmaterialistic
properties, or static properties.
Static Analysis While static analysis and abstract interpretation [6, 19] are
more computationally efficient, they must often approximate values. In turn,
such under-approximations and over-approximations result in higher impre-
cision. Thus, static analysis is insufficient for software verification, where one
requires a higher degree of certainty regarding program properties than the
static analysis is able to provide. However, the static detection of program ar-
eas likely to contain problematic computations to guide exploration is one way
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static analysis can supplement dynamic analysis [37]. Static analysis could also
help with production of a control flow graph for dynamic tools [14].
Dynamic Analysis Dynamic white-box testing [75, 14, 12], which comes at
a higher computational cost time- and resource-wise, is utilised to achieve pre-
cision. One of the most popular method for white-box exploration is symbolic
execution. Symbolic execution proposes the execution of a program, which
itself is merely a sequence of instructions, by substituting specific concrete or
absolute values with symbolic values. Symbolic values are expressions that may
refer to ranges of valid values that can be assumed.
For example, the variable x may be defined by the symbolic expression
4 < x < 6. Assuming that x is an integer data type, the only value satisfying
the expression, and that variable x can assume under these constraints, is 5.
Each path through a program has a set of constraints under which that path
is reachable. Assume the expression for the current path was instead x < 12.
Thus, whatever properties are valid for the current path are valid for all values
of x smaller than 12. This model is precise, since the property must hold for
all possible values of x that satisfy the constraint. The model is also complete,
provided that all constraints in a given program are collected by the model
(given infinite time and resources).
Path Exploration Symbolic execution can explore multiple concrete paths
simultaneously by representing a range of different, possible values of a vari-
able using a single symbolic value. Whenever a conditional statement involves
a symbolic value, the current path splits, also known as a fork. If the path con-
dition ϕ involves a symbolic value α whose value we do not wish to concretize,
two paths will exist: one where ϕ ∧ α holds and a new path where ϕ ∧ ¬α
holds [12]. In practice, only a single new state is created (ϕ ∧ ¬α) and the
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existing state that forked continues its execution forward from the point of
forking.
Hence, standard symbolic execution captures symbolic data only - each
path follows the same control-flow for every possible assignment to its sym-
bolic values. Some of the consequences of thismode of operation are discussed
in Section 3.2. The number of existing paths when exploring a program using
symbolic execution is, in general, exponential in the number of symbolic con-
ditional statements. This problem is known as the path explosion problem and
manifests itself as a scalability issue [1, 75]. For a deeper discussion of symbolic
execution, see Section 3.2.
3.1.3. . Security Exploits
A security exploit places a program into a state outside the set of intended or
benign states (a state not in set S1). Despite this, it is a program state that is
permitted by the implementation and mechanics of the program in question
(state is in set S2). However, it is not sufficient for an input to induce a pro-
gram state in S2 and not in S1 to qualify as a security exploit, because not all
unintended program states have security relevance. Therefore, for an input to
qualify as a security exploit, we require a security property. By definition, an
exploit is a program input that violates that security property.
Definition 3.3 (exploit). Following on from our definition of a computer pro-
gram P (see Definition 3.1), let γ be a security property, such that γ holds true
for all S1. An exploit is a program input that transitionsP into a program state
in S2 where γ does not hold.
These security properties are not explicitly articulated in everyday com-
puting tasks. But they are commonly understood to be implicitly a part of
programming languages or systems. For example, if ϕ defines the integrity of
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77F5233A ...
77F5233D mov [ebp-C0h], ecx
77F52343 mov eax, [eax+04h]
77F52346 mov [ebp-C4h], eax
77F5234C L_unlink:
77F5234C mov [eax], ecx
77F5234E mov [ecx+04h], eax
77F52351 mov al, [esi+05h]
77F52356 ...
Code Sample 3.1: A write-4 primitive in ntdll.dll
buffer boundaries on the stack, then a security exploit of ϕ is a stack-based
buffer overflow exploit.
Exploit Mechanics
Definition 3.4 (shellcode). A shellcode is a sequence of x86 instructions that
constitutes the initial stage of an executable payload delivered to a target during
exploitation and often bootstraps the execution of a subsequent stage.
We now give an example of a simple heap-based control-flow hijacking
exploit. Observe the code in Code Sample 3.1. Assume the attacker controls
the values of registers ECX and EAX on line 77F5234C. Assume the next line,
line 77F5234E, causes a memory access violation exception to be raised. The
exception is a result of the destination of the write operation (mov) being non-
writable.
To achieve arbitrary code execution, the exploit must divert the natural
control-flow of the application to shellcode (see Definition 3.4). Candidates
for exploitable indirect control transfers are function pointers or installed ex-
ception handlers. The exception on line 77F5234E will trigger the exception
handler code visible in Code Sample 3.2. Reverse engineering of the code re-
veals that a pointer is fetched from 77ED63B4 and invoked on line 77EB9B8C
without any sanity checks.
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Ergo, it stands to reason that any given value in 77EB9B8C will be invoked
by the exception handler. Therefore, if the mov ecx,eax instruction can be
used to replace the value at memory address 77EB9B8C, then control flow can
be diverted to an arbitrary memory address. For instance, this could be the
memory address of our shellcode or a jmp to a memory address of our choice.
77EB9B80 ...
77EB9B82 mov eax, [77ED63B4]




77EB9B8E cmp eax, 01h
77EB9B91 ...
Code Sample 3.2: An exception handler dispatch (UEF)
Exploit Structure
Observe the three-part structure shown in Figure 3.1. The individual parts are
colour-coded as follows: bytes with no semantic effect, except for advancing
the instruction pointer, are blue; bytes containing non-executable data fields
are red; and bytes containing assembled x86 instructions as the exploit payload
(shellcode) are green.
3.1.4. . Summary
Given that software bugs are indeed program states, the act of bug-finding is
similar to the act of program state exploration. We present a historically well-
known method for the systematic exploration of program states in the next
section (Section 3.2).
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Key: NOP sled, data bytes, shellcode
Figure 3.1: An example application-specific exploit
1 void f(int x, int y) {
2 int z = 2*y;
3 if (x == 100000) {
4 if (x < z) {




Code Sample 3.3: A simple function with two integer inputs
3.23.2 Symbolic Execution
This section presents symbolic execution. Symbolic execution is a tech-nique for the systematic enumeration of program paths, and it has been
highly successful in automated test case generation [35, 12, 14]. In symbolic
execution, inputs to the program under test are given symbolic instead of con-
crete values. Whenever a symbolic input variable is used in a conditional state-
ment, execution forks and follows both branches. During execution, the con-
ditional expressions on branches are added as conjunctions to the path con-
dition. The path condition expresses the condition over input variables under
which that path is taken. Whenever a path forks into two, the symbolic execu-
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tion engine can rule out infeasible paths by calling a constraint solver to check
whether both or just one of the resulting path conditions is satisfiable. Observe
the function in Code Sample 3.3.
Figure 3.2: A symbolic execution path tree for function f
Completeness In principle, a symbolic execution engine eventually explores
all control flow paths in a target program; symbolic execution is theoretically
complete. In practice, the exponential growth in the number of paths limits the
amount of exploration that an engine can achieve. Many symbolic execution
engines forego completeness by concretizing parts of the symbolic state space.
For instance, when external functions are called, parameters whose value de-
pends on symbolic input can be fixed to a single concrete value to rule out any
forking in the callee.
Soundness Symbolic execution is sound, since all the paths it explores are
also feasible in real executions. In the S2E1 framework (see Section 3.2.4), exe-
cution consistency models define how concretization affects the soundness of
program paths (see Section. If consistency is not observed and infeasible paths
are inadvertently executed, it may render the analysis unsound.
1S2E symbolic execution framework (https://s2e.systems/)
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Practical Challenges Numerous practical problems hinder symbolic execu-
tion from being easily applicable to real-world software. Generally, these are
problems associated with scaling and precision [1]. The three major practical
challenges are:
• Path Explosion - the exponential growth in the number of paths when
exploring a program in a breadth-first fashion, or the exponential growth
in the amount of time it takes to explore a program in a depth-first fash-
ion (see Section 3.2.1),
• Environment Modelling - interactions between the unit under consider-
ation and the environment increase the difficulty in exercising accurate
behaviour in the target program (see Section 3.2.2),
• Complex Constraint Solving - the boolean satisfiability problem is NP-
complete and thus, constraint solving is not computationally efficient in
the general case (see Section 3.2.3).
3.2.1. . Path Explosion
Path explosion (or, equivalently, state space explosion) describes the problem
arising from the fact that, in general, the number of program paths is expo-
nential in the size of the program. In practice, this might be exhibited as the
system hitting amemory cap and being unable to fork any further states. Many
techniques have been proposed to cope with path explosion, including search
strategies that prioritise important paths [12], function summaries [33], and
state merging, which tries to reduce the number of paths by combining states
using disjunctions [49].
Scope of Exploration In practice, state forking is only performed if a condi-
tional statement is manipulating symbolic bytes (variables assuming no con-
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Figure 3.3: A visualisation of the state space explosion problem [63]
crete value that occupy a byte each in memory). Otherwise, there is no possi-
bility of path divergence or loss of either soundness or completeness. The de-
cision to mark a piece of program input as symbolic is delegated to the tester
and restricts the scope of exploration to program areas influenced by the prop-
agation of symbolic bytes.
This principle of restricted scope has led to the development of a technique
known as selective symbolic execution, supported by S2E [14]. Running sec-
tions of a program concretely, rather than symbolically, presents a significant
speed-up over full symbolic execution. Several implications of selective sym-
bolic execution are explained later in Section 3.2.4.
In order to compensate for the size of the state space, virtually all existing
tools impose artificial limits on the amount or type of paths that are explored.
This makes the search theoretically incomplete, but somewhat more scalable
[5]. Note that imposing such artificial conditions requires, at least partially, a
priori knowledge of which paths to explore or prioritise.
3.2.2. . Environment Modelling
Programs interact with their environment during their execution. Under nor-
mal execution, informationflows seamlessly across theunit-environment bound-
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ary and maintaining this information flow is crucial to evoking correct pro-
gram behaviour.
Environment interactions Interactions with the environment increase the
difficulty of exercising accurate behaviour in the program under test. Tools
such as KLEE2 are equipped with a handful of system call models that abstract
and imitate the application-system interaction [12]. Unlike KLEE, the S2E sys-
tem [14] does notmodel the environment, but instead provides a full operating
system stack, composed of applications, system libraries, drivers and the ker-
nel. If required, S2E could explore the entire system symbolically, although in
practice, one typically chooses to run most of the system concretely while just
selectively enabling symbolic execution. The environment is normally several
orders ofmagnitude larger than the unit under test and avoiding its exploration
improves scalability.
Elasticity Most tools operate in concrete mode until a symbolic value is in-
jected. Therefore, they cross the concrete-symbolic boundary once the symbolic
value is involved in a conditional jump and remain in symbolic mode until ter-
mination. On the other hand, S2E is the first tool to provide the elasticity of
crossing the concrete-symbolic boundary back and forth.
Efficiency The motivation for modelling the environment, within which a
test program resides, is increased efficiency of exploration. More specifically,
it is twofold: reducing the size of exploration and avoiding re-exploration. The
environment is often magnitudes larger than the test unit and symbolically
exploring it is unnecessarily expensive. Under most circumstances, the en-
vironment and its functionality is familiar territory and does not require re-
exploration at every crossing of the environment boundary.
2KLEE symbolic execution engine (https://klee.github.io/)
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PracticalChallenges Thus,models of the environment have been introduced
to improve performance. However, these models involve abstraction, and in
turn, introduce new challenges. The challenges stemming from modelling the
environment include:
• Consistency - themodelsmust be precise and completewith respect to the
implementation of API calls to accurately mimic the information flow
across the program-system boundary,
• Labour-intensive models - it has been reported in [14] to take several
person-years to implement accurate and complete models of all system
utilities,
• Adaptability - relying on models reduces the testing system’s ability to
explore programs in unfamiliar environments, thus decreasing their adap-
tive capabilities, as desired in [21].
3.2.3. . Constraint Solving
Symbolic execution is normally accompanied by a method for generating test
inputs that exercise a particular path in the program under consideration. The
process of obtaining that input is called constraint solving and it is performed
by components known as constraint solvers, such as Z33 or Yices4, which im-
plement decision procedures.
SAT problem The Boolean satisfiability (SAT) problem [18] can be stated
as follows: given a formula in propositional logic, determine whether there
exists an assignment to its variables, called an interpretation, that would cause
the formula to evaluate to true. Modern SAT and SMT solvers are capable of
presenting a model for a satisfiable formula or a proof of unsatisfiability. The
3Z3 SMT solver (https://github.com/Z3Prover/z3)
4Yices SMT solver (http://yices.csl.sri.com/)
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SAT problem has a special significance in complexity theory - it was the first
problem shown to beNP-complete.
Bottleneck SAT solving [25] is often cited as the bottleneck of symbolic ex-
ecution tools. Therefore, most tools employ query optimisation to minimise
the workload of the SAT backend. Common optimizations enabled by default
in tools such as [12, 75] include substitution, subsumption and distribution of
a query amongst several solvers. Thus far, every automatic exploit generation
system has relied upon SAT/SMT solvers to generate exploits. In the context
of constraint solving, an exploit is merely a test case which happens to possess
the characteristics of causing unintentional effects in programs when supplied
as the input.
(set-logic QF_UF)
(declare-fun p () Bool)
(assert (and p (not p)))
(check-sat)
Code Sample 3.4: A quantifier-free formula with uninterpreted
functions
Example In Code Sample 3.4, the usage of a quantifier-free theory with un-
interpreted functions is declared. Using the declare-fun specifier, an unin-
terpreted function is declared as taking no arguments and returning a Bool
boolean value. Functions with no arguments are treated as constants. In fact,
constants are always defined as functions that accept no arguments and return
constant values. The following is the equivalent in propositional logic:
p ∧ (¬p)
which clearly presents a logical contradiction. If the SMT solver is defined over
the theory in which the formula is expressed then it must return UNSAT. This
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indicates that there cannot exist any interpretation under the theory which
would cause the formula to be satisfied (to evaluate to true).
Obfuscation of Path Constraints It is possible to contemplate a program
that intentionally contains defences against popular program exploration and
analysis techniques, such as symbolic execution. A candidate method for hin-
dering test case generation involves encoding logic into a program such that
resulting path constraints are difficult to satisfy and prove unsatisfiable [87].
Similar effects have been achieved using cryptographic hash functions that
hide trigger-activated code from malware analysers [76]. However, these are
limited to protecting code that runs only occasionally, such as, upon the ex-
ternal input of a special keyword.
While the SAT problem lies in the NP complexity class, this fact alone
does not guarantee the computational hardness of specific instances of the
problem. Studies using randomly-generated formulas [74] show that there ex-
ists a sweet-spot in which formulas are considerably hard to decide. In [74], it
is argued that short-length formulas are quick to satisfy due to simplicity and
long-length formula quickly present a lot of contradictions. Thus, the formulas
on which SMT solvers performed most inefficiently weremedium-length ran-
dom formulas. The length of a formula is directly proportional to the number
of variables therein.
3.2.4. . Selective Symbolic Execution
Code that manipulates concrete values is executed natively by S2E. By natively,
we mean executed directly in the QEMU5 virtual machine without significant
overhead, such as instrumentation that collects path constraints. On the other
hand, code that handles symbolic valuesmight fork and thus requires symbolic
exploration. Therefore, such code is dynamically translated on-the-fly from
5QEMU virtual machine (https://www.qemu.org/)
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x86 to LLVM6 bitcode and passed to KLEE for symbolic execution. Developers
can write analysis plugins to inspect the properties of program states along
the execution of a program path. Developers can write searcher plugins to
decide how to prioritise paths; this allows for the implementation of custom
search strategies. Every time a state selection event is raised (several times per
second), a decision is reached by a searcher plugin to select one of the existing
suspended states as the next active state.
Figure 3.4: The S2E framework [27]
Execution Consistency Models
We briefly discuss some terminology and definitions introduced by S2E [14].
The term unit refers to the subject of interest to the testing process, while the
6LLVM compiler infrastructure (https://llvm.org/)
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environment is everything that supports the unit’s functioning. In addition, the
set of environment components isdisjoint from the set of unit components, and
the union of environment and unit components constitutes the system.
Consistency Types There are three types of paths discovered by S2E’s consis-
tencymodels: statically feasible, locally feasible and globally feasible paths [14].
The set of statically feasible paths is a superset of locally and globally feasible
paths. The set of locally feasible paths is a superset of globally feasible paths. A
globally feasible path is a synonym for a concrete or feasible path. It is a path
such that there exists an input which when supplied to a given program exer-
cises that path. The following execution consistency models are employed by
S2E:
1. Strictly Consistent Concrete Execution (SC-CE) - under this model, the
system is treated as a complete black-box. This model is equivalent to
that used by black-box fuzzers that generate random input without in-
formation gathered from the subject of interest. The model is also con-
sistent: every path discovered by this model is a globally feasible path.
2. Strictly Consistent Unit-level Execution (SC-UE) - this model permits
white-box analysis of the unit under test; however, no information from
the environment is acquired. This model is (based on the author’s ob-
servations) the most widely adopted model by security testing tools.
3. Strictly Consistent System-level Execution (SC-SE) - under this model, an
exploration engine gathers information from all parts of the system. In
practice, this model is not commonly employed due to scalability prob-
lems.
4. Local Consistency (LC) - paths discovered by this model are consistent
with respect to the unit under test. If there exists a concrete path leading
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to an intra-procedural path within the unit, then that intra-procedural
path is a globally feasible path.
5. Overapproximate Consistency (RC-OC) - the RC-OC model relaxes the
model of the system call to permit the injection of symbolic values that
may assume unconventional return values. Therefore, this model also
permits locally infeasible paths in the unit under test.
6. CFGConsistency (RC-CC) - thismodel permits roughly the same amount
of information as static analysis tools (it finds statically feasible paths).
Furthermore, using SC-SE to explore an application with a full Windows
stack would be impractical beyond acceptable levels. In practice, LC is im-
plemented by performing a system call and injecting its return value with a
symbolic value. The symbolic value would be bound by the model of that sys-
tem call, i.e., the symbolic value could never assume an unconventional return
value for a given system call. Due to the general lack of consistency, the RC-OC
model is used for tasks that aim to maximise code coverage rather than pre-
serve precision, such as reverse engineering.
Note that information gathering from a unit does not necessarily imply
symbolic execution is employed. In fact, it permits any mode of operation
where information is derived from analysing the unit, e.g., static analysis. The
execution consistency models simply provide a systematic way of reasoning
about the consistency of paths. Inmany cases the requirement of consistency is
unnecessarily strong and the cost of providing such consistency is prohibitively
high [14]. The models provide testers with the flexibility to make the best
trade-offs between precision and cost. The cost can be expressed in terms of
resource usage, such as memory or disk usage, or time taken for exploration.
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3.2.5. . Compositional SE
Compositional symbolic execution [33, 2] utilises the modularity of software.
Rather than performing symbolic execution on the entire program, composi-
tional symbolic execution divides a program into units or modules, which are
then explored individually. The feasible paths with respect to the units would,
under S2E’s execution consistency models, be considered to have local consis-
tency. Compositional symbolic execution finds the equivalent of globally fea-
sible paths through the program under test by forming inter-procedural paths
between the intra-procedural paths of previously-explored units [33].
Thebiggest benefit of performing symbolic execution compositionally stems
from having to explore a unit only once. Under standard non-compositional
symbolic execution, a unit would be re-explored everytime it is invoked. Ergo,
under compositional symbolic execution, the total number of paths to explore
is a sum, rather than a product, of the number of intra-procedural paths. The
total number of paths to explore is therefore linear rather than exponential in
the number of intra-procedural paths in the program [33]. The output of a
module that is explored compositionally is a function summary. A summary
of a function ϕ is a formula in propositional logic of the form
(ϕpre) ∧ (ϕpost)
where ϕpre is a set of function pre-conditions and ϕpost is a set of function
post-conditions. Given a set of pre-conditions, after the execution of function
ϕ, the set of post-conditions must hold, assuming function ϕ terminates. The
pre-conditions are considered to be any input to the function, i.e., any values
that are read during the function, while the post-conditions are expressions
over any values that are written, including the function’s return value.
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3.2.6. . Demand-driven SE
Demand-driven symbolic execution [2] further reduces the workload by only
exploring intra-procedural paths that must necessarily be explored in order
to generate an input leading to a target. In certain cases, the calling context
of a sub-function, e.g., a concrete input, only requires that certain branches
of the sub-function are explored. Once a return value is found that reaches a
target code in the parent function, the exploration of the sub-function ceases.
This leaves the execution tree of the sub-function partially unexplored. This
model is only appropriate if a target code that is to be reached is pre-determined.
The nature of the target depends on the purpose of the exploration. Various
search heuristics have been employed in the past. For example, most testing
tools aim for code coverage - they prioritise paths that lead to new code. Other
search heuristics, for example, heuristics employed by many bug-finding tools
prioritise high loop iterations in the hope of causing buffer overflows.
3.2.7. . Handling Symbolic Loop Bounds
A common source of buffer boundary violation vulnerabilities is the preva-
lence of complex loops that write to memory [37]. Understanding loops be-
comes more difficult in the presence of symbolic variables or symbolic input.
Tools based on dynamic symbolic execution are historically ineffective in such
scenarios [12, 14, 37]. In standard symbolic execution, loop iterations are un-
rolled, i.e., treated as a continuous stream of instructions. If a loop is bound
by a symbolic value, the loop forks off a new state at every iteration - one state
exits the loop and the other resumes executing the loop. This results in a path
explosion at the loop guard in the loop header.
Most existing tools deal with the path explosion resulting from a sym-
bolic loop bound by limiting the amount of total states that fork at the loop
guard [12, 14]. A loop guard is a conditional jump statement with one target
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inside and another target outside the loop body. The consequences of placing
a hard limit on the number of states that can fork from any loop guard, where
the number is proportional to the loop iteration count, is that the symbolic
execution engine fails to explore higher loop iteration counts. Any behaviour
resulting from a higher number of loop iterations will remain unexhibited.
A search for arbitrary properties of the program under test that follows this
model becomes incomplete by construction and will, under normal circum-
stances, be unable to detect unexhibited behaviour.
3.2.8. . Loop-extended SE
Loop-extended symbolic execution [69] attempts to address the problem of
comprehending the behaviour of loops with bounds directly or indirectly de-
pendent on properties of the input. The technique requires a user-supplied
grammar to describe the relationship between the input and the loop iteration
count, e.g., an input string’s length. Given the input-grammar, it is then able
to predict the side-effects of an arbitrary number of loop iterations. In doing
so, it can recognise vulnerable loops over delimited fields. This in turn permits
the crafting of an input that triggers a bug which is only activated by certain
features of the input, e.g., an overflow triggered by the input’s length, rather
than content.
Otherworkdealingwith loops in dynamic symbolic execution, such as [34],
aim to automate the recognition of input-dependent induction variables, effec-
tively eliminating the requirement of a user-supplied input-grammar. In [34],
the induction variables and their relationship to the input is determined using
pattern-matching rules, rather than static analysis or abstract interpretation.
The technique is only capable of recognising linear relationships, but could
likely be extended to other types. The technique in [34] is also unable to deal
with non-induction variable-based loop guards, such as pointers to arbitrary
3.3. Related Research 63
memory. While a number of previous papers focused on generating loop in-
variants using static analysis, the techniques in [34, 69] appear to be the only
ones dealing with automated handling of loops in dynamic symbolic execu-
tion.
3.33.3 Related Research
This section covers previous and existing research into the field of auto-matic exploit generation. Our raison d’être is simple: to understand
the feasibility of performing on-the-fly exploit generation [13, 42, 5, 11] for
zero-day vulnerabilities and strategically prepare defences against as-yet non-
materialised threats, we must advance the current state of automatic exploit
generators.
Memory Corruption Programming errors that allow the corruption of crit-
ical portions of program memory, such as buffer and heap overflows, remain a
prevalent problem [83, 80]. An attacker can exploit such vulnerabilities by in-
jecting new code to be executed or re-using existing code in unintended ways.
Even though most modern programming languages rule out these low-level
risks by design, unsafe languages, such as C and C++, continue to be popular.
On the one hand, this is driven by their vast repositories of legacy code; on the
other hand, the continuous quest for performance and the limited resources
of embedded environments are a constant source of new software written in
these languages.
Exploit Generators Despite recent advances in the area of automated ex-
ploit generation [13, 42, 5, 11], there has been no study showing the require-
ments for the successful automated exploitation of heap-based vulnerabilities.
The automatic exploit generation problem was first proposed by Brumley et
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al [11], where an exploit is synthesised from a vulnerable application and a
corresponding patched version of the same application. Subsequently, Heelan
[42] described a way to produce a control-flow hijacking exploit given a crash-
ing input and a register trampoline (see Definition 3.5). The first system that
dealt with the end-to-end problem of finding a vulnerability and producing
an exploit was [5]. The system was then logically extended in [13] to work on
cross-platform binary-only applications. All of the aforementioned exploit-
generating systems have only succeeded in producing exploits for stack-based
buffer overflow and string-format vulnerabilities.
Definition 3.5 (trampoline). A trampoline is a set of one or more x86 instruc-
tions whose sole purpose is to redirect program control flow to code at a dif-
ferent target destination. For example, a trampoline may fascilitate a jump to
an attacker-controlled register value.
Increased Difficulty It is often stated (for example, in [54]) that heap-based
vulnerabilities are more difficult to manually exploit than, for example, stack-
based buffer overflows, due to the number of factors that must be satisfied.
For example, each new Windows Service Pack (SP) and operating system ver-
sion has made consistent and incremental improvements in the heap manager
[54], including improvements in the areas of performance, e.g., using the faster
lookaside lists to keep track of busy memory chunks, and security, e.g., using
safe unlinking when removing a memory chunk from the freelists. Numerous
works describing UNIX-based [30] and Windows-based [54, 81] heap man-
agers are testament to the fact that discovering vulnerable heap configurations
is not a trivial task.
Stack-based generators Buffer-overflows on the stack are well-studied and
have a long history of being exploited. The basic strategy is to overflow a local
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buffer on the stack with oversized input data until the data overwrites the loca-
tion of a code pointer (typically the return address). An arms race of ever-more
sophisticated defences and attacks has lead to stack exploits becoming increas-
ingly difficult to execute against hardened programs. In the absence of strong
defences, however, it is often even possible to synthesise an exploit automati-
cally. Tools for automated exploit generation can find stack-based vulnerabili-
ties and automatically construct customised exploits [11, 5, 13, 42]. While the
appeal of such tools to potential attackers seems obvious, they actually offer a
powerful proactive defence strategy in the form of an automated penetration
tester. Using these tools, developers can attempt to exploit their own systems
at low costs. By seeding an exploit generator with a reported bug, developers
can automatically test the bug’s exploitability and prioritise it accordingly.
Heap Problem Conversely, attacks on the heap are considerably more dif-
ficult than a basic stack exploit, and still the realm of manual analysis. They
are based on overflowing a heap-allocated buffer into heap metadata, which
causes subsequent operations of the heap manager (such as free) to write
attacker-controlled data to an attacker-controlled location. Like stack-based
buffer overflows, heap attacks require a programming mistake like a missing
bounds check in the target binary. In addition, however, setting the attack up
correctly requires intricate knowledge about the data structures and internal
state of the heap manager; otherwise, the program will most likely crash with-
out executing any attacker-controlled code. Similar to the arms race in stack
exploits, modern developments in hardening heap managers against common
exploits have made this type of attack even more complex [54]. Thus, the task
of crafting exploits for the heap still lies firmly in the realm of manual analysis.
ProblemDomain Since the introduction of the patch-based exploit genera-
tion challenge [11], there have been a number of tools that have attempted to
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automate the entire exploit writing pipeline. These tools have, under relaxed
security measures, produced exploits for stack-based and string-format vul-
nerabilities [13, 42, 5]. However, due to limitations in their modelling of secu-
rity vulnerabilities, their capabilities did not extend to heap-based vulnerabil-
ities. The lack of success of these systems in tackling non-trivial vulnerabilities
can be attributed to the primitive modelling of the problem domain [84]. To
successfully exploit the heap, an exploit generation tool must be able to reason
about factors such as the heap layout and heap-management functions.
ExploitMitigations In stack-based instances of the exploit generation prob-
lem [42, 5] with no exploit mitigations enabled, output from tools performing
test case generation is used as the basis for exploits. In other words, a con-
crete input that exercises a path leading to a vulnerability in a program is used
as a prefix in the exploit string. It is sometimes possible to layer shellcode on
top of the prefix to achieve arbitrary code execution. However, with exploit
mitigations enabled and, in particular, due to the non-determinism caused by
Address Space Layout Randomisation (ASLR) [78, 52], a path leading to an
exploit primitive may no longer constitute a sufficient condition for successful
exploitation. The heap layout may need to be rendered exploit-friendly in ad-
vance to enable the prediction of memory addresses, as in heap spraying [26]
or heap feng shui [77]. This requirement might in turn designate a subset of
the paths in the vulnerable program as non-exploitable.
Heap Literature Automatic exploit generation tools described in academic
literature [13, 42, 5] have previously tackled the problem of automating the
exploit writing pipeline for stack-based buffer overflow and format string vul-
nerabilities. Due to limitations in their modelling of security vulnerabilities,
the capability of the aforementioned systems did not extend to other classes
of vulnerabilities. There is no previous study in academic literature that tack-
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les the problem of synthesising exploits for heap vulnerabilities 7. In [39], an
input is produced that causes a heap-vulnerable program to crash. The result
is analogous to that achieved by a fuzzer and requires no modelling or com-
prehension of the heap domain, nor does it require the selection of appropriate
pointers in order to craft working shellcode. All of the exploit-generating tools
have operated under relaxed security measures and have not bypassed exploit
mitigations, such as GS, DEP or SafeSEH. However, Q [72] produced hardened
exploits using ROP techniques given an amount of non-randomised code.
Following Research There has been further research conducted into heap-
based exploit generation since the publication ofmaterial contained in this the-
sis. In particular, [43] explores ways of automatically manipulating the heap
layout through routines in interpreters that perform heap management calls.
This step is often a prerequisite for setting up an exploitable memory config-
uration and the automation of this step brings exploit generation closer to a
fully automated solution. The follow-up work then integrates this automated
search for an adequate heap layout into a broader solution involving genetic
algorithms and the automatic discovery of exploit primitives [44].
Sacrificing Completeness The most common method for tackling the state
space explosion problem is limiting the size of the state space to be searched.
While this appears to be an intuitive, straight-forward answer to state space
explosion, it merely avoids the problem, rather than constitutes a solution. All
models adhering to this principle become incomplete by construction. In the
implementation of the automatic exploit generation systems in [5] and [13],
pre-conditioned symbolic execution is used to narrow down the target state
space to search in accordance with a chosen pre-condition. While this reduces
the total workload, omitting a large portion of the state space from the search
7At the time of our paper’s publication [65]
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for which the pre-condition does not hold makes the search incomplete. One
such pre-condition for detecting buffer overflows is a minimum limit on the
length of the input string.
Under this assumption, any vulnerabilities resulting from a lower number
of loop iterations (assuming the loop count is proportional to string length)
will be missed by construction. In [5], the size of the largest fixed-size buffer σ
is determined statically prior to testing and (σ∗1.1) is used as the input length.
This approach misses any buffer overflows on the stack or heap whose buffer
size is dynamically computed, e.g., any buffer that is dynamically allocated and
whose size depends on user input. Note that while a prefix is also used in [5]
and [13] as a pre-condition, the prefix is concrete rather than symbolic. Ergo,
the prefix already partially specifies the path leading to a bug and is ill-suited
for the discovery of zero-day vulnerabilities. In addition, to avoid hitting a
memory cap, Mayhem [13] creates checkpoints to postpone state forking in
low-memory conditions and also to avoid re-executing portions of a concrete
run.
3.3.1. . Existing Solutions
Some AEG authors appear to be of the conviction that human-assisted tools for
exploit generation are, for the time being, more realistic than automatic ones.
They may be right; but we shall not witness the emergence of practical tools
of sufficient maturity until such a time as ambitious research is conducted into
the possibility.
Types of System Input Existing AEG systems can and do operate on various
input types. The three most common types of input is binary code (including
custombytecode), source code and a combination of the two. The type of input
an important design consideration, because it determines what level of rich-
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ness of information the AEG system has at its disposal. This in turn affects how
efficiently it can find different types of vulnerabilities in the input program.
ResearchQuestions It is clear, however, that it ismore difficult for anAEG sys-
tem to reason about program behaviour at the binary level, since much of the
higher-level semantics become less apparent or disappear altogether when a
program is compiled. Therefore, most of the existing AEG systems [13, 5, 11]
operate on binaries only if the source code is also present to serve as a cross-
reference. It should, in theory, be derivable, but is still left unsaid: to what
extent vulnerability exploitation is complicated by working on binaries-only
systems and whether it renders any class of vulnerabilities unexploitable by
current or future AEG systems.
Binary-Only Input The term binary-only input does not refer to the input
being singular and of the binary type; rather, it refers to the ability to operate
in circumstances when the only input taken into consideration is binary.
Operating on compiled binary images instead of source code has the ad-
vantage of language independence (modulo processor architecture and instruc-
tion set). A source code’s form is dictated by the language it is described in, and
consequently different parsers are needed to process each language’s unique
semantics. Nowadays, software is written in a myriad of different languages,
with each language having an arbitrary level of abstraction frommachine code.
This created a problem when attempting to conduct standardised analysis and
hence, tools such as LLVM [51] were introduced to provide intermediary rep-
resentations and bridge the gap between differences in languages.
Advantages of Binary-Only AEG systems that can operate solely on binaries
are preferable to those requiring source code. The most ostensible benefit is
the ability to handle closed-source binaries, i.e., binaries to which correspond-
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ing source code is not made available. Hypothetically, this set of binaries may
include important targets of interest: legacy software, third-party applications
and malicious software. These potential targets commonly import external li-
braries and depend on third-party binaries to perform specific tasks. There-
fore, it is critical that we possess the ability to independently verify the security
of such software.
In the case of malicious software, with perhaps the exception of malware
written in interpreted languages, it is always the case that analysts lack the
source code. Hence, even though it is more tedious to perform analysis with-
out the richness and crutches of linguistic constructs, it is critical that we do
so. We should develop ways to reason about the behaviour and function of
binary code, with the intention of making closed-sourced binaries accessible
to the process of automatic exploit generation.
CHAPTER 4
Heap Exploits
This chapter introduces the paradigm of heap exploits. The heapmanager is a fundamental component ofmodern operating sys-tems, servicing dynamic requests formemory thousands of timesper second. Even a fractional decrease in the efficiency of this
well-oiledmechanismwould have a dramatic knock-on effect on the efficiency
of all running applications. This incentivizes the design team tomake the heap
perform as quickly as possible - and in computational terms, this in turn im-
plies performing as few operational steps as possible to achieve an objective.
Therefore, the argument for placingmetadata adjacent to user chunks is proba-
bly an efficiency argument. Since the client application keeps track of allocated
memory, and supplies a pointer to every heap call, the heap can always rather
conveniently compute the location of metadata relative to the pointer supplied
by the user. However, strictly from a security standpoint, the inter-mixing of
internal heap metadata with user-controlled content is fertile ground for the
potential corruption of critical heap data structures. If an application erro-
neously permits user input to be written past the boundaries of an allocated
chunk, there is a non-negligible possibility of user input overwriting adjacent
heap metadata. The consequences of this action depend on the type of meta-
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data positioned after the chunk, as well as the subsequent set of operations that
is performed on the corrupted metadata.
Since the introduction of the patch-based exploit generation challenge [11],
there have been a number of tools that have attempted to automate the entire
exploit writing pipeline. These tools have, under relaxed security measures,
produced exploits for stack-based and string-format vulnerabilities [13, 42, 5].
However, due to limitations in their modelling of security vulnerabilities, their
capabilities did not extend to heap-based vulnerabilities. To successfully ex-
ploit the heap, an exploit generation tool must be able to reason about factors
such as the heap layout and heap-management functions.
We set the scene for the heap exploit generation problemby defining a heap
vulnerability as a manipulation of heap metadata that results in the execution
of an exploit primitive for writing arbitrary data to arbitrary locations. Hence,
we are concerned only with a subclass of all heap vulnerabilities and present
an exploit generator for finding write primitives in heap allocators. Thus, there
are instances of heap vulnerabilities that escape our model. For example, an
attacker that overwrites heap metadata used in the allocation search can cause
a heap allocator to return non-free security-sensitive memory to a client ap-
plication instead of a free chunk, permitting an attacker to read from or write
to that sensitive memory. Such a situation does not involve the execution of
an exploit primitive but it demonstrates an abuse of the heap interface.
In order to accommodate the unique properties of the heap, we structure
our approach to heap exploit generation differently than we would to, for ex-
ample, stack-based exploit generation. The problem of exploiting heap-based
vulnerabilities differs from that of exploiting stack-based or string-format vul-
nerabilities, in that it actually involves two separate targets: the application
that is host to a heap-based buffer boundary violation and the heap manager
that provisions the memory allocation. Exploit primitives in heap managers,
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e.g., write-4 or write-n for writing 4 or n bytes to an arbitrary address, re-
spectively, exist independently of application-specific implementations. Thus,
it suffices to locate a set of exploit primitives once for each heap allocator and
then re-use the primitives repetitively on different applications1. In the case of
default heap managers in operating systems, the exploit primitives are present
whenever the application runs on that operating system version.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing fashion:
• Section 4.1 introduces the paradigm of heap exploits and gives a primer
on memory management, metadata corruption and heap exploit prim-
itives;
• Section 4.2 discusses a way of combining symbolic execution and exploit
formulas to synthesise functional exploits;
4.14.1 Heap Anatomy
Firstly, we begin by delving into the low-level housekeeping details ofhow modern heap managers maintain internal knowledge of allocated
and free chunks of memory (Section 4.1.1). The specifics of how allocation
routines are implemented, and which types of data structures they employ,
in turn often decide which exploit primitives are contained therein. Next, we
continue by exploring how poor security practises, such as insufficient mem-
ory separation between user-controlled data and the heap’s internal metadata,
give rise to unexpected program behaviour (Section 4.1.2). In some instances,
this unexpected behaviour can violate fundamental security assumptions (Sec-
tion 4.1.3).
1Theassumption being that offsets of trampolines (see Definition 3.5) will be valid in both
surrogates and target applications, as they share common modules, e.g., kernel32.dll.
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4.1.1. . HeapMemoryManagement
The heap memory manager is a fundamental component of modern software
systems. It is responsible for the provision, organisation, and optimisation
of dynamically allocated memory. Applications can compute their memory
requirements based on user input and request memory at runtime from the
heapmanager using malloc() or HeapAlloc() calls (corresponding tomem-
ory allocation on Linux and Windows, respectively). The heap manager keeps
track of free memory chunks and, upon receiving a request for memory of a
particular size, it services the request by searching its list of free chunks and
returning a chunk greater than, or equal to, that requested by the client appli-
cation. The application is then entrusted with respecting the boundaries of the
memory chunk. It is also entrusted with releasing it back to the heap manager
by deallocating it, by invoking free() or HeapFree(), once it is no longer re-
quired. Observe, in Figure 4.1, the memory architecture of a typical Windows
operating system and the heap’s effective role as an interface between client
applications and the Virtual Memory Manager (VMM).
Figure 4.1: WindowsMemory Architecture [59]
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Anatomy InWindowsXP, the heapmanager is divided into a high-performance
front-end manager that utilises fast lookaside lists and the low fragmentation
heap, and a more robust, general-purpose backend manager that utilises freel-
ists and the heap cache [54, 81]. Thepurpose of both is tominimise the amount
of requests for large memory blocks that must be forwarded to the Virtual
MemoryManager (VMM).Applications dynamically allocatememory viaHeap
API functions exported by kernel32.dll, which provides common function-
ality to userspace programs. Requests to these heap-management functions,
which include HeapAlloc and HeapFree, are actually thin wrappers around
the Windows Heap Manager residing in ntdll.dll.
The Heap Manager provides RtlAllocateHeap and itself divides large
chunks ofmemory acquired from theVMMusingNtAllocateVirtualMemory
into smaller, re-usable chunks. The backend heap manager maintains several
circular doubly-linked lists (FreeLists[0] – FreeLists[128]) to keep track of free
memory chunks in any particular heap.
Security Choices Heapmanagers differ in their design choices regarding the
placement and layout of metadata. Many popular heap managers, including
the defaultWindowsheapmanager [46] andLinux’sdlmallocorptmalloc2 [30],
employ freelist-based memory management. In that model, the heap manager
prefixes a memory chunk with heap metadata. The consequence is that mem-
ory areas to which user input is potentially written are intermixed with inter-
nal heap metadata. This has security implications. Other operating systems,
such as FreeBSD2 and OpenBSD3, use BiBoP memory managers [9], which
align allocations to page boundaries and store metadata at the start of a page.
This minimises opportunities for causing metadata corruption using sequen-
tial buffer overflows.
2FreeBSD operating system (https://www.freebsd.org/)
3OpenBSD operating system (https://www.openbsd.org/)
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Figure 4.2: Heap Chunk Header
Heap Chunks The heap chunk header (see Figure 4.2) is 16 bytes in size: the
first 8 bytes, containing the chunk size and flags, are present in every header
type, including busy chunks, but the flink and blink pointers (forward and
backwardpointers in a circular doubly-linked list, respectively) are only present
in free chunks of memory. Upon a client application requestingmemory using
HeapAlloc, the heap manager traverses the FreeLists by using the flink and
blink pointers. If a suitable chunk of memory H is found, it is returned to the
client application and unlinked from the FreeLists. Unlinking of a free chunk
header H is archetypically done using H’s own flink and blink pointers as
shown in Figure 4.3.
(H.blink).flink = H.flink
(H.flink).blink = H.blink
Figure 4.3: The Unlink Operation
4.1.2. . Metadata Corruption
The heap manager is a fundamental component of modern operating systems,
servicing dynamic requests for memory thousands of times per second. Even a
fractional decrease in the efficiency of this well-oiled mechanism would have
a dramatic knock-on effect on the efficiency of all running applications. This
incentivizes the design team to make the heap perform as quickly as possible -
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and in computational terms, this in turn implies performing as few operational
steps as possible to achieve an objective. Therefore, the argument for placing
metadata adjacent to user chunks is probably an efficiency argument. Since the
client application keeps track of allocated memory, and supplies a pointer to
every heap call, the heap can always rather conveniently compute the location
of metadata relative to the pointer supplied by the user.
However, strictly from a security standpoint, the inter-mixing of internal
heap metadata with user-controlled content is fertile ground for the potential
corruption of critical heap data structures.
BufferOverflows If an application erroneously permits user input to bewrit-
ten past the boundaries of an allocated chunk, there is a non-negligible possi-
bility of user input overwriting adjacent heap metadata. The consequences of
this action depend on the type of metadata positioned after the chunk, as well
as the subsequent set of operations that is performed on the corrupted meta-
data. Observe the example in Code Sample 4.1. The example contains a bug
that would be classified as a heap-based buffer overflow (CWE-1224) due to in-
sufficient bound checks on a user argument. If the length of null-terminated
string str is greater than BUFSIZE, then strwill overflow into adjacent mem-
ory.
The effect of a metadata corruption attack can be ascertained by learning
what metadata exists, where it is positioned relative to user chunks or another
frame of reference, and how heap management operations manipulate it. On
a deterministic heap manager, a finite sequence of heap actions (invocations
of heap management calls) produces a single consistent heap state at each ex-
ecution and a memory layout that is reproducible. For example, two consecu-
tive heap allocations are guaranteed to sit side by side in memory. The heap
4CWE-122 vulnerability class (https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/122.
html)
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1 int write4(char *str)
2 {
3 HANDLE *hp, h1, h2;
4
5 hp = HeapCreate(0,0x1000,0x10000);
6 h1 = HeapAlloc(hp,HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY ,6);
7
8 // Heap Overflow occurs here:
9 strcpy(h1, buf);
10
11 // Second call to HeapAlloc() triggers write-4
12 h2 = HeapAlloc(hp,HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY ,6);
13 return 0;
14 }
Code Sample 4.1: A write exploit primitive in HeapAlloc
state is predictable by an attacker if the target application’s state is also known
(both states are inter-dependent and can suffer from cross-propagation of er-
ror). Under a non-deterministic heap manager, such as Windows 8, wherein
allocations are randomly offset as an exploit mitigation measure, a sequence of
heap actions produces merely one of a set of numerous possible states.
Non-determinism Heap managers that perform deterministic allocations
(allocate chunks at predictable memory addresses) produce a consistent heap
layout between multiple runs of a finite sequence of heap-management calls.
Those heap managers that incorporate randomness into their allocation pat-
terns produce heap layouts of polymorphic shape. As a matter of strategy, an
attacker seeks to place a vulnerable heap chunk directly in front of target meta-
data, in preparation for a sequential overflow. A constantly shifting heap layout
does not afford exploits the certainty of predictable locations for heap meta-
data, rendering the exploit’s mechanics potentially ineffective and its success
probabilistic in nature.
After an allocation request for memory of size buf and with free_1 bytes
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Figure 4.4: Heapmetadata is adjacent to user content
remaining unallocated in the heap, the memory layout will resemble that of
Figure 4.4. Thus, the metadata in question will be that of a chunk header.
Every metadata corruption attack revolves around the creation or genera-
tion of metadata, and the invocation of heap operations that unsafely manipu-
late that metadata. Therefore, an attacker must ask the following questions to
ascertain a valid attack technique:
• What metadata does a series of heap actions generate?
• Which metadata is sensitive and which is impervious to corruption?
• How does one reproduce a sequence of heap actions in the target?
4.1.3. . Exploit Primitives
There are a number of exploit primitives encapsulated in heap memory man-
agement operations. The archetypal exploit primitive is the write primitive,
specifically, the write-4. It occurs in many instances and code areas, but is
historically associated with the unlink macro.
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UnlinkMacro Windows versions up toXPService Pack 1, aswell asdlmalloc
and ptmalloc2, implement the unlinking of a free chunk header P without
any sanity checks in essentially the same way as the multi-line macro in Code
Sample 4.2, which is found in the source code to ptmalloc in the GNU C li-
brary5 version 2.3.3. Note that ptmalloc uses fd and bk in place of flink
and blink for the list pointers. Arguments BK and FD are used as temporary
storage.
1 /* Take a chunk off a bin list */
2 #define unlink(P, BK, FD) { \
3 FD = P->fd; \
4 BK = P->bk; \
5 FD->bk = BK; \
6 BK->fd = FD; \
7 }
Code Sample 4.2: The unlink macro from glibc 2.3.3
Unsafe Unlinking: Contains a Write Primitive Observe the operational
steps in Code Sample 4.2. An attacker who controls P->fd and P->bk can
choose their values to trigger a write of an arbitrary value to an arbitrarymem-
ory location. The line FD->bk = BK will write the value in P->bk to the ad-
dress computed as the sum of P->fd and the offset of the bk field in the en-
closing list struct. The second write access to BK->fd then reverses the roles of
the values; its values depend directly on the ones chosen for the first write and
can trigger an access violation if not chosen carefully (this is a typical challenge
for writing working heap exploits).
Such elementary write-anything-anywhere operations have been dubbed
exploit primitives, since they serve as building blocks in a chain of primitives
used to achieve arbitrary code execution. There are a number of other com-
mon heap-management operations, such as the coalescing of two adjacent free
5GNU C library (https://ftp.gnu.org/gnu/libc/)
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chunks into a single large chunk of memory (see Code Sample 4.3), that may
give rise to exploit primitives if heapmetadata is corrupted and is not correctly
verified.
1 if(!prev_inuse(p)) {
2 prevsize = p->prev_size;
3 size += prevsize;
4 p = chunk_at_offset(p, -prevsize);
5 unlink(p, bck, fwd);
6 }
Code Sample 4.3: Coalescing of chunks in dlmalloc
Windows versions beginning with XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) have added two
sanity checks to the unlinkmacro that use the data structure invariants of the
circular doubly-linked freelist (node->bk->fd == node and node->fd->bk
== node) to verify the list’s local integrity before executing a write.
Allocation primitive An allocation heap exploit primitive is a violation of
the safety property that client requests for memory result strictly in the allo-
cation of designated memory. It commonly arises due to a corruption of heap
metadata, such as the insertion of a fake pointer into the FreeLists. The
heap manager is designed to return a pointer to a free chunk in response to
a request for memory. An allocation primitive can subvert and influence the
choice of pointer returned at the next request for memory. In principle, the
heap manager can be forced to return an arbitrary pointer. An attacker, how-
ever, traditionally chooses to allocate over security-sensitive data to achieve
arbitrary code execution. For example, a function pointer can be set to an
arbitrary value in order to divert program control flow. Let S(x) be the set
of memory addresses that belong to the memory region occupied by chunk x
(i.e., a memory region from x to x+size). After a heap with intact integrity is
used for n allocations, as such in Code Sample 4.4,
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1 char *m[n];
2 for(k=0; k<n; k++)
3 (possible alloc primitive)
4 m[k] = malloc(size);
Code Sample 4.4: A series of n consecutive allocations
the existence of the following i and j would showone instance of amisbehaving
allocator
∃i, j : ((i ≥ 0 ∧ i < n) ∧ (j ≥ 0 ∧ j < n))
∧ ((S(m[i]) ∩ S(m[j])) ̸= ∅
where for any values of i and j, if the set intersection of S(m[i]) and S(m[j]) is
not the empty set, then the heap manager is returning memory that overlaps.
The allocation of non-free or illegal memory is a typical symptom of a heap
allocation primitive. In this thesis, we give a number of practical examples of
allocation primitives present throughout the modern versions of Windows.
Lookaside Lists: Hide an Alloc Primitive The fast singly-linked lookaside
lists can be exploited by corrupting heapmetadata such that an attacker-chosen
pointer is inserted into the list. Once HeapAlloc returns an entry from the
lookaside list to a client application, any write to that pointer by the application
targets attacker-chosenmemory. If the data written is also attacker-chosen, the
attacker has again found a full write exploit primitive.
Read Primitives
Some heap managers, such as dlmalloc and ptmalloc2, also require the use
of read exploit primitives. Upon overflowing the heap chunk header with sym-
bolic bytes (sequence of variables that assume no concrete values and occupy a
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byte each inmemory - any value derived from symbolic bytes will itself become
symbolic), field p->prev_size becomes symbolic (see Code Sample 4.3) and
the unlink macro performs memory load operations from the symbolic ex-
pression.
Depending on the memory model of the symbolic execution engine used,
a symbolic read is either concretised or leads to expensive subsequent solver
queries involving array logic. We use a concrete memory model, i.e. a sym-
bolic expressionmust be concretised before it is used as a pointer for amemory
read. Conceptually, any feasible address is a possible solution; for complete-
ness, all possible addresses have to be eventually enumerated. We decide to
concretise symbolic reads to a memory address within bounds of the attacker-
controlled buffer, if possible. This follows a general strategy of making sym-
bolic (sometimes referred to as tainting) as much as possible of the program
state. If the value chosen does not lead to a write primitive, the current path
terminates unsuccessfully and a new path is forked with a new value. In the
case of dlmalloc, the result is that the unlink macro fetches symbolic bytes
and ultimately executes a write-4 exploit primitive as before.
4.1.4. . Exploit Mitigation
In this section, we discuss the response to the discovery of the write and allo-
cation primitives.
SafeUnlinking: Unsafe forLookasides Thefirst set ofheap hardening changes
were released with Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003 SP1. Prior to
Windows XP SP2, the heap manager was performing unlink operations on
heap chunk headers in an unsafe manner. A fix that added security checks to
the unlink operation, dubbed safe unlinking, was implemented tomitigate the
problem. However, it relied on an invariance check that required the existence
of both a forward and backward pointer, and was consequently only appli-
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Figure 4.5: Shaping heap layout via allocations
cable to dynamic data structures that possessed both, such as doubly-linked
lists (e.g., FreeLists at the base of the heap). As a result, the lookaside lists,
which are only singly-linked using a forward pointer for efficiency reasons,
remained unsafe with respect to handling this type of metadata corruption.
The safe unlinking check was only added to the kernel pool in Windows 7.
4.1.5. . Memory Layout Shaping
In real-world exploitation scenarios, a few additional considerations come into
play. For example, to achieve successful heap exploitation, a heap’s layoutmight
require special preparation before the activation of an exploit primitive.
In Windows heap management, after allocation requests for memory of
sizeDn andDn+1 bytes and with Freen+2 bytes remaining unallocated in the
heap, the memory layout will resemble that of Figure 4.5. Header Hn+2 refer-
ences a free block of memory and forms part of the FreeLists. If an application
permits buffer Dn+1 to be overflown (the overflow area is marked in bold),
then the Flink and Blink pointers in Hn+2 can be set to arbitrary values.
HeaderHn+2 points back to the FreeList[0] such that a search for available
memory terminates upon returning to the beginning of the head node.
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Layout Morphology In Figure 4.5, the heap is not fragmented and coalesc-
ing is not required, soHn+2 can summarise the entirety of free memory avail-
able in the heap. Any further allocations would split Freen+2 into Dn+2 and
Freen+3, moving Hn+2’s Flink and Blink pointers further towards the end
of the heap. However, a series of de-allocations could poke holes in consec-
utively allocated memory and would result in a fragmented heap, with buffer
Dn potentially sitting next to new Flink and Blink pointers. More advanced
manipulations of heap metadata layouts translate to more surgical exploita-
tion.
Use-After-Frees Use-after-free bugs6 arise from the continued use of dis-
carded memory. They are application-specific errors that do not depend on
heap metadata corruption. However, their exploitation requires an intricate
understanding of memory allocation patterns, reminiscent of heap vulnera-
bilities. Mitigations for use-after-free exploits include isolated heaps and de-
ferred frees. Isolation involves the usage of independent heaps for high-risk
code and user allocations. This guarantees that the heaps will allocate disjoint
memory regions and that user data (i.e. potentially malicious data) cannot be
inadvertently recycled for use by high-risk code. Deferred frees use a fixed-size
buffered queue to delay re-allocations of freed heap chunks. Delays increase
the difficulty of forcing chunk re-allocation at a strategic point in time.
Exploit Reliability Heap spraying is a technique for achieving exploit relia-
bility in the presence of memory address randomisation. The principle behind
heap spraying is to put a heap manager, which starts off in an unknown state,
into a predictable state. This is primarily done for two reasons: firstly, to coun-
teract non-determinism used by modern heap allocators (e.g., a random heap
6CWE-416 class of vulnerability (https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/
416.html)
86 Heap Exploits
base); and secondly, to factor out runtime differences in program state that un-
predictably affect the shape of the heap memory layout. For example, a web
server’s heap consumption might depend on external environmental factors,
such as the number of client connections received that day.
MemoryConvergence Theprobability of a givenmemory addressmatching
the location of attacker data is, generally, directly proportional to the overall
amount of data sprayed onto the heap. It does not, in practice, require the
attacker to fill the entirety of the 232 or 264 address space nor would this be
practical in many cases. Rather, after the attacker places a considerably large
amount (e.g. 200MB) of data on the heap, the most probable candidate lo-
cations for this data will begin to converge at a particular memory address.
Often, while the absolute address of initial allocations are tough to predict,
these eventually become consecutive at higher memory addresses (provided
only the heap base is randomised). It is a sufficient condition for depending
on that memory address to contain attacker data in the general case, thereby
facilitating more reliable exploitation. Of course, more memory-exhaustive
heap sprays increase exploit reliability, but an exploit must strike a fine bal-
ance between reliability and the execution time necessary for the completion
of a successful attack. If a target application is terminated by the user during a
time-consuming heap spray due to a decrease in the application’s responsive-
ness, the attack will be stopped dead in its tracks before it has had the chance
to achieve arbitrary code execution.
Self-referential A commonly used value in heap sprays is the memory ad-
dress 0C0C0C0C. This serves the dual purpose of a valid heap address and a se-
ries of 2-byte NOP instructions (technically, or al, 0x0C). Depending on the
amount of sprayed data required to produce a reliable exploit, low (06060606)
or high (0A0A0A0A) memory addresses can be chosen. The value at the mem-
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ory address 0C0C0C0C is itself set to 0C0C0C0C, effectively creating a self refer-
ential pointer. If any offset into a heap sprayed block is interpreted as a DWORD
pointer and dereferentialized, it also leads back to 0C0C0C0C. In situations
where attackers cannot set valid pointers due to ASLR, this setup avoids ac-
cess violation errors that would otherwise occur when reading from corrupted
pointers. As an exploit mitigation, EMET7 allocates popular regions used by
heap sprays to prevent their use as areas supporting self-referential pointers.
Scripting Engines A target application that is susceptible to heap spraying
typically exposes an interface to its heap. For example, by exposing a scripting
engine to the user. Common instances of applications that expose a JavaScript
interface include web browsers and file format readers. A sequence of instruc-
tions in the interpreted language has a direct mapping to a heap-management
call. In the case of JavaScript, the instruction var x = "hello"; results in
a call to HeapAlloc. For example, joining two BSTR strings in JavaScript re-
sults in a call to HeapAlloc. Thus, 0x12 repetitions of the instruction are con-
catenated to activate the front-end LFH heap manager. For any other inter-
preted language, we require the user to supply an instruction-to-call mapping
(a grammar) for each heap-management call. The heap spray code is then gen-
erated by parsing the grammar and translating each heap call to its correspond-
ing instruction. The granularity of heap manipulations is implementation-
specific. The granularity of heap manipulations depends on a combination
of the application’s interface and our depth of knowledge with respect to heap
behaviour.




This section discusses how a combination of path exploration and pathconstraints can be used to create exploit formulas. Automatically gen-
erating exploits is in many ways similar to generating a test case exhibiting a
particular bug. Therefore, symbolic execution is well-suited as a foundation
for this task. Prior work on automatic exploit generation has either built di-
rectly on symbolic execution [13, 5, 11], or closely related techniques such as
bounded model checking [42].
AEG Definition Firstly, we dissect the various definitions of automatic ex-
ploit generation. The term automatic has previously been used in academic
literature to refer to at least two distinct scenarios. Therefore, to differentiate
between the two categories of exploit generation solutions, we introduce the
designation of the full and the bootstrapped notion of the AEG problem. The
distinction drawn is based on the pre-requisite for exploit synthesis: in the first
case, the AEG system must find a vulnerability, in addition to generating an ex-
ploit; and in the second case, it is already bootstrapped with an input leading
to a vulnerability, and must merely synthesise an exploit for the vulnerability.
TimeComplexity While the precise computational difficulty of crafting valid
exploits depends on the time complexity of the search algorithm employed, it
is the case in practice, at least in previously-built restricted-model AEG sys-
tems, that it is often more computationally efficient to produce a working ex-
ploit than to locate the bug that permitted the exploit to work in the first place.
This is likely due to the fact that exploit templates are simpler than the general
problem of exploit construction and are used only when applicable without
much significant modification. It is expected that a custom shellcode genera-
tor would have higher time complexity than a system applying a template.
4.2. Exploit Synthesis 89
BootstrappedMode The bootstrapped definition of the AEG problem can be
stated as follows: given an input leading to a bug in a program, generate a
new input (an exploit) that executes arbitrary code within the context of the
program. Or more specifically:
Definition 4.1 (bootstrapped). Given a vulnerable program P , an input I ,
a safety property ϕ and a shellcode S , such that running P(I) leads to the
violation of safety property ϕ in P , generate a new input (an exploit) X that
hijacks the control-flow of P and results in the execution of (arbitrary) code
S .
This approach has been taken by [41] and [11] in theirwork on patch-based
exploit generation. On the other hand, the full version of the AEG problem can
be stated as follows: given a description of a computer program, find any safety
violation and generate an input (an exploit) that executes arbitrary code in the
context of that program.
Permitted Assumptions We later clarify and discuss exactly what knowl-
edge it is acceptable to be given a priori about the target or environment. For
example, generally speaking, the environment under which the program oper-
ates is assumed to befixed. Thus, it is acceptable tomake assumptions about the
functionality of the libraries and kernel that compose the environment of the
program under consideration. This assumption is supported by the fact that
all full-system emulators, like S2E, seek only to explore the unit of interest, and
limit exploration of any components considered to be part of the environment.
ProblemStatement Theproblem being addressed in this phase can be stated
as: given an arbitrary applicationA that is host to a heap-based buffer bound-
ary error and given an exploit-friendly set of sequences S, we guideA towards
any member in set S. Thereafter, we produce the exploit solution X such that
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upon running A(X), an exploit primitive overwrites an invoked pointer and
causes subsequent execution of arbitrary code.
Trampoline Logic Suppose it has previously been established that the heap
manager imposes no conflicting constraints on data used in exploit primitives
that would forbid us from using the primitives with our chosen values. In
the next phase, it is necessary to collect constraints imposed by the target ap-
plication to verify whether the same degree of freedom still holds. Both the
heap manager and the target application must permit an attacker to use ex-
ploit primitives with the pre-determined values for exploitation to be possible
(or values must be chosen that are permissible). The constraints must be con-
sistent up to the point of execution of the exploit primitive. Suppose a control-
flow trampoline bounces control to an address residing within the boundaries
of the injected buffer. Hence, the exact offset from the start of the buffer that
control is transferred to is dependent on the trampoline. We shall refer to the
bytes residing exactly at that offset as the landing site.
Byte Restrictions There are usually both spatial and value limitations within
which an exploit must be constructed. It can be the case that the target appli-
cation imposes equality constraints on certain bytes in the user input, such
that the bytes can assume no other values apart from those specified by the
constraints. In addition, any spatial restrictions must permit a constant-size
shellcode and any auxiliary gadgets to fit within the buffer. However, there
are only a limited number of bytes actually necessary for the construction of
a functioning exploit. It is mandatory to exercise control over several bytes at
the landing site. If the successive bytes are bad bytes, this at least permits us to
introduce a jmp instruction to the rest of the shellcode. Failure to do so could
cause an invalid instruction or access violation once control reaches that part
of the buffer. In order to avoid executing bad bytes in the user input that can-
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not, due to constraints, assume values of valid instructions, we prefix all such
bytes with a jmp and conveniently jump over them. If we install shellcode as
an exception handler, an invalid instruction in the shellcode may result in an
infinite loop.
The rest of the bytes that do not form part of the shellcode or any auxiliary
gadgets are set to NOP instructions in order to form a NOP slide directed towards
the shellcode. The resulting NOP slide could be contiguous up to the shellcode
or alternatively, it could be a segmented NOP slide.
Imposing Constraints As a symbolic execution engine, e.g., KLEE, explores
a target program, it gathers path constraints under which any given path can
be realistically taken. These path constraints (Pc) are gathered as logical con-
junctions and can be represented as follows:
Pc = (buf [0] ≡ 0x32) ∧ (buf [1] ≡ 0x32) ∧ (buf [2] ≡ 0x32)
(buf [3] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [4] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [5] ≡ 0x70)
(buf [6] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [7] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [8] ≡ 0x70)
(buf [9] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [A] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [B] ≡ 0x70)
(buf [C] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [D] ≡ 0x70) ∧ (buf [E] ≡ 0x70)
Figure 4.6: Path conditions expressing byte equivalences
In the above case (see Figure 4.6), the first three bytes are each set to 0x32
and the rest of the bytes are all set to 0x70. Needless to say, the logical operators
therein can be different from equivalency assertions. For example, dumping
KLEE conditions for a symbolic byte during program execution can yield the
formula in Code Sample 4.5.
In Code Sample 4.5, the variable heapSym is an injected symbolic byte,
being extended to a width of 32 bits, and after being AND’ed against a value of
0x10, is tested for equivalency to zero, producing an overall boolean result.
92 Heap Exploits
(Eq (w32 0x0)
(And w32 (ZExt w32
(Read w8 0xd v0_heapSym_0))
(w32 0x10)))
Code Sample 4.5: KLEE/LLVM constraints imposed upon bytes
Solving Formulas Subsequently, the SMT solver in the symbolic execution
engine is invoked to produce a decision on satisfiability of the formula, and if
satisfiable, produce a proof: a set of concrete values that can be demonstrably
shown to fit the query. See Code Sample 4.6 for an example function from our
system’ source code that produces concrete values to solver queries.
// Solve symbolic expression for concrete values
void SkyriseAnalyzer::produceTestCase(
S2EExecutionState *state, uint64_t pc) {
ConcreteInputs out;









Code Sample 4.6: Solving the exploit formula for concrete values
4.2.1. . Properties of exploitable heaps
Heap memory layouts generally refer to memory regions occupied by heap
chunks andmetadata, and (various) properties, such as their proximity to each
other. In Section 4.2.2, we list chunk ordering and metadata reachability as
properties that are factors in deciding exploitability.
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4.2.2. . Non-deterministic allocators
As a matter of strategy, attackers seek to position attacker-controlled heap
chunks in front of targetmetadata. This prepares the heap layout for sequential
overflows from the heap chunks in the direction of target metadata.
A sequential buffer overflow of length Z with positive direction from Src
to Dst requires the following properties to hold: an ordering relation (Src <





where k1 and k2 areS-sized allocations, and aZ-byte overflow of k1 occurs
thereafter. Deterministic allocators, e.g., Windows XP, produce a consistent
heap layout between multiple runs of a finite sequence of heap operations. For
n runs of sequence i, everymember of then-sized set of outputswould be equal
to every other. For an empty or defragmented heap, it would hold that k1 < k2
and k1 overflows k2 (by a minimum of 1 byte) ifZ > (k2−k1). The properties
also hold for allocators that randomise the heap base, e.g. Windows Vista or
7, with the exception that the absolute values of k1 and k2 are unpredictable.
Allocators that randomise the heap base and selection of chunks from fixed-
sized containers, e.g., Windows 8, produce heap layouts of polymorphic shape.
Under Windows 8, it may be the case that k1 > k2, making lower-to-higher
address overflows impossible, or creating gaps ofR size, whereR is typically a
multiple of S, such that Z < (k2 − k1). Thus, the aforementioned properties
are a factor in whether a given heap layout is exploitable. Consequently, heap
sequences that piggyback on relative references to memory objects (e.g., seg-





In this chapter, we present the basic concepts behind formulating heapstrings formetadata corruption attacks. The purpose of heap strings isto encapsulate feasible attack techniques and sequences against arbi-trary heap managers. These sequences can be expressed as a series of
interactions with heap data structures andmemory layout via the documented
and exposed heap interface. Depending on whether a heap managers per-
forms deterministic or non-deterministic allocations, these interactions will
result in the instantiation of deterministic or probabilistic heap states. Fur-
thermore, the sequences can be reproduced in target applications to replicate
a particular heap state, such as that handling data unsafely. In combination
with heap-specific search heuristics, the strings can be used to guide target
heap managers into previously identified states of interest. For example, they
can encode the precise steps required to generate, corrupt and overwrite heap
metadata in preparation for program control flow hijacking.




• Section 5.1 briefly derives the motivation for formulating heap strings
for metadata attacks,
• Section 5.2 presents a basic language for encapsulating heap strings,
• Section 5.3 shows the responsiveness of the heap layout morphology to
heap actions,
• Section 5.4 lists some of the inherent properties of heap strings,
• Section 5.5 introduces our modular methodology with which we ap-
proach the heap exploit problem, and provides an overview of the in-
dividual steps (or phases) involved in the process.
5.15.1 Motivation
In order to accommodate the unique properties of the heap, we structure our
approach to heap exploit generation differently than we would to, for example,
stack-based exploit generation. The problem of exploiting heap-based vulner-
abilities differs from that of exploiting stack-based or string-format vulnera-
bilities, in that it actually involves two separate targets: the application that
is host to a heap-based buffer boundary violation and the heap manager that
provisions the memory allocation. Exploit primitives in heap managers, e.g.,
write-4 or write-n for writing 4 or n bytes to an arbitrary address, respec-
tively, exist independently of application-specific implementations. Thus, it
suffices to locate a set of exploit primitives once for each heap allocator and
then re-use the primitives repetitively on different applications1. In the case of
default heap managers in operating systems, the exploit primitives are present
whenever the application runs on that operating system version.
1The assumption being that offsets of trampolines will be valid in both surrogates and
target applications, as they share common modules, e.g., kernel32.dll.
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Modularity Recognising this, we make use of the modularity and advocate
a compositional approach to exploit generation for heap-based vulnerabili-
ties. The problem is akin to that of compositional symbolic execution [33, 2].
Standard symbolic execution re-explores a procedure if two distinct paths lead
through it. On the other hand, compositional symbolic execution explores
procedures in isolation and combines inter-procedural paths to form a set of
realistic program paths. Since each procedure is merely explored once, the set
of possible inter-procedural paths scales linearly rather than exponentially in
the number of procedures explored [33], partially constituting a solution to
the path explosion problem. The compositional approach is also motivated
by the fact that in more complex non-deterministic heap allocators, crafting
an exploit-friendly heap layout may be a pre-condition for successful exploita-
tion. While such an architecture is not strictly necessary for our current work,
we recognise the future importance of such an architecture.
In stack-based instances of the exploit generation problem [42, 5] with no
exploit mitigations enabled, output from tools performing test case generation
is used as the basis for exploits. In other words, a concrete input that exercises
a path leading to a vulnerability in a program is used as a prefix in the exploit
string. It is always possible to layer shellcode on top of the prefix to achieve
arbitrary code execution. However, with exploit mitigations enabled and, in
particular, due to the non-determinism caused by Address Space Layout Ran-
domisation (ASLR) [78, 52], a path leading to an exploit primitive may no
longer constitute a sufficient condition for successful exploitation. The heap
layout may need to be rendered exploit-friendly in advance to enable the pre-
diction of memory addresses, as in heap spraying [26] or heap feng shui [77].
This requirement might in turn designate a subset of the paths in the vulnera-
ble program as non-exploitable.
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A heap exploit. A heap exploit is typically a composition of the following
components:
1. Heap spray - this step increases the probability of the attacker correctly
referencing data in memory from the ”corruption phase” despite a lack
of memory address awareness.
2. Heap manipulation - this step makes sure that the necessary heap meta-
data is in position to be corrupted by a heap buffer overflow.
3. Heap corruption - the replacement of metadata values to facilitate the
attack.
4. Trigger - the point of redirection of program control flow (when the
metadata takes effect)
Secret states Because a remote Internet-facing web server would have exe-
cuted an arbitrary sequence of heap actions due to environmental factors, it
will be in an unpredictable ”black-box” state. Knowing the exact sequence of
heap actions that leads to a vulnerable heap layout is not so useful, because the
exact sequence can no longer be imposed. We need to learn how to transition
(using heap deltas) the target server from an unknown state into a predictable
one.
Heap protocol Heap vulnerabilities can be summarised as violations of the
”protocol” that expresses a number of expectations from valid interactions be-
tween a client application and a heap manager:
1. a client application should respect the boundaries of dynamically allo-
cated memory and free the memory after usage (explicitly via free()
or implicitly via garbage collection),
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2. each request for memory, if successful, should result in the returning of
new ”legal” memory by the heap manager,
3. an allocated memory chunk must only be freed once (or rather, a free
chunk should not be freed), after which its scope expires and its usemust
cease.
RuleViolations Aviolation of rule I by the client application results inmem-
ory leaks and corrupted heap metadata (e.g., via a buffer overflow). This can
in turn facilitate a violation of rule II, such that the heap manager is forced to
allocate over an existing object (yielding a heap exploit primitive). Instances of
rule III violations by the client application include double-free and use-after-
free memory errors. In the definition of rule II, the term ”legal” is stronger
than simply ”unallocated” when expressing memory that should be returned
by a heap manager. For example, memory from a secondary heap could be
both committed and unallocated in a running process, but is not a ”legal” al-
location with respect to the primary heap.
Stack vsHeap There are intrinsic differences between the stack and the heap.
A program’s stack is a single linear first-in-last-out data structure; it is a con-
tiguous piece of memory, manipulated via x86 instructions PUSH and POP and
the stack pointer, ESP. A program’s heap, on the other hand, is a complex blend
of memory chunks and management operations that provision and optimise
thatmemory. A heap is often host tomultiple data structures, including singly-
and doubly-linked lists, bitmaps and pointer lookup tables. The automatic ex-
ploit generation problem must account for not only data sitting on the heap,
but also the operations that are unique to each heap manager.
Compositional It is unnecessary to re-explore the heap manager in search
for exploit primitives for every target application, since the heap manager is
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a module shared by multiple applications (excluding custom memory wrap-
pers). The compositional approach to exploit generation put forward in this
document advocates an initial exploration of the heap manager in isolation.
The reasoning behind this suggestion follows the observation that ascertain-
ing a set of exploitable heap configurations is beneficial for numerous reasons
that are intrinsic to the problem at hand:
1. it is computationally cheaper to explore the heap manager and applica-
tion independently, forming a set of inter-procedural paths that grows
in size linearly rather than exponentially,
2. it partially addresses the state space explosion problem by informing
search heuristics to guide the application towards a heap configuration
previously identified as being exploitable,
3. it helps to pre-emptively setup the correct heap memory layout before
triggering a vulnerability in the target application (a possible pre-requisite
for satisfying exploitability conditions).
5.25.2 Language Definition
In this section, a basic encoding is defined for encapsulating sequences ofheap interactions and describing a subset of their properties. This enables
search heuristics to find, recognise and navigate towards sequences that carry
out heap metadata attacks and discriminate against sequences that deviated
from perscribed patterns.
heap = C(options)
chunk = A(heap, size)
chunk = A(size)
F (heap, chunk)
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W (dst, src, size)
Lowercase identifiers are variables. Uppercase are functions. Specifically, the
uppercase symbols (C,A, F,W ) are placeholders for heap-management func-
tions HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, HeapFree and CopyMemory, respectively, if
operating on the Windows platform. Therefore, their precise semantics are
defined not by our encoding, but by the implementation of the heap allocator.
It is sufficient for symbol A to map to a memory allocation routine, regard-
less of its implementation details, as the symbol represents an approximation
of the routine. The uppercase symbols are mapped to their respective equiva-
lents onUNIX-based platforms. For example, the default Linux equivalents for
HeapAlloc and HeapFree would be malloc and free calls, respectively. If
the target is a custom heap allocator operating on top of the default heap, then
the symbols would map to the custom allocator’s interface for manipulating
the custom heap implementation. The symbol A is overloaded in the follow-
ing way: if a heap is specified alongside a size value, then an allocation occurs
from that heap; if a heap is not explicitly specified, the process’ or custom heap
implementation’s default heap is used to resolve the allocation request.
C : Z → Z
A : Z × Z → Z
A : Z → Z
F : Z × Z
W : Z × Z ×Z
Z values are integers: heap chunk sizes must be non-negative whole num-
bers and heap handles are assumed to be unsigned integer values as well. Val-
ues such as S1 are symbolic, i.e. arbitrary functions of user input. The se-
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quences are described in their simplest form - which is merely one instance of
an attack from a class of possible attack sequences. Every assume is somewhat
implicit in the usage of the sequence; it does not need to be explicitly articu-
lated in the sequence. Every const is a text-replacement macro, requiring no
code execution. This keyword explicitly states that for the sequence to remain
consistent, any vales marked as constants must be preserved and non-variable.
If A results in B we write A → B. A discarded or non-existent return value
(function doesn’t exit) is written as . For example, the following sentences
from the heap language allocate two S-sized chunks, k1 and k2, and write Z




Claim. Every possible sequence of interactions between a target program
and a heap manager is expressible as a string over the heap language. A sym-
bolic execution engine can build a set of path-wise heap strings that completely
embody the heap interactions and can instantiate the resulting heap state at a
later stage (modulo approximations).
Heap State Approximation
Only a handful of heap call arguments are relevant for building heap models
that answer the question of heap exploitability. The prototype of a HeapAlloc
call isHeapAlloc(HANDLE hHeap, DWORD dwFlags, SIZE_T dwBytes). An
abstraction of the call can record detail including: hHeap, specifying which
heap provisions the allocation, and dwBytes, placing a hard limit on the mini-
mum size of a successful allocation. Whether dwFlags is set to zero-out newly
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allocated memory is not always relevant. Given a heap language H , it may be
the case that for two strings A and B, where A ∈ L(H) and B ∈ L(H), it
holds that A = B, but A and B actually produce distinct heap states in real-
ity. Thus, every string in the heap language is an over-approximation of a heap
state. The precision of heap state approximations should directly reflect the
granularity of heap language H , w.r.t. the arguments collected. Heap layouts
produced by A and B can differ on non-deterministic heap allocators due to
entropy introduced as part of the ASLR exploit mitigation measure.
5.35.3 Morphology of Heap Layouts
If the following unlink-link sequence puts the heap allocator into a vulner-able state
k0 = A(n); W (k0, ...); A();
then variants thereof may or may not lead to an exploitable heap state, de-
pending on whether the extra heap operations affect exploitability properties.
For example, a sequence can tolerate an arbitrary number of A symbols if an
arbitrary repetition ofA preserves the essential property: the relative distance
between a heap chunk and target metadata. Assume the heap state remains
exploitable even after prefixing severalA(n) operations, yielding the following
(still) exploitable variations:
A(n); k0 = A(n); W (k0, ...); A(n);
A(n); A(n); k0 = A(n); W (k0, ...); A(n);
A(n); A(n); A(n); k0 = A(n); W (k0, ...); A(n);
Thus, to summarise the unlink method as completely as possible, we ex-
tract a pattern recognition automaton. The automaton in Figure 5.1 accepts a
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Cstart AK OK A
Figure 5.1: An automaton for a heap sequence
(non-regular) language, which asserts the sequence of heap operations neces-
sary for executing an unlink attack (e.g. against ptmalloc2 in glibc 2.3.3). The
automaton captures the properties that constitute an exploitable heap layout
w.r.t. the unlink attack. The sequence can tolerate an arbitrary number of A
symbols, since an arbitrary repetition ofA preserves the essential property: the
relative distance between a heap chunk and target metadata. Search heuristics
aim to navigate exploration down any program paths that correspond to heap
strings generated by the automaton in Figure 5.1.
5.45.4 Properties of Heap Strings
In this section, we discuss the properties of heap strings, such as fragility andrecyclability or reusability.
Let P be the set of all strings over heap language H that are accepted by
heap manager M . Set P can be logically divided into strings that produce
vulnerable states (set V ) under M and strings that produce safe, benign states
(setS) underM , such thatP = V ∪S. An unsafe heap state is considered to be
one that exhibits a heap exploit primitive, and a benign state is one which does
not. In the case of non-deterministic allocators, sets V and S might intersect.
Armed with a specification of heap language H , any feasible heap state
underM can be instantiated by iterative enumeration of set P in a blind or se-
lective manner. For unbounded string lengths, P may be an infinite set. This
makes it only practical to enumerate a proper subset of P . Attackers seek to
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find unsafe heap states (produced by members of set V ) and re-instantiate any
Vi ∈ V in target programs. By instrumenting heap calls, the symbolic exe-
cution engine extracts a string j ∈ L(H). Subsequently, j can be re-used in
target programs that allocate fromM , in order to transitionM from an initial
(benign) state to an unsafe, vulnerable state. A correctly crafted j is instru-
mental in a heap metadata corruption exploit, because j must encapsulate the
necessary steps to generate metadata, corrupt it and force its unsafe process-
ing by M . Heap strings are program-independent in the heap states they yield.
Thus, it suffices to find a heap string for M once, and re-use it in the entire
set of programs that use M (if that program path is feasible) to re-instantiate
a particular, desired state. Furthermore, due to internal differences between
heap managers, heap strings are typically allocator-specific. Attacks against dl-
malloc, ptmalloc2, Windows 2000, Windows XP, Windows 7 and Windows 8
default heaps can all be expressed as strings over the heap language.
Heap manipulation A heap action is an invocation of a heap management
call, e.g. HeapAlloc. This normally results in changes (heap deltas) to the
heap state. In a deterministic heap manager, a finite sequence of heap ac-
tions produces a single consistent heap state at each execution. For example,
two consecutive heap allocations are guaranteed to sit side by side in mem-
ory. The heap state is predictable by an attacker if the target application’s
state is also known (both states are inter-dependent and can suffer from cross-
propagation of error). Under a non-deterministic heap manager, such as Win-
dows 8, wherein allocations are randomly offset as an exploit mitigation mea-
sure, a sequence of heap actions produces merely one of a set of numerous
possible states.
Heap Layout Configuration The configuration of the heap layout refers to
the composition of heap metadata sitting on the heap. It refers to the identity
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of the metadata data structures, their absolute positions in memory and their
proximity to other metadata. In popular attacks such as buffer overflows, close
proximity of heap metadata to a vulnerable buffer is key to success. Ergo, at-
tackers seek to execute a sequence of heap actions in the target application that
yield the desired heap layout. Attackers cannot directly interface with a target
application’s heap manager. Rather, interactions with heap managers are me-
diated via the code of target applications and might be controlled to a varying
degree by inputs supplied to the applications. For example, if an application
allocates a heap buffer B for a null-terminated string Z that it receives over the
network, it might do:
char *B = malloc(strlen(Z) + 1)
whereby the size parameter passed to the malloc request is completely con-
trolled by the length of attacker-supplied string B. Assume the target applica-
tion is a Internet-facing web server and Z can be sent to the application repet-
itively. Then, the program path from the receipt of Z to the malloc call is
considered to be an allocation gadget. It may be used repetitively to spray the
heap or position chunks in some desired order. Target applications that ex-
pose a scripting engine, such as web browsers processing JavaScript, thus ex-
pose their heaps to manipulation by attackers. In heap exploitation, the pre-
emptive crafting of heap layout prior to the triggering of an vulnerability is in
most cases a pre-requisite for later satisfying exploitability conditions.
heapExploit = heapSpray + heapCrafting
+ vulnOverflow + callTrigger
The attacker must know the following:
• What metadata does a heap action generate?
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• Which metadata is sensitive and which is impervious to manipulation?
• How do we execute a desired sequence of heap actions in the target ap-
plication?
Definition 5.1 (Heap Manager). The heap manager exposes an interface with
a series of contractual obligations. One of which is to return, upon a request
formemory, a chunk of size larger than or equal to the requested size. The heap
manager is a stateful (Turing) machine that accepts inputs that are sentences
from languageL. The languageL has a symbol for each heapmanagement call
exported by the heap manager (and each supported argument).
Each terminating path in an application performs a finite sequence of heap
actions at runtime. The signature of its heap activity is therefore a string over
language L. Let H be the recursively enumerable set of all possible sequences
of heap actions. Or equivalently, letH be the set of all strings overL. The heap
signature of any path in the target application is thus necessarily contained in
H . Take a particular sequence i ∈ H . AssumeC(i) is the heap layout resulting
from one execution of i. Furthermore, assume Pi is the set of all possible heap
layouts that results from an execution of i. It is always the case that C(i) ∈ Pi.
A proper subset of Pi can be ascertained by exercising the heap manager on
sequence i (via simulation). After n simulations of sequence i, each C(i) will
have an associated frequency of occurrence. Thus, we can assign a probability
to each C(i) ∈ Pi for any sequence i. The sequence with most success should
be selected. In the case of a deterministic allocator, e.g. Windows XP, Pi can
be ascertained in a single run of i because |Pi| = 1 or alternatively
∀ k, p ∈ Pi : k ≡ p
A heap exploit also exhibits a signature of heap activity. If we know a se-
quence of heap actions, X , that is exploitable, and know the heap activity so
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far, we can derive the necessary heap actions to reach X . If we have found an
allocation gadget and free gadget for a target application, we should know how
to take the path to reach sequence X . If we have a test input from a bug re-
port that causes metadata corruption, but takes a non-exploitable path, we can
re-construct that path in a surrogate. If we’re using a user-specified grammar
of a scripting language, we can derive the input by parsing the heap call-to-
instruction mapping. Recursively enumerating the set H for Windows XP,
shows that
1. HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapAlloc
2. HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapAlloc, HeapAlloc
3. HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapAlloc, HeapAlloc, HeapAlloc
all result in similar metadata corruption (they have the same exploit primitive
in common). Therefore, the most suitable sequence can be picked based on
what the target application permits.
5.55.5 Overview of Methodology
Since the introduction of the patch-based exploit generation challenge [11],
there have been a number of tools that have attempted to automate the entire
exploit writing pipeline. These tools have, under relaxed security measures,
produced exploits for stack-based and string-format vulnerabilities [13, 42, 5].
However, due to limitations in their modelling of security vulnerabilities, their
capabilities did not extend to heap-based vulnerabilities. To successfully ex-
ploit the heap, an exploit generation tool must be able to reason about factors
such as the heap layout and heap-management functions.
In this thesis, we set the scene for the heap exploit generation problem by
defining a heap vulnerability as a manipulation of heap metadata that results
in the execution of an exploit primitive for writing arbitrary data to arbitrary
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locations. Hence, we are concerned only with a subclass of all heap vulner-
abilities and present an exploit generator for finding write primitives in heap
allocators. Thus, there are instances of heap vulnerabilities that escape our
model. For example, an attacker that overwrites heap metadata used in the al-
location search can cause a heap allocator to return non-free security-sensitive
memory to a client application instead of a free chunk, permitting an attacker
to read from or write to that sensitive memory. Such a situation does not in-
volve the execution of an exploit primitive but it demonstrates an abuse of the
heap interface.
In this section, we give an overview of our approach to automatic exploit
generation for heap-based vulnerabilities. There are several dimensions to the
heap-based exploit generation problem. Our system is composed of multiple
components, each addressing a separate sub-task that forms part of the overall
solution. The algorithm establishes a chain of information flow from com-
ponents with lower identifiers (for example, phase #1) to components with
higher identifiers (for example, phase #2). It is worth mentioning that there
are numerous ways to approach the problem, based on the desired objective.
For example, in order to produce exploits in the fastest manner, running the
components consecutively in a depth-first fashion is preferred. In order to per-
form a more complete search of the heap manager and discover as many ex-
ploit primitives as possible, a breadth-first search should be selected. Briefly,
the steps that we take are:
I) Find a sequence that permits heap metadata to be sequentially overwrit-
ten during an overflow and build a surrogate program that implements
the sequence (Interact).
II) Inject an input buffer with symbolic bytes and discover an exploit prim-
itive in the heap manager (Primitive).
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III) Locate a transfer of control flow to a function pointer and impose con-
straints such that the exploit primitive hijacks the pointer (Hijack and
Bounce).
In order to clarify the individual steps that are taken, we present a walk-
through of the algorithm. The initial step, the Interact phase, involves find-
ing a sequence that permits heap metadata to be sequentially overwritten dur-
ing a buffer overflow. In this step, we explore different combinations of heap-
management functions and overflow positions, until we isolate the sequence
(HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapAlloc) as leading to
a corruption of heap metadata. The sequence is implemented by a surrogate
program thatmerely acts as a skeleton for exercising the called functions in the
heap manager. In our evaluation, we use a set of pre-generated surrogates, but
principally, a system can use a single surrogate and pick various different paths
through it, i.e., not executing the program in sequential order, in order to avoid
the overhead of surrogate re-compilation. Using a surrogate program avoids
the possibility of unnecessarily exploring irrelevant paths upon the injection
of symbolic bytes. In this particular instance, the final HeapAlloc call trusts
the corrupted metadata and performs an unsafe operation, causing the subse-
quent execution of an exploit primitive. The purpose of the Interact phase
is to determine vulnerable sequences of application-heap interactions for arbi-
trary heap managers. The process should elucidate and encapsulate sufficient
information for heap layout differences to be eliminated from consideration
in the subsequent phases.
The second phase, Primitive, is designed to look for exploit primitives.
Once Interact passes a sequence to Primitive, a mov [eax], ecx instruc-
tion can be observed executing in the heap manager in ntdll.dll as shown
in Figure 5.2. Primitive is designed to detect that both EAX and ECX registers
contain symbolic values at that point and are therefore under a degree of con-
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trol of the attacker, determined by the constraints imposed on the symbolic
values.
77F5233A ...
77F5233D mov [ebp-C0h], ecx
77F52343 mov eax, [eax+04h]
77F52346 mov [ebp-C4h], eax
77F5234C L_unlink:
77F5234C mov [eax], ecx
77F5234E mov [ecx+04h], eax
77F52351 mov al, [esi+05h]
77F52356 ...
Figure 5.2: The procedure containing an exploit primitive
Upon marking the exploit primitive, Primitive runs the third phase, Hi-
jack, which resumes execution from the point of the exploit primitive until a
pointer is detected that would permit a hijack of control flow. The intuition
being that the exploit primitive will overwrite the pointer and causes a transfer
of control to arbitrary parts of the application. In order to find such pointers,
we follow the execution trace until an indirect transfer of control is observed.
Such a transfer of control often occurs when a function pointer in a call table is
invoked or an installed exception handler kicks in. Due to heap metadata cor-
ruption, after the execution of the exploit primitive, an exception occurs in the
heap manager and a series of exception handlers are invoked. Observe from
Figure 5.3, that in one of the exception handling dispatch routines, the value
at memory address 77ED63B4 is moved into EAX and subsequently called.
After Hijack extracts the memory address, one half of the data required to
hijack control flow using the discovered exploit primitive has been ascertained.
By setting EAX to 77ED63B4 at the mov [eax], ecx instruction, control flow
will be transferred to the value of ECX, provided that the same path is followed
in the target application. The objective is to perform a jump to data in the in-
jected buffer that will be host to arbitrary shellcode. In order to construct such
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77EB9B80 ...
77EB9B82 mov eax, [L77ED63B4]




77EB9B8E cmp eax, 01h
77EB9B91 ...
Figure 5.3: The UEF exception handler dispatch
a jump, it must be determined whether at the point of control transfer (call
eax) it is possible to utilise a register to perform an indirect jump to the in-
jected buffer. Thus, our system scans the 8 general purpose registers and finds
that two different registers (EDI and EBP) reference a pointer to our buffer.
We select one of the available options (EDI) and use an in-vitro scanner in the
guest operating system to look for call or jmp instructions to EDI+offset in
any module loaded in the target process. Obtaining an address of such an in-
struction gives us the second half of data necessary for hijacking control flow
using the discovered exploit primitive. The address will be the value imposed
upon data that is loaded into the ECX register at the point of the exploit primi-
tive. The remaining problem is that of constructing a valid shellcode that does
not conflict with constraints imposed upon user input.
5.5.1. . Application-heap interaction
The purpose of the Interact phase is to determine exploitable sequences of
application-heap interactions for arbitrary heapmanagers. The process should
elucidate and encapsulate sufficient information for heap layout differences to
be eliminated from consideration in the subsequent phases. The set F would
contain commonheap-management functions, such asHeapCreate, HeapAlloc
and HeapFree. The set F2 = {F ∪ overflow} merely adds an overflow ele-
ment toF , whichmarks the position at which a buffer overflow should be sim-
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A→ H requesting memory chunk M using HeapAlloc
A← H returning memory chuck M matching request
A→M using memory chunk M for data storage
A→ H deallocating memory chunk M using HeapFree
Figure 5.4: Interaction between application and heapmanager
ulated. Interact involves discovering sequences of application-heap interac-
tions, limited to elements of set F2, that upon the corruption of heap metadata
permit an exploit primitive to be reached.
The act of determining a sequence of heap-application interactions that
causes a heapmanager tomalfunction indicates the occurrence of two separate
events: 1) the overflow element succeeded in touching and corrupting heap
metadata, and therefore it can be ascertained that metadata is present after
an allocated memory chunk, hinting at the shape of the heap layout, and 2)
the heap management function following the overflow element is susceptible
to trusting invalid data. In contrast, if the sequence (HeapAlloc, overflow,
HeapFree) manages to overwrite heap metadata, but HeapFreemakes no use
of the corrupted metadata, then an exploit primitive will not be found and
surrogate A will terminate gracefully.
The problem addressed in this phase can be stated as: given an implemen-
tation of an arbitrary heap manager H and a corresponding interface F for
creating private heaps, and allocating and freeing memory in the heaps, de-
termine a set of necessary and sufficient sequences of application-heap inter-
actions S that permit an application to corrupt heap metadata and violate the
internal consistency of heap data structures.
Observe from Figure 5.4 that memory chunkM has valid-until-free scope.
A is free to interact with M in whatever way it wishes, including writing past
the boundaries ofM into (potentially) heap metadata. This would be a case of
a classic heap-based buffer overflow, which violates the internal consistency of
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heap data structures. Once heap metadata is corrupted, subsequently invoked
heap-management functions, such as memory allocations and de-allocations,
can be made to perform unsafe computations if they fail to verify the integrity
of heap metadata. In practice, there exists a wide variety of methods for over-
writing heap metadata. In this work, we restrict our model to heap-based
buffer overflows that always overwrite heap metadata sequentially by writing
past the boundaries of allocated buffers. This means that the surrogate pro-
gram is generated such that the input buffer is always an allocated memory
chunk, rather than a heap base structure or a random portion of the heap.
The list of possible software security errors that could result in the corruption
of metadata is too exhaustive to detail here. For example, it is not necessary
to corrupt metadata sequentially by overwriting an allocated buffer. Strictly
speaking, an integer arithmetic error in an array subscript could always di-
rectly corrupt heapmetadata from any point in a program, all the while leaving
adjacent fields such as header cookies intact.
This can be enforced by conjoining HeapAlloc with the overflow element
and making it the only mandatory element in S. In the context of heap-based
buffer overflows, the problem can be stated as follows: given an arbitrary heap
manager and a set of heap-management functions, determine the sequence of
interactions necessary and sufficient for an application to corrupt heap meta-
data by writing past the boundaries of an allocated buffer. With regards to
completeness, this makes the set of vulnerabilities that we use to trigger ex-
ploit primitives a proper subset of the set of vulnerabilities in existence.
This implies that there may exist exploit primitives that are not detected by
our model, due to factors such as the heap layout and the ordering of memory
chunks. For example, if a heap base structure always precedes the memory
chunks given to client applications, fields in the heap base structure will never
be injected with symbolic bytes and will always be treated as concrete. Any
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potential manipulations of the fields that could give rise to exploitable config-
urations will be overlooked by design. However, it is possible for a particular
sequence of application-heap interactions to switch features on/off in the heap
base structure. For example, a large number of consecutive allocations and
de-allocations may result in the enabling of Lookaside lists [54] that permit
exploitation to take place, due to a lack of safety checks on singly-linked lists.
As the set of possible application-heap interaction sequences is infinite with
an unbounded length parameter, the length threshold serves to terminate the
search. Upon constructing a surrogate program A that implements the se-
quence S, A is passed to Primitive in order to be injected.
It is possible to benefit searchheuristics by ascertaining a vulnerable application-
heap interaction sequence. After discovering an interaction that causes the
heap manager to malfunction, it is possible to prioritise paths in the target
application by giving precedence to paths that follow that sequence of interac-
tions. For example, if a malfunction was preceded by a sequence of program-
heap interactions equivalent to the sequence HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapFree,
then preference is given to a state that took the correct first step. Some appli-
cations expose an API or a scripting engine, permitting for more fine-grained
control of the heap layout. For example, joining two BSTR strings in JavaScript
results in a call to HeapAlloc [77]. Given an application-heap interaction se-
quence, by feeding symbolic input into an interpreter, it should be theoretically
possible to derive code that induces that application-heap sequence in an ap-
plication and use the code to setup an attack.
Thepurpose of the Interactphase inAlgorithm1 is to ascertain sequences
of heap interactions for arbitrary heap managers that generate metadata, per-
mit its corruption and unsafely handle the result. The process should elucidate
and then encapsulate sufficient information for memory layout differences to
be eliminated from consideration in the subsequent phases.
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Data: a set of heap interface functions F
Data: length threshold L
Result: an exploit primitive tuple {Aval, Vval}
while len≤ L do
if (S = pickNewSequence(F , len) ̸= ⊥) then
A← genSurrogate(S);




len← len + 1
end
end
Algorithm 1: Finding a heap sequence (Interact)
Problem Statement The problem addressed in this phase can be stated as:
given an implementation of an arbitrary heapmanagerH and a corresponding
interface F for creating private heaps, and allocating and freeing memory in
the heaps, determine a set of necessary and sufficient sequences of application-
heap interactions S that permit an application to corrupt heap metadata and
violate the internal consistency of heap data structures.
Scan Implementation ThesetF would contain commonheap-management
functions, such as HeapCreate, HeapAlloc and HeapFree. The set F2 =
{F ∪ overflow}merely appends an overflow element to F , which marks the
position at which a buffer overflow should be simulated. Interact involves
discovering sequences of application-heap interactions, limited to elements of
set F2, that upon the corruption of heap metadata permit an exploit primitive
to be reached.
Surrogates In order to facilitate the exploration of the heap manager, sur-
rogate applications are used. Surrogates are bare-bones programs akin to test
drivers, designed to stimulate the heap manager into action by invoking its ex-
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ported functions. Using real-world applications for this purpose would add
unnecessary overhead (in the form of irrelevant paths) that distract from the
unit under consideration.
Detection Principle The act of determining a sequence of heap-application
interactions that causes a heap manager to malfunction indicates the occur-
rence of two separate events:
1. the overflow element succeeded in touching and corrupting heap meta-
data, and therefore it can be ascertained that metadata is present after an
allocated memory chunk, hinting at the shape of the heap layout, and
2. the heap management function following the overflow element is sus-
ceptible to trusting corrupted data.
In contrast, if the sequence (HeapAlloc, overflow, HeapFree) manages to
overwrite heap metadata, but HeapFreemakes no use of the corrupted meta-
data, then an exploit primitive will not be found and surrogateAwill terminate
gracefully.
5.5.2. . Heap exploit primitives
The problem being addressed in this phase (Algorithm 2) can be stated as:
given the heap implementation H, a heap-management interface F to H and a
member from the set of application-heap sequences Si, discover a set of heap
exploit primitives P for overwriting security-sensitive data in the application.
Figure 7.10 shows the set of exploit primitives with respect to symbolic bytes.
M[c]← x symbolic write-n to fixed location
M[x]← c fixed write-n to symbolic location
M[x]← x symbolic write-n to symbolic location
Figure 5.5: Description of heap exploit primitives
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Data: a surrogate S exercising a good sequence
Result: an offset tuple {Aval, Vval} for exploit primitive
while (P = pickNewPath(S)) ̸= ⊥ do
while (I = nextInstruct (P )) ̸= ⊥ do
if (I =M[A]← V ) then
if (A = sym) ∧ (V = sym) then
{Aval, Ref} = FindHijack(P, I);
Vval = Bounce (Ref);
ok = P.addCon(A = Aval, V = Vval);







Algorithm 2: Discovering an exploit primitive (Primitive)
M[·] is a total function mapping a memory address to its corresponding
value and x is an attacker-controlled symbolic value, whichmay have arbitrary
constraints imposed upon it. Symbolic bytes experience implicit data tainting:
if only attacker-specified input is made symbolic and critical operations even-
tually manipulate symbolic bytes, then attacker input is reaching critical oper-
ations under some constraints. The constraints determine the level of control
that the attacker exercises over the values used in critical operations. Hence,
anytime a flow of symbolic data to a symbolic destination is detected, we have
discovered a heap exploit primitive. The primitive is used as a building block
in a chain of primitives to ultimately achieve arbitrary code execution. Gener-
ally, we deal with write-n primitives. In the case of a 32-bit system, n refers
to a value of 1, 2 or 4 bytes, as opposed to an unbounded value.
5.5.3. . Finding control hijacks
The problem being addressed in Algorithm 3 can be stated as: given P , the set
of heap exploit primitives in H , we find a writable pointer T in H such that
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Data: a path P to search
Result: an offset tuple {Aval, Vval} for exploit primitive
while ((I = nextInstruct (P )) ̸= ⊥) do
// Discard if modified
if (modifies(I, r32)) then
map[r32][0] = bad;
end




if (I = (goto r32)) then
if (map[r32][0] = ok) then
Ref = scanRegs(P);





Algorithm 3: Finding transfers of control (Bounce)
a single member or a chain of members from the set P can hijack the control
flow of H by redirecting T to an attacker-controlled address.
Hijack aims to locate indirect transfers of control to memory locations
that are writable. Informally, we are interested in showing that the value of
r322 has not been modified up to the point of the transfer, since it first as-
sumed the value of a memory address. In theory, if a modification has taken
place, we could build a symbolic expression of themodification, such that solv-
ing a formula for an address of interest would yield the original value we must
set the memory address to. However, we limit the scope of our analysis and
use program slicing. The process of slicing deletes those parts of the program
that are determined to have no effect on the variable of interest. In addition, we
disregard a value if it gets modified during that temporal window. Static anal-
ysis is utilised to correlate the movement of a memory address into a register
2r32 is the register observed being used as a jump trampoline.
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with the register’s subsequent invocation. This implies that the concrete path
being explored must display such behaviour for it to be observed in the first
place. However, there exist situations when an exception handling dispatch
routine, which would otherwise display such recognisable behaviour, is pro-
tected by a conditional guard. The dispatch routine might not run if a handler
is not installed a priori.
5.5.4. . Shellcoding
The shellcode is fitted with Service Pack-specific offsets to API functions that
are employed by the shellcode. This occurs at the Bounce phase, which also
seeks out memory addresses of trampolines to the buffer. The bytes that cause
logical contradictions when values corresponding to the individual bytes of in-
structions are imposed on them are filtered out. A contiguous or segmented
NOP slide to shellcode that maximises the probability of its execution is con-
structed.







Figure 5.6: An example application-specific exploit
The exploit is expressed as a C-based character array and also packaged
into a stand-alone executable Python script, based on the desired method of
delivery, e.g., over a network to network-enabled applications, and transferred
to the guest operating system for deployment.
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Trampoline Logic Suppose it has previously been established that the heap
manager imposes no conflicting constraints on data used in exploit primitives
that would forbid us from using the primitives with our chosen values. In
the next phase, it is necessary to collect constraints imposed by the target ap-
plication to verify whether the same degree of freedom still holds. Both the
heap manager and the target application must permit an attacker to use ex-
ploit primitives with the pre-determined values for exploitation to be possible
(or values must be chosen that are permissible). The constraints must be con-
sistent up to the point of execution of the exploit primitive. Suppose a control-
flow trampoline bounces control to an address residing within the boundaries
of the injected buffer. Hence, the exact offset from the start of the buffer that
control is transferred to is dependent on the trampoline. We shall refer to the
bytes residing exactly at that offset as the landing site.
Byte Restrictions There are usually both spatial and value limitations within
which an exploit must be constructed. It can be the case that the target appli-
cation imposes equality constraints on certain bytes in the user input, such
that the bytes can assume no other values apart from those specified by the
constraints. In addition, any spatial restrictions must permit a constant-size
shellcode and any auxiliary gadgets to fit within the buffer. However, there
are only a limited number of bytes actually necessary for the construction of
a functioning exploit. It is mandatory to exercise control over several bytes at
the landing site. If the successive bytes are bad bytes, this at least permits us to
introduce a jmp instruction to the rest of the shellcode. Failure to do so could
cause an invalid instruction or access violation once control reaches that part
of the buffer. In order to avoid executing bad bytes in the user input that can-
not, due to constraints, assume values of valid instructions, we prefix all such
bytes with a jmp and conveniently jump over them. If we install shellcode as
an exception handler, an invalid instruction in the shellcode may result in an
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infinite loop.
The rest of the bytes that do not form part of the shellcode or any auxiliary
gadgets are set to NOP instructions in order to form a NOP slide directed towards
the shellcode. The resulting NOP slide could be contiguous up to the shellcode
or alternatively, it could be a segmented NOP slide.
Imposing Constraints As a symbolic execution engine, e.g., KLEE, explores
a target program, it gathers path constraints under which any given path can
be realistically taken. For example, dumping KLEE conditions for a symbolic
byte during program execution can yield the formula in Code Sample 5.1.
100 [State 1] Forking state 1 at pc = 0x40105c
state 1 with condition (Eq (w32 0x1)
(Concat w32 (Extract w8 24 N0:(ZExt w32 N1:(
Read w8 0x0 v0_symInject_0)))
(Concat w24 (Extract w8 16 N0)
(Concat w16 (Extract w8
8 N0) N1))))
state 2 with condition (Not (Eq (w32 0x1)
(Concat w32 (Extract w8 24 N0:(ZExt w32 N1
:(Read w8 0x0 v0_symInject_0)))
(Concat w24 (Extract w8 16 N0)
(Concat w16 (
Extract w8 8 N0) N1)))))
Code Sample 5.1: State forking underWindows 7 heapmanager
In Code Sample 5.1, we can see state forking under the Windows 7 heap
manager and the two associated path constraints, including the negation part.
Solving Formulas Subsequently, the SMT solver in the symbolic execution
engine is invoked to produce a decision on satisfiability of the formula, and if
satisfiable, produce a proof: a set of concrete values that can be demonstrably
shown to fit the query.
CHAPTER 6
Metadata Manipulation
In this chapter, we present a taxonomy of heap metadata corruptiontechniques. Furthermore, we provide a corresponding formulationof the attacks in heap string language. Since metadata corruption hasoften depended on an insufficiently validated header field, or an al-
gorithmically vulnerable operation against a dynamic data structure, the secu-
rity response has often involved the insertion of encoded keys or cookies, or
the removal of dangerous data structures in their entirety. These responses are
applied ad-hoc and mere patches against very specific metadata exploitation
techniques. Therefore, the field of heap exploitation has been an arms race
against hardening techniques, and many new techniques are a direct result of
finding attack vectors that remain impervious to security changes.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing fashion:




• Section 6.2 lists several heap metadata corruption techniques against
various data structures employed in the internal bookkeeping
• Section 6.3 explores ad-hoc heap-hardening measures that were applied
in response to historical attacks,
• Section 6.4 lists a number ofmetadata attacks that are exploredmanually
and automatically in our evaluation,
• Section 6.5 provides metadata corruption templates for glibc’s dlmalloc
and ptmalloc2 allocators,
• finally, Section 6.6 through to Section 6.10 provide metadata corrup-
tion attacks against various versions of the Windows default userland
heap manager, and corresponding template formulations in the heap
language.
6.16.1 Diverse Allocators
In Windows XP, the heap manager is divided into a high-performance front-
end manager that utilises fast lookaside lists and the low fragmentation heap,
and amore robust, general-purpose backendmanager that utilises freelists and
the heap cache [54, 81]. Many popular heap managers, including the default
Windows heap manager [46] and Linux’s (technically, glibc’s) dlmalloc or pt-
malloc2 [30], employ freelist-based memory management. In that model, the
heapmanager prefixes amemory chunkwith heapmetadata. The consequence
is that memory areas to which user input is potentially written are intermixed
with internal heap metadata. This has security implications. Other operating
systems, such as FreeBSD1 and OpenBSD2, use BiBoP memory managers [9],
which align allocations to page boundaries and store metadata at the start of
1FreeBSD operating system (https://www.freebsd.org/)
2OpenBSD operating system (https://www.openbsd.org/)
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a page. This minimises opportunities for causing metadata corruption using
sequential buffer overflows. It is common practise for larger applications to
bundle their own heap implementation for efficiency reasons. For example,
Adobe Flash uses the MMgc allocator3, Safari uses a heap based on tcmalloc,
FreeBSD uses jemalloc etc.
6.26.2 Existing Techniques
Vista, 7 and Server 2008 Coalesce unlink overwrite [23, 31] and critical sec-
tion unlink overwrite [28] are both precluded by the introduction of safe un-
linking. Lookaside list overwrites [3, 53, 17, 55] expired in effectiveness when
Lookaside lists were removed and replaced by the Low Fragmentation Heap.
FreeLists attacks [53, 17, 57, 86, 58, 55] and Heap cache attacks [55] are being
mitigated by the fact that Array-based FreeLists were removed, which invali-
dates most techniques as stated; and by safe unlinking, Heap entry metadata
randomisation, Heap entry cookie checks and DEP and ASLR. LFHbucket over-
writes [40] and _HEAP data structure overwrites [40] are feasible, but difficult.
They are complicated by DEP and ASLR. App-specific data corruption [86, 40]
is feasible, but difficult, and being complicated by Heap entry metadata ran-
domisation and Heap entry cookie check (if heap entry header corruption is
required) and DEP and ASLR. And if heap metadata randomisation material
and cookies are secret and terminate on heap corruption is enabled (which is
the default for in-box Windows applications and Internet Explorer 7/8).
6.36.3 Heap Hardening
Theuserland heap hardening effort beganwithWindowsXP SP2 andWindows




until present day. The heap hardening measures can be generally divided into
metadata protection and non-determinism.
Safe unlinking Windows versions beginning with XP Service Pack 2 (SP2)
have added two sanity checks to the unlinkmacro that use the data structure
invariants of the circular doubly-linked freelist (node->bk->fd == node and
node->fd->bk == node) to verify the list’s local integrity before executing a
write.
Heapentryheader cookie An 8-bit pseudo-randomvalue, dubbed theheader
cookie, was added to each _HEAP_ENTRYwhich is validated by HeapFree. This
makes it possible to detect corruption when a chunk is being deallocated.
Later Efforts The heap managers in Windows Vista, Windows Server 2008,
and Windows 7 expanded on the hardening work that went into Windows XP
SP2 and Windows Server 2003 SP1 by incorporating a number of additional
security improvements. These improvements are enabled by default, with the
exception of termination on heap corruption, and include:
1. Removal of commonly targeted data structures: Heap data structures
such as lookaside lists and array lists, which have been targeted by mul-
tiple exploitation techniques, have been removed. Lookaside lists have
been replaced by the Low Fragmentation Heap.
2. Heap entry metadata encoding: The header associated with each heap
entry is XOR’ed with a pseudo-random value in order to protect the in-
tegrity of themetadata. The heapmanager then unpacks and verifies the
integrity of each heap entry prior to operating on it.
3. Expanded role of heap header cookie: The 8-bit random value that is
associated with the header of each heap entry has had its scope extended
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to enable integrity checking of more fields. The cookie’s value is also
verified in many more places (rather than only checking at the time that
a heap entry is freed).
4. Randomised heap base address: The base memory address of a heap
region is randomised as part of the overall Address Space Layout Ran-
domisation (ASLR) implementation and has 5 bits of entropy.
5. Function pointer encoding: Function pointers (e.g., CommitRoutine)
in heap data structures are encodedwith a randomvalue to prevent them
from being replaced with an untrusted value.
6. Termination on heap corruption: If enabled, any detected corruption
of a heap data structure will lead to immediate process termination [45].
This is the default for most built-in Windows applications, and can be
enabled dynamically by third parties. If disabled, corruption errors are
ignored and the application is allowed to continue executing.
7. Algorithm variation: The allocation algorithms used by the heap man-
ager may shift depending on allocation patterns and policies. This can
make it more difficult to deterministically predict the state of the heap
when an attack occurs. This may also result in a runtime switch to code
paths that have proven thus far to bemore resilient to brute force attacks.
6.46.4 Explored Techniques
We select the following heap exploitation techniques as benchmarks, and ex-
amines the feasibility of automating their underlying discovery and reasoning:
1. unlink - A technique traditionally associatedwith heap exploitation. The
unlink macro without safe unlinking checks provides an instance of a
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write exploit primitive. Used extensively on Windows 2000 and up to,
and including, Windows XP SP1 (see Section 6.6).
2. lookaside - The fast singly-linked lookaside lists provide an arbitrary al-
location exploit primitive that bypasses safe unlinking and cookie checks
introduced in Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003 (see Sec-
tion 6.6).
3. _HEAP overwrite - An overflow into the heap base structure (_HEAP)
does not provide an exploit primitive per se, but instead results in a con-
trol flow diversion by setting EIP. Used in Windows Vista, Windows 7
and Windows Server 2008 (see Section 6.7).
4. SegOffset and FreeEntryOffset - A manipulation of the SegmentOffset
andFreeEntryOffsetfields (in_HEAP_ENTRY?) results in a semi-arbitrary
allocation exploit primitive. Attack is applicable toWindowsVista,Win-
dows 7 and Windows Server 2008 (see Section 6.8).
5. UserData overflow - An overflow into a _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER that
modifies theFirstAllocationOffset andBlockStridefields results
in a semi-arbitrary allocation exploit primitive. Attack is applicable to
Windows 8 (see Section 6.9).
The intention behind examining the underlyingmechanics of existing heap
exploits is to generalize the attack patterns by extracting their essence, refining
it for automation and extrapolating it to new situations. This effort has lead
to the construction of abstractions for control flow, write and allocation heap
exploit primitives.
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const s = 3210
let k = A(0, s)
do W(k, x, y)
assume (y > s) e.g., y = 2s
let  = A(0, s)→M[xi] = xj
Figure 6.2: ptmalloc2metadata attack
6.56.5 glibc
The metadata attack in Figure 6.2 is applicable to both dlmalloc and ptmalloc2,
running as in-built custom heap managers running on top of the default heap
managers in Windows XP.
6.66.6 Windows XP
The entire range ofWindows XP Service Packs (SP0 - SP3) is vulnerable to one
of twoheapmetadatamanipulation attacks: theunsafe unlinking of chunks and
the insertion of false entries into the lookaside lists. These techniques utilise
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write primitives and allocation primitives, respectively.
Encoded Pointers The PEB and TEB structures of a process are randomised
since Windows XP SP 2 [60] in an effort to prevent exploits from replacing
function pointers.
Dynamic Shellcode Adynamic shellcode that runs onWindows 2000 through
toWindows 8.1, without any hard-coded API offsets, is used. It accesses a pro-
cess’ PEB via the FS segment register, parses the export table of kernel32.dll
and loads any necessary libraries.
Write-4 in Unlink Macro Recall the operational steps in Code Sample 4.2.
An attacker who controls P->fd and P->bk can choose their values to trigger a
write of an arbitrary value to an arbitrarymemory location. The line FD->bk =
BK will write the value in P->bk to the address computed as the sum of P->fd
and the offset of the bk field in the enclosing list struct. The secondwrite access
to BK->fd then reverses the roles of the values; its values depend directly on the
ones chosen for the first write and can trigger an access violation if not chosen
carefully (this is a typical challenge for writing working heap exploits). The
procedure for executing this attack in its simplest form is shown in Figure 6.3.
Such elementary write-anything-anywhere operations have been dubbed
exploit primitives, since they serve as building blocks in a chain of primitives
used to achieve arbitrary code execution. There are a number of other com-
mon heap-management operations, such as the coalescing of two adjacent free
chunks into a single large chunk of memory (see Code Sample 4.3), that may
give rise to exploit primitives if heapmetadata is corrupted and is not correctly
verified.
An allocation heap exploit primitive is a violation of the safety property
that client requests for memory result strictly in the allocation of designated




const s = 3210
let h0 = C(0)
let k = A(h0, s)
do W(k, x, y)
assume (y > s) e.g., y = 2s
let  = A(h0, s)→M[xi] = xj
Figure 6.3: Windows XP Unlinkmetadata attack
memory. It commonly arises due to a corruption of heapmetadata, such as the
insertion of a fake pointer into the FreeLists. The heap manager is designed
to return a pointer to a free chunk in response to a request for memory. An
allocation primitive can subvert and influence the choice of pointer returned
at the next request for memory. In principle, the heap manager can be forced
to return an arbitrary pointer. An attacker, however, traditionally chooses to
allocate over security-sensitive data to achieve arbitrary code execution. For
example, a function pointer can be set to an arbitrary value in order to divert
program control flow.
The fast singly-linked lookaside lists can be exploited by corrupting heap
metadata such that an attacker-chosen pointer is inserted into the list. Once
HeapAlloc returns an entry from the lookaside list to a client application, any
write to that pointer by the application targets attacker-chosen memory. If the
data written is also attacker-chosen, the attacker has again found a full write
exploit primitive.
Singly-linked lists, such as the lightweight lookaside lists in the Windows
heap manager, do not allow for such a simple invariant check as safe unlinking
to be implemented. Thus, versions up toWindows 2003 Server remain vulner-
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able via their lookaside lists even though the exploit primitive in the unlink
operation was removed. The lookaside list can be exploited by corrupting heap
metadata such that an attacker-chosen pointer is eventually inserted into the
list (see Figure 6.4). Once HeapAlloc then returns an entry from the looka-
side list to the application, any write to that pointer by the application targets
attacker-chosen memory. If the data written is also attacker-chosen, the at-




const s = 1016
let h0 = C(0)
let k1 = A(h0, s)
let k2 = A(h0, s)
do F(h0, k2)
do W(k1, xi, y1)
assume (y1 > s) e.g., y1 = 2810, s = 1016
let k3 = A(h0, s)
let k4 = A(h0, s)
do W(k4, xj, y2)
assume (y2 > 0)
Figure 6.4: Windows Lookaside Lists metadata attack
6.76.7 Windows Vista
The architectural re-design of the Vista codebase, which covers Windows 7 as
well as Server 2008, saw the removal of the fast singly-linked lookaside lists
used by Windows XP and 2003 Server from the userland heap. However, they
would remain in Windows 7’s kernel pool. The sole front-end heap manager
is now the Low Fragmentation Heap (LFH), which is dormant by default and
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activated by a heuristic in the back-end (0x12 consecutive allocations of under
N bytes (usually, under 16KB).
6.7.1. . Exploit Mitigations
Randomisation Vista introduced for the first time a prophylactic technology
aimed at diversify attack surface and reducing exploit effectiveness4. Vista allo-
cates heap base structures (_HEAP) at 64KB-aligned memory addresses, giving
the addresses a total of 5 bits of entropy. Memory chunks are then allocated
consecutively inside the resulting heap segment, and at a predictable offset from
the heap base. The randomisation of the heap base address was introduced in
Windows Vista as part of a generic system-wide ASLR exploit mitigation. In
addition, the front-end LFH adds heap-specific randomisation. Only the front-
end LFH applies chunk offset randomisation; if an attacker wishes to avoid the
non-determinism of chunk randomisation, he can allocate from the back-end
instead, by setting the requested size to aminimumof 16KB. Alternatively, one
can avoid triggering the LFH activation heuristics altogether.
In Windows 8, the front-end LFH manager also randomises the allocation
order of chunks by starting the search for a free chunk at a random index.
During a heap overflow, an attacker can influence or completely neutralise LFH
chunk randomisation by manipulating the _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER header
(see Section 6.9.2).
ASLR is generally more effective on 64-bit platforms, with HiASLR giv-
ing a space of 1TB. However, many applications on 64-bit platforms are still
run in 32-bit mode, making the aforementioned restrictions applicable. Vista
enforces DEP and ASLR on a per-image basis, requiring PE executables to be
compiled with the /NXCOMPAT linker switch to be DEP-compatible. Likewise,
the /DYNAMICBASE switch is needed to support the ASLR randomisation of an
4ASLR on Vista (http://blogs.msdn.com/michael_howard/archive/2006/05/
26/608315.aspx)
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Figure 6.5: Randomisation onWindows XP, Seven and 8
executable’s image base. Both linker switches are manifested as flags in the
DllCharacteristics field of the PE file header.
A ROP payload to bypass DEPmay be constructed from the .text section of
any executable module that was compiled without the /DYNAMICBASE switch
and is loaded in the target process (a static or dynamic dependency). For ex-
ample, Java 6 was shipped with a ASLR-disabled msvcr71.dll library. And
hxds.dll, another ASLR-disabled library, can be loaded into Microsoft In-
ternet Explorer using purely JavaScript if Microsoft Office 2007 or 2010 is in-
stalled. Both of these methods are blocked by EMET5 3.5 ROP mitigations. The
DEP policy on Windows desktop operating systems is Opt-in due to backward
compatibility issues. The EMET exploit mitigation toolkit can be used to retrofit
ASLR for legacy applications that are not compiled to be compatible, but are
nevertheless stable when run under DEP and ASLR. Reportedly, 64-bit IE runs
new tabs as 32-bit processes by default.
Furthermore, analysis ofVista randomisationpatterns showed smaller ran-
domisation ranges than expected6 and clear practical biases. Furthermore,
there are non-randomised regions of memory. One such region is
SharedUserData, always loaded at a fixed address of 0x7ffe0000. It is also
possible to use interpreters to derive pointers via pointer inference. A common
5EMET toolkit (https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?
id=50766)
6Testing Vista ASLR (https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/
Address_Space_Layout_Randomization.pdf)
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tactic is to use a ROP payload to change the memory protections of a mapped
page using VirtualAlloc, returning to shellcode on the stack or heap with
DEP effectively disabled. A process with an information disclosure vulnerabil-
ity (e.g. a string format bug) can leak the image bases of core system libraries
on other processes, since Windows randomises image bases system-wide and
once per boot.
6.7.2. . Metadata Attacks
_HEAPoverwrite Aspecially-crafted 212-byte payload is copied over a heap
base structure returned by HeapCreate. Upon a subsequent allocation from
the heap, two heap base fields (CommitRoutine and Encoding) are XOR’ed
together and the result is set as EIP. For the attack to succeed, the ucrEntry
and freeEntry fields in the heap base need to be valid pointers (in fact, a
chain of valid pointers). The attack appears to be valid for Server 2008 and
Windows 7 too. However, keep in mind, the heap base structure is allocated at
a randomised offset.
Crucially, the_HEAP structure can be overwrittenwith amalicious payload,
because it can be free’ed and returned by HeapAlloc. The reason for it being
free’able is that it inadvertently contained a valid _HEAP_ENTRYheader, making
it indistinguishable from a user chunk.
There are other memory manipulations, such as pointer corruption, that
can be used to achieve the overwrite in the first place. Assume HeapAlloc
returns a pointer such as 0150D700 (with 01500000 being the heap base). A
2-byte overflow on a little-endian system into the 16 LSBs of the target pointer
can turn 0150D700 into 01500008. Once the target application frees the cor-
rupted pointer, it ends up freeing the heap base structure instead (under Win-
dows Vista and 7, the heap base begins with a _HEAP_ENTRY structure, i.e., can
be interpreted as a valid heap chunk). Subsequently, a HeapAlloc call returns
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the heap base structure to the application, allowing an attacker to overwrite




let h0 = C(0)
let k1 = A(h0, 3210)
do W(&(k1), xi, y1)
assume (y1 > 0)
do F(h0, k1)
let k2 = A(h0, 3210)
assume (k2 ≈ h)
do W(k2, xj, y2)
assume (y2 >= 21210)
let  = A(h0, 3210)→ EIP=f(xj)
where f(x) happens to be xp ⊕ xq.
Figure 6.6: Windows Vista _HEAPmetadata attack
The two techniques differ not in payload, but in their method for achiev-
ing a successful overwrite of the heap base structure (_HEAP).The first achieves
an overwrite by freeing and re-allocating a chunk, while the latter requires the
ability to create a new private heap to obtain a handle into the (_HEAP) struc-
ture.
Conclusion Partial pointer overwrites are effective in ASLR-enabled situa-
tions, eliminating the requirement for the attacker to know the randomised
portion of a memory address. An example of this is freeing the _HEAP struc-
ture on Windows Vista and 7, since the address of the heap base is known
relative to a heap chunk.




const s = 21210
let h0 = C(0)
do W(h0, x, y)
let k1 = A(h0, 3210)→ EIP=f(x)
Figure 6.7: Windows Vista _HEAPmetadata attack 2
6.86.8 Windows 7
Segment Overwrite This attack is an instance of an exploit primitive that
leads to semi-arbitrary allocation (see Figure 6.8). While the first 4 bytes of the
8-byte heap chunk header (_HEAP_ENTRY) are XOR’ed and checksummed for
integrity, the trailing 4 bytes, including theSegmentOffset andUnusedBytes
fields, remain in plaintext. By overflowing the chunkheader and settingSegmentOffset
andUnusedBytes to specific values, we can forceHeapAlloc to return a chunk
of memory up to (0xFF * 0x8) bytes away in a negative direction. This attack
step can be used to, for example, allocate over a nearby C++ object to overwrite
its vtable pointers, eventually leading to direct control over EIP.
FreeEntryOffsetOverwrite This attack is also an instance of an exploit prim-
itive that leads to a semi-arbitrary allocation (see Figure 6.9). A manipulation
of the FreeEntryOffset field gives a range of (0xFFFF * 0x8) for arbitrary
allocations. Both attacks require the application to pre-emptively activate the
front-end LFHmanager by performing a number of consecutive allocations (at
least 0x10). Code Sample 6.1 provides an example dummy implementation of





const s = 3210
let h0 = C(0)
let k1, ..., k32 = A(h0, s)
let k33 = A(h0, s)
let k34 = A(h0, s)
do W(k33, xi, y1)
do F(h0, k34)
let k35 = A(h0, s)
do W(k35, xj, y2)
assume (y2 > 0)
Figure 6.8: Windows 7 SegmentOffset metadata attack
Kernel Pool The kernel pool is not as hardened as the userland heap. Looka-
side lists are still in use in the kernel pool in Windows 7. In addition, safe
unlinking was only introduced in Windows 77. Heap attacks in the near fu-
ture will be more successful and possibly more rewarding if conducted against
Windows device drivers.
6.96.9 Windows 8
Under a non-deterministic heapmanager, such asWindows 8, wherein alloca-
tions are randomly offset as an exploit mitigation measure, a sequence of heap
actions produces merely one of a set of numerous possible states.
7Safe unlinking in kernel pool (https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/srd/
2009/05/26/safe-unlinking-in-the-kernel-pool/)
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void FreeEntryOffset(void) {
// Create private heap
hHeap = HeapCreate(0, 1*1024*1024, 0);
// Activate LFH using structs
for (i=0; i < 0x1F; i++) {
chunks[i] = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, sizeof(TYPE));
// Initialize func address for each struct
chunks[i]->get_eip = &foo2;
}
a = (char*) HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 0x20);





// Set the FreeEntryOffset
b = (char*) HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 0x20);
// Allocate over a struct
c = (char*) HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 0x20);
// Fill 'c' with shellcode and smash struct
memcpy(c, "\xC1\xC2\xC3\xC4\
x42AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA", 32);
// Call our functions









const s = 3210
let h0 = C(0)
let k1, ..., k32 = A(h0, s)
do W(k32, xi, y1)
assume (y1 > s)
let k33 = A(h0, s)
let k34 = A(h0, s)
do W(k34, xj, y2)
assume (y2 > 0)
Figure 6.9: Windows 7 FreeEntryOffset metadata attack
6.9.1. . Porting _HEAP toWindows 8
InWindows 8, the technique still works as previously described if the global key
is obtained; any value for the future EIP can then be pre-computed. In Win-
dows 8, theCommitRoutinepointer is set to zero by default. TheCommitRoutine
function pointer is no longer encoded using the _HEAP.Encoding field, but
rather a 32-bit random global key in ntdll.dll is used (offset DF0C from im-
age base). The encoding method is pointer = (plaintext XOR globalKey), and
because (a XOR 0) = a, an empty CommitRoutine pointer will be equal to
the global key. Thus, a memory leak of the _HEAP structure can be used to for-
mulate a _HEAP payload to set a precise EIP. All heaps use the same global key,
so if 2 heaps have different CommitRoutines, at least one of them has a call-
back installed. This could potentially be of interest to an attacker as arguments
to the callback are tainted by attacker values.
Strength of Random EIP Since the (random) global key is generally unpre-
dictable, any CommitRoutine pointer supplied as part of the _HEAP payload
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is XOR’ed and becomes just as random as the global key (resulting in a random
EIP). In our experiments, we heap sprayed an NOP slide and shellcode into 2GB
of memory (took 1 second in our surrogate app) and let EIP be freely set to a
random value. Successful execution was nevertheless achieved with a random
EIP in more than 50% of test runs. This implies that encoding the pointer only





const s = 3210
let h0 = C(0)
let k1, ..., k150 = A(h0, s)
do W(k60, xi, y1)
let k151 = A(h0, s)
do W(k151, xj, y2)
assume (y2 > 0)
Figure 6.10: Win8 UserDataHeader metadata attack
6.9.2. . Allocation primitive: UserBlocks header
Upon a memory request, Windows 8 returns a randomly-selected free chunk
from UserBlock container by generating a pseudo-random starting position
for searching the UserBlock bitmap and returning the index of the first zero
bit. In Windows 8, the next chunk allocation from an active UserBlocks con-
tainer for a requested size is calculated as follows:
startingPosition = random(0, bitmap.Size)
randomIndex = firstFreeBit(bitmap, startingPosition)
nextAlloc = uBlocks + FirstOffset
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Figure 6.11: Structure of UserBlocks Metadata [82]
+ (randomHint * BlockStride)
Given a sequential heap overflow into the _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER data
structure, the following can be achieved:
• Given a known distance between a UserBlock and a target pointer (e.g.,
disclosed during amemory leak), the pointer can be precisely and deter-
ministically allocated over by neutralising the effect of the randomHint
with BlockStride= 0.
• By heap spraying the bitmap bits (0xFF) and setting the bitmap size,
randomHint can be controlled by leaving only a single bit with a zero
value at a chosen index.
• By utilising a large randomHint and BlockStride, an arithmetic wrap-
around allows allocations over data in a negative direction (e.g. over the
_HEAP base), subject to the heap chunk freeness test (UnusedBytes &
0x3F).
Windows 8.1 and 10 directly address this technique by introducing a new
structure (_HEAP_USERDATA_OFFSETS) containing an encoded BlockStride
and FirstAllocationOffset (see Section 6.10).
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Figure 6.12: Reactive Exploit Mitigations of Windows 8 [56]
6.9.3. . Encoded Function Pointers
InWindows 8, theCommitRoutine function pointer is no longer encodedwith
a key given as part of the _HEAP structure, but instead it is XORed with a 32-bit
randomised global key in ntdll.dll to improve resilience. However, a NULL
pointer in the CommitRoutine field will thus be equal to the value of the global
key (since x ⊕ 0 = x). A memory leak of a local _HEAP structure could thus
disclose the global key and could be used as an ingredient of an attack payload.
Furthermore, pointer encoding does not provide complete protection from
control flow hijacks. On a 32-bit system, extensive heap spraying can make
even jumps to a random address (as a result of encoding) lead to arbitrary
code execution with a reasonable degree of success.
6.9.4. . Procedure for Activation
We begin by creating a private heap and performing a heap spray for the ad-
dress 0C0C0C0C. The content at that address is set to zero and serves as a
bitmap during allocation searches. Subsequently, we activate the LFH front-
end for size 120 by performing 0x12, and one additional allocation to set the
activeSegmentfield. EachUserBlock container has a small number of equally-
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sized chunks. We allocate 3 UserBlock containers (A, B, C) by exhaust-
ing all the chunks in the container (Depth=0). This places the heap metadata
(_HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER) next to user-controlledmemory. TheUserBlocks
must be set up so that a_HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER is adjacent to_HEAP_ENTRY.
We simulate a sequential overflow from a randomly-placed chunk in BlockB.
The overflow is 8000 bytes in size and the required size depends on the size
of the container (number of items and size of each item). The objective of the
overflow is to reach the _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER of ChunkC, which should
be located adjacent to BlockB.
Theoverflow is done by repeating the same crafted_HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER
payload into the 8000 bytes. The structure can be aligned in memory to make
sure the correct fields are overwritten in BlockC’s _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER
regardless of its memory address. The bitmap pointer is set to the heap sprayed
address (0C0C0C0C) and needs to be readable.
An allocation primitive allows an attacker to influence the allocation choice
of the heap manager. Upon overflowing the UserBlocks header, an allocation
must be triggered from that block tomake use of the allocation primitive. Thus,
a few chunks should be left empty. The FirstAllocationOffset field can be
used to tweak the allocation distance.
We assume an allocation primitive cannot exceed its bounds (allocating
a 32-byte chunk over security-sensitive memory only permits 32 bytes to be
written within boundaries). It is therefore beneficial to allocate a large (120
byte) buffer over a smaller chunk (64), because we cannot exactly predict the
location of a target pointer. We can defeat randomisation of chunk allocation
by overwriting an entire UserBlocks container.
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6.9.5. . Increasing Determinism
Due to a random hint, the search for free chunks begins at a random index.
Thus, we cannot predict where in a UserBlock the following will be allocated:
// chunk size = 64
DWORD *p = HeapAlloc(hHeap, 0, 56);
To overflow a _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER, we must overflow from one
UserBlocks container to the next. In that overflow, we can set
FirstAllocationOffset and BlockStride.
nextAlloc = userBlocks + FirstAllocationOffset
+ (randomHint * BlockStride)
Wecan force the allocation search to start at index zero by settingBlockStride
to zero. A UserBlocks container of 31 chunks of size 64 is 2016 bytes in size.
In theory, if we allocate the 0th chunk and write 2016 bytes, we can reach a
pointer anywhere in the UserBlocks. We should assume that we can allocate
arbitrary sizes, but write only within boundaries. Thus, we need to force an al-
location over a pointer precisely or allocate a larger buffer over a smaller one.
We can only allocate in a forward direction.
UserBlocksHeader: 20 bytes "A"
UserBlocksHeader: 2016 bytes "B"
UserBlocksHeader: 32 bytes "C"
A vulnerable chunk in BlockA overwrites BlockB’s header. An allocation
from BlockB results in a return of memory from BlockC. Multiple chunks in
BlockC can be overwritten by stayingwithin the boundaries of a single BlockB
chunk to overcome randomisation at the boundary. By exhausting the chunks
in a UserBlocks (of depth 31), a second UserBlocks gets allocated adjacent,
approximately 1000 bytes away (dependent on the sizes we used).
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6.106.10 Windows 10
We described a technique for overwriting _HEAP_USERDATA_HEADER in Sec-
tion 6.9.2. Changes in Windows 8.1 and 10 directly address this technique
by introducing a new structure (_HEAP_USERDATA_OFFSETS) containing an
encoded version of BlockStride and FirstAllocationOffset. Many ex-
ported heap functions decode the chunk header with a global key to verify
integrity, and disregard corrupted chunks. To execute a heap metadata cor-
ruption attack against Windows 10, a novel sequence of heap operations is re-
quired that leads to unsafe computation. It is as yet an open question whether
or not a heap metadata corruption sequence exists for default allocators on the
Windows 8.1 and 10 platforms.
CHAPTER 7
Evaluation
In this chapter, we present our experimental results and empirical data.The evolution of the security of the built-in Windows XP heap man-ager over the range of Service Packs is representative of the develop-ment of countermeasures across other platforms as well. The heap
vulnerabilities are not mere programming errors, but complex operations on
data structures which occasionally result in unsafe program states. For ex-
ample, both the Windows heap and glibc contained unsafe unlink macros.
Over the years, both gradually introduced similar safetymeasures, e.g., cookies
to the heap header and non-writable guard pages to prevent cross-page over-
flows. For the purposes of exploit generation, each Windows XP Service Pack
represents a completely separate heap manager, since each is a binary build
with a unique set of pointer offsets. Consequently, an exploit is tailored for
deployment against a particular Service Pack. We also built dlmalloc and
ptmalloc2 on Windows, but the detection and use of their respective exploit
primitives happens completely inside the code of the application. While their
hijack onWindows ismediated via the UEF exception handler, a different (pos-




Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing fashion:
• Section 7.1 discusses the general implementation details of our multi-
component system,
• Section 7.2 presents initial results of early work,
• Section 7.3 presents later results of expanded work,
7.17.1 Implementation
In this section we present the components that constitute our system. Wedesigned our system (see Figure 7.1) as an extension of the open-source
selective symbolic execution framework, S2E [14]. Our motivation for select-
ing S2E as our symbolic execution engine lies in the fact that S2E can symbol-
ically execute binary-only closed-source targets. This is particularly relevant
when targetting the Windows operating system’s default userland heap, which
is both closed-source and distributed in binary-only form. Our plugin is an
analyser plugin that inspects program states for heap exploit primitives. We
also make use of a custom selector plugin to apply search heuristics, such as
path prioritisation. In S2E, search heuristics can be implemented using se-
lector plugins that are consulted in the event of state switching. The S2E [14]
platform has introduced selective symbolic execution as a method for dealing
with the path explosion problem. Executing portions of a program selectively
means that the selected portion is explored symbolically, while the rest is run
concretely. Furthermore, S2E introduced execution consistency models as a
way of reasoning about the feasibility of paths that are discovered. The selec-
tive symbolic execution model is motivated by the fact that the unit, i.e., the
portion of code explored symbolically, is of primary interest to the testing pro-
cess and the environment merely supports its functioning. Most tools operate
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Figure 7.1: Our system and its inputs/outputs
in concrete mode until a symbolic value is injected. Therefore, they cross the
concrete-symbolic boundary once the symbolic value is involved in a condi-
tional jump and remain in symbolic mode until termination. On the other
hand, S2E is the first tool to provide the elasticity of crossing the concrete-
symbolic boundary back and forth [14].
7.1.1. . S2E Plugins
We have implemented our system as a S2E plugin written in more than 5,000
lines of C, C++ and assembly code. Code is run natively if concrete, and if
symbolic, it is dynamically translated from x86 to LLVM bitcode and symboli-
cally executed using KLEE (see Figure 7.2). As in standard S2E configurations,
we use STP as our decision procedure (Z3 in later versions) in combination
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Figure 7.2: Systems underpinning our plugins
with the QFBV theory and QEMU as our virtual machine. In addition, we have
extended S2E plugins, such as the WindowsMonitor plugin, to work on SP0
and SP1, Vista and Windows 8 service packs to support our design. The pur-
pose of the extensions is merely to allow S2E to run these Windows versions
as guest operating systems and is not related to the technique presented in this
thesis. In the exploit generation phase, we produce a compact stand-alone
Python script that delivers the exploit over a chosen interface, e.g., over the
network to network-enabled applications. Ultimately, we intend to make the
implementation of our system open-source and freely available online, along
with an accompanying demonstration video.
Consistency models
In order to simulate user input, we inject symbolic data by utilising conven-
tional input vectors, such as arguments, files on disk, network transmissions
or environment variables (see Code Sample 7.1). To inject symbolic data into
an input buffer, we model a certain set of API calls by bypassing them, but re-
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// Perform a symbolic memory inject of (min,max)
bool SkyriseAnalyzer::inject_symbolicMemoryRange(
S2EExecutionState *state, uint64_t sym_size,
uint64_t sym_addr, const char *sym_name ,






// Add to Klee/Expr.h to use
mark = start_sym_uid;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sym_size; ++i) {
// Mark the symbolic bytes starting with
// start_sym_uid and increment each time.
ref<Expr> s = symb[i];
s->sym_uid = mark++;
// Place constraints of x <= s <= y
ref<Expr> min_expr = ConstantExpr::alloc(min,
Expr::Int8);








std::cout << "max constraint... ok\n";
}








Code Sample 7.1: Injecting symbolic bytes into target memory
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specting their calling conventions. For example, when the application under
test invokes the recv() system call, in order to simulate network traffic, the
call ismodelled by setting theESPpointer to its pre-invocation position and the
EIP is set to the value of the return address. Before resuming execution from
the return address, the input buffer is filled up with symbolic bytes up to the
maximum specified by the length parameter. This form of function bypass has
local consistency (LC) with respect to the S2E execution consistency models
(see 7.3 or [14]). This implies that the execution run is consistent with respect
to the unit under test, but there is a possibility of side-effects in the environ-
ment causing inconsistencies to propagate. This is, however, highly dependent
on the function being bypassed and should be considered on a case-by-case
basis.
Complex Injection Models To this end, we implement a number of com-
plex interfaces, which we have observed to be necessary for the injection of
some real-world applications, that ensure a target application receives the sym-
bolic input properly. Our plugin intercepts WSAAsyncSelect in order to re-
trieve the message code and socket identifier used for the registration of asyn-
chronous network event notifications. The collected data is replayed into an
application’s main message loop using GetMessageA; this simulates a network
event occurrence that results either in the acceptance of a new connection or
in the reading from an established connection stream. In the latter case, a
ioctlsocket call is intercepted to simulate data waiting to be read from the
network buffer. Only then is any subsequent attempt to read the data using
recv utilised to inject symbolic bytes.
Search Heuristics
Basic Blocks A target program is executed as a series of basic blocks. Each
basic block is defined by the characteristic that it has one entry and one exit
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Figure 7.3: S2E consistencymodels [14]
point (under S2E, a basic block is synonymous with a TranslationBlock
(TB)). Thus, each basic block is a segment of code terminating in a conditional
or unconditional branch instruction (e.g., JMP, Jxx, CALL). It follows that each
basic block, including a TB in S2E, contains precisely zero or one CALL instruc-
tion to a function exported by the heap allocator.
Heap gadgets Aheap gadget is defined as a composition of one ormore basic
blocks, such that at least one basic block in the heap gadget executes a heap
operation, i.e., the gadget’s overall heap string is not the empty string ϵ. The
last basic block in the heap gadget necessarily terminateswith anunconditional
branch instruction. Thus, each gadget is atomic and the basic unit of heap
manipulation in the target program.
Program Navigation The theoretical extent of user-control exercised over
the heap state is ultimately determined and limited by a target program’s heap
gadget set. Program input manipulates heap state at the granularity of heap
gadgets (e.g., if the smallest unit isAAA, the heap state can only ever be ma-
nipulated 3 operations at a time). The target program restricts feasible paths
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such that only a subset of heap strings over the heap language is ever exhibited
in practice (allowing for limited heap state flexibility).
Gadget Language Thecorpus of knowledge about feasible inter-gadget paths
is program-specific and can be formulated on-the-fly during program explo-
ration. Thus, a partial heap gadget language that maps program inputs to heap
operations can be constructed for each target program.
Program Exploit Friendliness Whether or not a given heap vulnerability
in target program P is exploitable is ultimately a program-specific question.
Assume we have obtained a set X , the set of heap strings (operations) that
each put P ’s allocator into a vulnerable state. Assume G is an oracle for P ’s
complete gadget-language that takes heap operations and returns the program
input that causes them to be performed. An attacker seeks to construct inputs
for P that perform members (Xi) of set X . Iterate over all members of X ,
query the oracle G(Xi), and any answer is a P -specific input that puts P ’s
allocator into a vulnerable state.
∃ Xi ∈ X s.t. G(Xi) ̸= ϵ
Putting the heap into a vulnerable state primes the program for exploita-
tion. However, it is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for P ’s ex-
ploitation. Ultimately, the complete exploit formula, including data for exploit
primitives and shellcode, must be satisfiable and a concrete solution must be
ascertained.
7.27.2 Early Results
In order to introduce heap-based exploit generators, we have initially se-lected the most basic instances of popular heap managers as the subject of
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our analysis, namely, the Windows XP SP0 and SP1 heap managers. Due to
scope limitations, we must necessarily limit our study to these service packs
and leave later and more complex SPs for future work. The Windows XP range
of Service Packs (SP0-SP3) is representative of the evolution of heap-based
vulnerabilities and corresponding counter-measures onmany other platforms.
For example, both Windows and Linux suffered from the same fundamental
security problems relating to the removal of items from doubly-linked lists and
have both since added safe unlinking. Moreover, both of the operating systems
have since added similar safety measures, e.g., cookies to the heap header that
function like stack canaries, and non-writable guard pages to prevent cross-
page overflows.
Our compositional approach to heap exploitation is reminiscent of algo-
rithms for compositional symbolic execution [33, 2]. Standard symbolic ex-
ecution re-explores a procedure if two distinct paths lead through it. In con-
trast, compositional symbolic execution explores procedures in isolation and
combines inter-procedural paths to form a set of realistic program paths. Since
each intra-procedural path is explored only once, the number of possible inter-
procedural paths grows linearly rather than exponentially in the number of
procedures explored [33].
Search Strategy We evaluate our automatic exploit generation algorithm us-
ing a depth-first strategy. Recall that in order to produce exploits in the fastest
possible manner, running the components consecutively in a depth-first fash-
ion is preferred, in contrast to a wider search for all possible exploit primitives
in the heap manager. A depth-first search requires that every component pro-
duces only sufficient information such that a subsequent component can per-
form its function. This search strategy avoids exploring irrelevant paths and
collecting information that is not necessary in order to build a single working
exploit. The reasoning is motivated by the fact that a single working exploit is
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Sequence Concrete (s) Exit
Alloc, overflow, Free 3.307 θ
Alloc, overflow, Alloc 3.379 θ
Create, Alloc, overflow, Free 3.437 crash
Create, Alloc, overflow, Alloc 3.134 crash
Table 7.1: Simulating heap interactions with concrete bytes
Sequence Exit Primitive
Alloc, overflow, Free clean ϵ
Alloc, overflow, Alloc clean ϵ
Create, Alloc, overflow, Free crash ϵ
Create, Alloc, overflow, Alloc crash write-4
Table 7.2: Simulating heap interactions with symbolic bytes
sufficient to compromise a target system.
7.2.1. . Application-heap interaction
Table 7.1 and Table 7.3 show the set of application-heap interaction sequences
tested for exploit primitives, using concrete and symbolic bytes, respectively.
Since we are in depth-first search mode, we terminate execution at the first
exploit primitive that is found and proceed to the next section.
In Table 7.1, we measure the time taken to execute a particular sequence
with a concrete overflow. We distinguish between the type of termination ex-
perienced by the surrogate. θ represents a clean exit via ExitProcess. Note
that for a surrogate to exit cleanly with θ, control would have to return to the
surrogate from the heap manager after the occurrence of the overflow. A clean
exit is indicative of the fact that the post-overflow heap-management functions
make no use of the corrupted metadata. A crash is an encouraging sign with
respect to finding exploit primitives, but is itself insufficient to prove that we
exercise sufficient control over the actions of the surrogate or heap manager to
form an exploit.
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Sequence Symbolic (s) Primitive
Alloc, overflow, Free 3.317 ϵ
Alloc, overflow, Alloc 3.935 ϵ
Create, Alloc, overflow, Free ∞ ϵ
Create, Alloc, overflow, Alloc 5.946 write-4
Table 7.3: Timingmeasurements for symbolic input
Sequence Concrete Symbolic
Alloc, overflow, Free 3.307 3.317s
Alloc, overflow, Alloc 3.379 3.935s
Create, Alloc, overflow, Free 3.437 ∞
Create, Alloc, overflow, Alloc 3.134 5.946s
Table 7.4: Timingmeasurements for concrete input
In order to determine the level of control over the actions of the crashing
sequences, we expose them to symbolic input. While we subject all sequences
to symbolic testing in our evaluation, a more efficient system may want to skip
over sequences that permitted a clean exit. In Table 7.3, ϵ represents a surro-
gate termination before an exploit primitive is found. The final sequence in the
Table 7.3 shows that HeapAlloc is host to a dangerous attacker-influenceable
operation. The operation corresponds to the unlink macro that is used to re-
move a free memory chunk from a doubly-linked FreeList before the chunk is
returned to the client application.
Table 7.3 shows the times (in seconds) taken to reach a conclusion regard-
ing exploitability of a particular sequence. For the first two sequences that do
not seem to be influenced by the overflow, the times are comparable for con-
crete and symbolic input. We obtain ϵ for the sequence with running time
∞ since we make the decision to terminate the search after a fixed period of
time of either fork explosions or during which the symbolic execution engine
makes no progress. Better search heuristics are likely needed to complete the
exploration of the sequence.
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States UserTime WallTime QueryTime SolverTime
1 6.87 x 100 8.32 x 100 0 0
3 1.23 x 101 2.05 x 101 1.06 x 10−2 5.03 x 10−3
7 1.36 x 101 2.21 x 101 3.01 x 10−1 8.20 x 10−3
7 1.39 x 101 2.25 x 101 3.06 x 10−1 1.18 x 10−2
Table 7.5: Timingmeasurements for reaching exploit primitive
States CpuConcrete CpuKlee Queries QConstructs
1 190898 0 0 0
3 24099316 84 2 19
7 24097122 2315 262 2772
7 24097122 2315 264 3817
Table 7.6: No. of instructions, queries, constructs
In Table 7.5, one can observe timing measurements corresponding to the
time spent in the STP solver as a portion of the total running time. If a system
is faced with particularly complex constraints then it will reflect in the increase
in time that is spent generating and solving queries.
In Table 7.6, we give the total number of concrete instructions, symbolic
instructions, queries and query constructs leading up to the write-4 primitive
in ntdll.dll. This gives a measurement of the size of the heap manager, as
well as the amount of symbolic execution effort required to pinpoint an exploit
primitive.
7.2.2. . Exploit primitives
Theexploit primitives occur numerous times and are spread throughoutntdll.dll,
with multiple distinct paths leading to different instances of exploit primitives.
It is always the instruction sequence displayed in Figure 7.5 that we observe,
making its recognition trivial in our case. However, while the primitive in Fig-
ure 7.5 is always the first exploit primitive encountered and used for exploit-
building in our evaluation, our approach is designed to use symbolic execution
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// Detect exploit primitives on state fork
void SkyriseAnalyzer::prim_onStateFork(
S2EExecutionState *origin,




// Pickup last instruction using
// the translation block type
TranslationBlock *tb = origin->getTb();
std::cout << "Executing block 0x"
<< std::hex << tb->pc << "-0x"
<< (tb->size + tb->pc) << " (";
print_TBtype(tb);
std::cout << ") \n";




effecState = (S2EExecutionState *) (*it2);




Code Sample 7.2: Detect exploit primitives on state forking
in order to discover exploit primitives of different shapes and sizes, including
those that have not been previously documented. The method is agnostic to
the exact sequence of instructions causing a flow of symbolic data into a sym-
bolic destination address. In the SP0 heapmanager, there are 7 forks preceding
a write-4 primitive. These forks are caused by conditions being imposed on
symbolic values in the heapmetadata post-injection. The 8th fork corresponds
to a write-4 primitive, yielding two states: one with an equality constraint of
a specific value imposed on a part of the write-4 data, e.g., ecx = 1 and one
with a negation of that constraint, i.e. ecx ̸= 1. S2E concretizes the symbolic
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77F5DA48 ...
77F5DA4D mov eax, [esi+08h]
77F5DA50 mov [ebp-94h], eax
77F5DA56 mov ecx, [esi+0Ch]
77F5DA59 mov [ebp-98h], ecx
77F5DA5F mov [ecx], eax
77F5DA61 mov [eax+4], ecx
77F5DA64 cmp eax, ecx
77F5DA66 jnz L77F5DA9C
77F5DA68 mov ax, word ptr[esi]
77F5DA6B cmp ax, 80
77F5DA6F jnb L77F5DA9C
77F5DA71 ...
Figure 7.4: The code segment containing an exploit primitive
memory destination by repetitively forking states at the write-4 point, each
time incrementing the value used in the equality constraint on the write-4
data. Hence, to be able to impose our own constraints on the write-4 data
as part of the exploit construction phase, we must navigate to a state whose
constraints permit us to impose effectively arbitrary values. It is pointless to
impose a conflicting constraint that results in a logical contradiction if wewant
the formula to be satisfiable, as satisfiability is a necessary condition for solving
the formula for concrete values. S2E expresses a symbolic write to a symbolic
destination as a fork because it always attempts to preserve a concrete mem-
orymodel. In practice, due to the small number of suitablememory addresses,
both for hijacking control flow and using as trampolines, it is improbable that
a constrained ECX and EAX would match a valid memory address. In such a
situation, a breadth-first search might be desired in order to find a wider range
of exploit primitives.
The constraint collection part of symbolic execution plays an important
role in verifying the suitability of exploit primitives. The closest solution to the
automatic exploit generation problemwithout the usage of symbolic execution
would most likely involve taint analysis. The constraint collection part of sym-
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bolic execution plays an important role in verifying the suitability of exploit
primitives. The closest solution to the automatic exploit generation problem
without the usage of symbolic execution would most likely involve taint anal-
ysis. The constraint collection part of symbolic execution plays an important
role in verifying the suitability of exploit primitives. The closest solution to
the automatic exploit generation problem without the usage of symbolic exe-
cution would most likely involve taint analysis. The constraint collection part
of symbolic execution plays an important role in verifying the suitability of
exploit primitives. The closest solution to the automatic exploit generation
problem without the usage of symbolic execution would most likely involve
taint analysis. This technique can be used to establish that attacker-controlled
input reaches data used in critical operations. However, vanilla taint analy-
sis does not collect constraints along a concrete path and merely focuses on
tracking data flows rather than the shape of data content. Ignoring constraints
imposed on data used in exploit primitives would result in the inability to dif-
ferentiate between realistic and unrealistic paths in a program, forcing us to
settle for an under- or over-approximation of exploit solutions.
Figure 7.4 shows another instance of an exploit primitive different to that
seen in Figure 5.2, but also located in ntdll.dll.
7.2.3. . Hijacking the control flow
In the Hijack phase, a method for transferring control from the heap man-
ager to shellcode is found. Due to the fact that the write-4 primitive com-
monly manifests itself in the form depicted in Figure 7.5, it is possible to write
a pointer-sized value to an arbitrary address in the first instruction and to sub-
sequently cause an access violation in the second instruction. The access vio-
lation forces exception handling routines to kick in and this (often) constitutes




Figure 7.5: A common instance of a write-4 primitive
Hence, rather than overwriting writable function pointers in the target ap-
plication, most manual heap-based exploits hijack control from the heapman-
ager itself, by targeting pointers to exception handlers.
There are multiple approaches that can be taken when dealing with prim-
itives like Figure 7.5. The first instruction permits values for EAX and ECX to
be set freely (within its constraints), but the second instruction presents an
interesting situation. The second instruction is also an instance of a write-4
primitive, but its values are bound to the first primitive. In other words, ifw(x)
is a predicate that expresses the writability of memory address x, and EAX=α
and ECX=β, it can be said that for the first primitive to succeed in hijacking a
pointer, it would have to be the case that w(β)∧ (w(α)∩¬w(α)), which sim-
plifies down to w(β). The second primitive suggests that for it to also succeed
it would have to be the case that (w(β)∧w(α+4))∧ (w(α)∩¬w(α)). Since
α is meant to be a call trampoline, it is, at least in our case, by design picked
from an executable .text section that is also usually non-writable. Thus it is
normally the case that ¬w(α) ∧ ¬w(α + 4). Under such conditions, the sec-
ond primitive causes an access violation and control flow is interrupted and
redirected to exception handling routines.
Alternatively, the exploit-generating tool can pick valid values for α and
β, but in doing so, restricts the possible memory addresses that α and β can
assume, possibly resulting in a failure to find exploitable conditions. It was
empirically determined that picking valid values in our particular case does
not achieve a great deal - the exploit primitives avert an access violation, but a
violation nevertheless occurs further down the line. From a path perspective,
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the path where exploit primitives succeed and the path where they cause an
access violation, ultimately merge in the exception handling routine. In ad-
dition, both paths are susceptible to the same hijacking method; thus, at least
in this case, the design choice did not influence exploitability. In general, it is
possible for the two paths to diverge and never meet.
Vectored Exceptions Unlike SEH exception handling, Vectored Exception
Handling (VEH) is not frame-based and will be called regardless of whether
control is in a particular call frame. The VEH dispatch routine is the first ex-
ception handler that is called in the event of an access violation in ntdll.dll,
having priority over, for example, SEH. For this reason, VEH is commonly used
in manual exploit writing. VEH handlers are called in the order in which they
are added and the head pointer can be ascertained by inspecting
AddVectoredExceptionHandler in ntdll.dll. To achieve arbitrary code
execution, the pointer to the head VEH node should be set as the destination
address of the write-4 primitive and the write value should be set to point
to a fake VEH node. A subsequently raised exception will transfer control to
arbitrary code (a fake handler) referenced from the fake VEH node, as per ex-
ception handling procedures. It is commonly the case that a fake VEH node
is constructed from a pointer on the stack that references the shellcode buffer.
However, this particular VEHmethod becomes unreliable if the stack fluctuates
unpredictably.
Conditional Guard The VEH dispatch routine is, however, protected by a
conditional guard. Our system is unable to install a handler a priori until
dispatch-like behaviour is observed and the routine is recognised as transfer-
ring control indirectly. Future work may focus on exploring such paths sym-
bolically by injecting symbolic bytes into memory transfers. The default ex-
ception handler is the Unhandled Exception Filter (UEF) which is responsible
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77EB9B80 ...
77EB9B82 mov eax, [L77ED63B4]




77EB9B8E cmp eax, 01h
77EB9B91 ...
Figure 7.6: The UEF exception handler dispatch
for displaying the recognisable error dialog upon an application crash. The
UEF, which can be observed in Figure 7.6, is the last effort to run an exception
handler and processes raised exceptions that otherwise no installed exception
handler is defined to process. It is common practice to use UEF when manu-
ally writing exploits for heap-based vulnerabilities. UEF is considered a more
reliable method of exploitation as it can tolerate unpredictable stack fluctua-
tions. In our evaluation, we have managed to automatically produce a hijack-
ing method that in fact corresponds to the UEF method.
When exploiting a target application in practice, whether the control flow
is transferred to shellcode from the heap manager or from application-specific
code is irrelevant. If the Primitive and Hijack phases succeed for surrogates,
control would never return to the client application after being hijacked in the
heapmanager. If we choose to target application-specific data, such as writable
function pointers that are stored on the heap, the Primitive and Hijack may
fail on surrogates, but may succeed on real applications. This is due to the
fact that the execution trace is not terminated after control leaves the modules
associated with the heap manager, e.g., ntdll.dll. Thus, the algorithm could
be used in such a scenario but would only yield an application-specificmethod
of exploitation that is unlikely to be portable. However, in this thesis, we strive
to generate a heap exploit methodology that works on any application using
the vulnerable heap manager.
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Solver *solv = s2e()->getExecutor()->getSolver();
Query query(state->constraints , expr);
bool res = solv->mustBeTrue(query.negateExpr(),
truth);
if (!res || truth) {
// Constraint is non-applicable
return false;
} else {




Code Sample 7.3: Testing the satisfiability of a constraint
(Eq (w32 0x0)
(And w32 (ZExt w32
(Read w8 0xd v0_heapSym_0))
(w32 0x10)))
Figure 7.7: Conditions imposed upon heapmetadata
7.2.4. . Exploit generation
During the exploit generation phase, it is determined that SP0 and SP1 place
constraints on data that is a part of the landing site. Observe from Figure 7.7
that v0_heapSym_0, the variable name for a series of symbolic bytes, has an
equality constraint equivalent to (heapSym[0x0D] & 0x10) == 0x00. The
inability to control bytes at the landing site may lead to invalid instructions or
access violations occurring. Hence, we perform a state-switch to a state with
more permissive constraints and resume the search for exploit primitives.
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// Create constraint 'EqExpr(mem, eqExpr)'
eqExpr = ConstantExpr::alloc(
eqByte, klee::Expr::Int8);
// Apply the path constraint
state.addConstraint(EqExpr::create(
currExpr , eqExpr));
Code Sample 7.4: Imposing constraints
Constraints imposed on metadata bytes that are neither involved in an ex-
ploit primitive nor a part of the landing site are considered bad bytes and the
exploit is subsequently built around the bytes. The bytes themselves are pre-
fixed with jmp instructions that jump to the next valid instruction. The exploit
string is packaged into a stand-alone executable Python script, based on the
desired method of delivery, e.g., over a network to network-enabled applica-
tions, and transferred to the guest operating system for deployment.
One of the main contributions of this work is to demonstrate that readily-
available tools, such as S2E, are capable of conducting attacks against popular
heap managers without running into problems with, for example, symboli-
cally executing parts of the heap-management code. While we have not pre-
viously observed any such instances, it is conceivable to imagine a hardened
heap implementation that would pro-actively attempt to resist symbolic exe-
cution [76, 32]. Such a defence might not hinder manual efforts to construct
exploits for heap implementations, but might present a challenge to automated
analysis and exploit-generating tools.
The unlink and lookaside techniques can be found automatically.
7.37.3 Validation of Extended Results
In this section, we first present our evaluation targets and methodology (Sec-
tion 7.3.1) and then present experimental results to answer the following ques-
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void SkyriseAnalyzer::prefixJumps(
RangeVector rVec,






// Check each range
foreach2(itVec, rVec.begin(), rVec.end()) {
fr = *itVec;
// Compute range size
if((fr.end-fr.begin) > 255) {




// Set the addresses of jumps
jmp_1 = fr.begin - 2;
jmp_2 = fr.begin - 1;
// Check range validity
if((jmp_1 <= inject_range ->begin) ||




// Apply jump constraints (0xEB=jmp rel8)
if(!applyByteEquiv(jmp_1,
0xEB, read_state , apply_state)) {




rsize, read_state , apply_state)) {


























Figure 7.8: Example of produced Python attack script
Length States Crashes Time (s) Technique
1 5 0 0 n/a
2 25 1 18 n/a
3 120 6 94 n/a
4 580 28 580 unlink
5 2,792 124 3,062 n/a
6 13,468 548 11,106 n/a
7 65,152 2,446 73,606 lookaside
Table 7.7: Number of states, crashes and time taken
tions:
1. Effectiveness (Section 7.3.2): Canour systemautomatically generate heap
exploits for real-world applications?
2. Generality (Section 7.3.3): Does our system apply to a wide range of
heap managers?
3. Automation (Section 7.3.4): What level of automation does our imple-
mentation offer?
7.3. Validation of Extended Results 169
We have 6 existing states.
Entering onStateFork (pc=0x77f51f0e)
We are about to fork state 0 into (at pc 0x77f51f0e)
state 0 state 7
We have 7 existing states.
Entering onStateFork (pc=0x77f5215c)
Fork is a MOV instruction - potential write-4 at pc=0x77f5215c
Forking at (potential) write-4 primitive
--> Checking write-4 primitive (EAX/ECX) at pc 0x77f5215c
[State 0] check_write4Primitive: EAX has symbolic value.









(ReadLSB w16 0x8 v0_symHeap_0))
Constraint:
(Eq (w32 0x0)




(ReadLSB w32 0x14 v0_symHeap_0))
Printing expression in EAX:
(ReadLSB w32 0x10 v0_symHeap_0)
Printing expression in ECX:
(ReadLSB w32 0x14 v0_symHeap_0)
Listing states we are forking into...
state 0 state 8
Analyzing exploit susceptibility of state 0
-> Attempting to add constraint to [EAX] data... OK.
-> Attempting to add constraint to ECX data... failed.
-> Moving on to next state.
Analyzing exploit susceptibility of state 8
-> Attempting to add constraint to [EAX] data... OK.
-> Attempting to add constraint to ECX data... OK.
[+] Acquired write-4 primitive.
[+] Successfully obtained exploit solution.
Figure 7.9: Example truncated output from our S2E plugin
Mn[c]← x symbolic write-n to fixed location
Mn[x]← c fixed write-n to symbolic location
Mn[x]← x symbolic write-n to symbolic location
v ←Mn[x] read-n from symbolic location
































Code Sample 7.6: An example shellcode template
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4. Performance (Section 7.3.5): What is our system’s overall performance
and what is the contribution of the individual steps?
We hope this analysis will help inform a discussion, and illuminate the
challenges and problems, yet to be overcome, in support of solving the au-
tomatic exploit generation problem.
7.3.1. . Evaluation Targets andMethodology
Heap Managers As target heap managers, we selected all four Windows XP
heap managers, from Service Packs 0 to SP3, and the open source implemen-
tations of dlmalloc (Doug Lea’s malloc) and ptmalloc2 (the heap manager
currently used in the GNU C library, glibc). We chose these target heap man-
agers since they allowed us to focus on the specifics of heap exploit generation,
without interference by more modern defence mechanisms. The evolution of
the security of the built-inWindowsXPheapmanager over the range of Service
Packs is representative of the development of countermeasures across other
platforms as well. The heap vulnerabilities are not mere programming errors,
but complex operations on data structures which occasionally result in unsafe
program states. For example, both the Windows heap and glibc contained un-
safe unlink macros. Over the years, both gradually introduced similar safety
measures, e.g., cookies to the heap header andnon-writable guard pages to pre-
vent cross-page overflows. For the purposes of exploit generation, each Win-
dows XP Service Pack represents a completely separate heap manager, since
each is a binary build with a unique set of pointer offsets. Consequently, an
exploit is tailored for deployment against a particular Service Pack.
We also built dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 on Windows, but the detection
and use of their respective exploit primitives happens completely inside the
code of the application. While their hijack onWindows ismediated via the UEF
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exception handler, a different (possibly application-specific) function pointer
can serve as a hijack target on other platforms.
Applications As test targets we employ two real-world closed-source appli-
cations, WellinTech KingView and a Windows GDI component. Both applica-
tions contain remotely exploitable heap-based buffer overflow vulnerabilities
that may lead to arbitrary code execution. Manual exploits for both applica-
tions are available in online security databases.
WellinTech KingView 6.53 (CVE-2011-0406) is a SCADA/HMI applica-
tion used in industrial control systems to visualise process. It is a large and
complex applications consisting of hundreds of files and utilities. The vulner-
ability, which was discovered in 2011 and given CVE-2011-0406, is present in
the HistorySvr.exe module that starts up in the background as a Windows
service and listens on TCP port 777.
The MS04-032 vulnerability is present in a core component of the Win-
dows operating system, the Graphics Device Interface (GDI) library. The vul-
nerability is triggeredwhen the thumbnail icon of a specially-crafted Enhanced
Metafile (.emf) image file is rendered by an application. An attack vector
would include an HTML email, an ordinary website or a remote shared drive.
Both real-world applications were tested onWindows XP SP1 and targeted
via the unlink exploit primitive. The exploit generation should therefore work
successfully on any of the unsafe unlink heap managers.
7.3.2. . Effectiveness
We have successfully found and utilised fully-controlled write-4 primitives
on Windows XP SP0 and SP1; a combination of read-4 and write-4 primi-
tives that work in concert with each other in dlmalloc and ptmalloc2; and
partial read-4 and write-4s, followed by an alphabet-induced write-4 (full
or partial) in Windows XP SP2 and SP3. The fact that a HeapAlloc call re-
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Sequence Vulnerable heap
unlink (UNIX) dlmalloc 2.7.2, glibc v2.3.3 (ptmalloc2)
unlink (Win32) Win2K, WinXP (SP0, SP1)
lookaside list WinXP (SP2, SP3), Win2K3 Server
Table 7.8: Heap attack applicability.
Length Technique Time (s) Hijack
4 unlink macro 5.946 UEF handler
8 lookaside list 9.790 App-specific
Table 7.9: Generation of exploit for bare-bones surrogate application.
turns a symbolic pointer during the lookaside sequencemeans that evenAPI
hooks can recognise this vulnerability. In our model, we recognise the vulner-
ability, since it results in a write primitive, due to a trailing γ (within-bounds
write) at the end of the sequence. In summary, we have verified applicability of
our unlink attack sequence onUNIX-based systems for dlmalloc 2.7.2 and
glibc v2.3.3 (ptmalloc2); onWin32 systems forWindows 2000,Windows
XP SP0, and Windows XP SP1. We verified the lookaside attack on Windows
XP SP2 and SP3, and Windows 2003 Server.
Our prototype system successfully automates the entire end-to-end pro-
cess of crafting a calc-spawning exploit for the two target applications. It
demonstrates that, at least for these case scenarios, the “hacker mind” can be
imitated to a practical degree. For a bare-bones surrogate application, full ex-
ploit generation for an unlink vulnerability with a UEF handler hijack took 5.9
seconds; a lookaside list exploit with app-specific hijack took 9.8 seconds.
7.3.3. . Generality
Asmentioned in Section 7.3.2, we canfind andutilise fully- or partially-controlled
read and write primitives on all Windows XP Service Packs. In dlmalloc
and ptmalloc2, successfully dealing with read is a pre-requisite for employ-
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ing write primitives to hijack pointers.
Hijack Method Our search for an invoked, writable code pointer on Win-
dows XP SP0 and SP1 results in finding and hijacking the
UnhandledExceptionFilter. The dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 managers are
compromised via the same mechanism, as neither employs its own exception
handling and each passes control directly to the UEF after an access violation.
We are, however, unable to exploit applications that preclude the execution
of UEF, for example, by installing a VEH handler. The VEH exception handler is
not the default handler and its dispatch is protected from execution by a condi-
tional guard. This means the head node to its exception handler chain cannot
be found using our method.
The hijack method slightly differs for later Windows versions. From Win-
dows XP SP2 onward, the UEF pointer is protected by EncodePointer, ren-
dering the UEF hijack method infeasible. However, unlike the unlink tech-
nique, the lookaside technique allows control flow to exit the heap manager,
permitting us to search for a hijackable pointer inside application code. Thus,
to hijack applications on Windows XP SP2 and SP3, we apply the same routine
that detects the UEF dispatch to application code, automatically lifting a valid,
but non-reusable target pointer.
MemoryWrappers Often enough, mid-sized or large software projects, like
the cross-platform Webkit, opt to employ their own memory-management
routines, usually in an effort to achieve greater performance. Weuse dlmalloc
and ptmalloc2 as memory wrappers around the Windows heap. This sce-
nario serves to show off that our system can exploit custom heap implemen-
tations, even if the underlying operating system heap is immune to attack.
While dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 are open source, our system does not use
their source code as an input. We are therefore able to demonstrate that the
7.3. Validation of Extended Results 175
binaries of dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 on Windows can be executed symboli-
cally, which is a pre-requisite for automatic exploit generation.
Applicability Although our evaluation is performed on Windows XP, the
exploitation techniques found and exercised by our system are also known to
be applicable to Windows 2000 SP0–SP4 and Windows 2003 Server. This in-
cludes, at minimum, another five real-world heap managers that our system
can target without modification. The early Windows XP versions, dlmalloc,
and ptmalloc2 are all attacked using the unlink method, as it is convenient
and sufficiently powerful. Nevertheless, our techniques are not limited to the
unlinkmethod, as shown by using the lookasidemethod against later Win-
dows XP versions that are explicitly hardened against unsafe unlinking.
The benefits of our prototype system are most clear-cut when an exploit,
which is under construction for a newly-tasked heap manager, differs only in
minor low-level detail and is still covered by the model in use. The extension
of exploit models or templates requires human reasoning, but minor low-level
details are parsed in a straightforward fashion by laborious, repetitive calcula-
tions, perfectly suited for out-sourcing to a fast, automated process.
Sequence Enumeration Designing or evolving effective heuristics to filter
out non-exploitable sequences has been left for future work. The ascertaining
of correct values for performing more complex heap manipulations, such as
repairing the default process heap automatically, is also beyond scope. How-
ever, in all our test cases, the path from the post-overflow invocation of the
HeapAlloc or malloc call to the execution of the exploit primitive was quite
short. Thus, while it may not qualify as a general criterion, terminating the
exploration of a sequence after 15 seconds is an effective search heuristic for
isolating the unlink and lookaside sequences.
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We have conducted searches of state spaces of up to 57 configurations, cov-
ering just over 65,000 states, which encompass both theunlink andlookaside
exploitation techniques. Note that for maximum speed, one should instead
employ a userland fuzzer with additional optimisation steps that reduce the
size of the state space. Our search lazily explores most permutations of the al-
phabet, including sequences without any θ operator. Using an S2E plugin for
searching, one complete sequence exploration takes on average 1.1 seconds,
with θ interpreted as a concrete overflow.
7.3.4. . Automation
Injection Models As briefly mentioned in Section 7.1, in order to simu-
late user input, we inject symbolic data by utilising conventional input vec-
tors, such as arguments, files on disk, network transmissions or environment
variables. To this end, we implement a number of complex interfaces, which
we have observed to be necessary for the injection of real-world applications.
These complex interfaces ensure a target application receives the symbolic in-
put properly. Our plugin intercepts WSAAsyncSelect in order to retrieve the
message code and socket identifier used for the registration of asynchronous
network event notifications. The collected data is replayed into an application’s
mainmessage loop using GetMessageA; this simulates a network event occur-
rence that results either in the acceptance of a new connection or in the reading
from an established connection stream. In the latter case, a ioctlsocket call
is intercepted to simulate data waiting to be read from the operating system’s
network buffer. Only then is any subsequent attempt to read the data using
recv utilised to inject symbolic bytes.
This procedure was used to inject the WellinTech KingView SCADA/HMI
application. It is infeasible to deliver an oversized input to KingView, and thus
infeasible to exploit it, if only recv is modelled. This demonstrates how dif-












state->getSp() + 1 * sizeof(uint32_t),
&socket, sizeof(uint32_t));
state->readMemoryConcrete(
state->getSp() + 2 * sizeof(uint32_t),
&p_sockaddr , sizeof(uint32_t));
state->readMemoryConcrete(




// Client socket (no error)
//











Code Sample 7.7: Abstracting the accept function call
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ficult it is, in practice, to stimulate behaviour from real-world applications. It
requires not only having models for each of the four individual API calls, but
also to have the four API calls work in concert with each other to create a con-
sistent illusion of incoming network traffic.
Length States Crashes Time (s) Technique
1 5 0 0
2 25 1 18
3 120 6 94
4 580 28 580 unlink
5 2,792 124 3,062
6 13,468 548 11,106
7 65,152 2,446 73,606 lookaside
Table 7.10: Number of states, crashes and time taken for each step
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To exploit the two real-world applications, we needed to bootstrap the sym-
bolic execution engine with a concrete prefix and suffix. We consider finding
the path to a vulnerability to be an orthogonal problem, but acknowledge that
it is an active research area and an important sub-problem in a full exploit gen-
eration system.
Table 7.13, we detail the input vectors for symbolic injections and the times
taken to craftworking exploits for real-world target applications. In Table 7.12,
we detail the auxiliary inputs that helped bootstrap S2E’s symbolic execution
engine for finding exploit primitives and key practical challenges that were
overcome.
KingViewVulnerability To tackle theCVE-2011-0406 vulnerability inKingView,
we provided an auxiliary concrete input consisting of 30,000 concrete bytes,
with the addition of 70 symbolic bytes. The auxiliary bytes that form the prefix
are derived from a crashing test case (without exploit). The prefix allows to
reach the location of the crash without re-exploring the entire application.
The nettransdll.dll that is host to the heap-based buffer overflow un-
fortunately computes a cyclic redundancy check (CRC16) on received network
data before passing it on. The error-checking calculation has no effect on the
exploitability of the vulnerability, i.e., the resulting checksum does not have to
match the expected value for the exploit towork. However, the execution of the
CRC16 routine itself can be problematic. A concrete prefix is often employed
to get the symbolic execution engine through problematic portions of code,
e.g., an application is made to perform difficult computations on a concrete
header of a packet, so it thereafter passes the entire packet, which bears a trail-
ing symbolic suffix, to the code of interest. In CVE-2011-0406, a checksum is
computed on the entire packet, resulting in a fork explosion upon the injection
of only a single symbolic byte. Cryptographic code, e.g., message digest func-
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Vulnerability Key challenge Concrete
CVE-2011-0406 CRC16 abstraction 30,000-byte prefix
CVE-2004-0209 Floating point EMF file format
Table 7.12: Real-world target: auxiliary input and key challenges
Vulnerability Process Vector Speed (s)
CVE-2011-0406 HistorySvr.exe TCP/IP sockets 22
CVE-2004-0209 explorer.exe file on disk 20
Table 7.13: Real-world targets: input vectors and speeds
we solve the problem by providing an S2E abstraction for the CRC16 function
with local consistency. Alternatively, a concolic string seeded with the con-
crete prefix can be used instead. Overall, generation of a full exploit took 22
seconds. The fact that the instrumentation statistics show that CpuConcr has
a significantly larger value thanCpuKleemeans that S2E is performing well: it
runs as much of the target stack as possible in concrete mode (QEMU) and only
elects to switch to symbolic mode (LLVM) when exploring the unit under test.
This yields performance improvements and may avoid an unmanagable state
space which may result from an occurence of the path explosion problem.
Windows GDI Vulnerability To generate an exploit for the MS04-032 Win-
dows GDI vulnerability, we provided an Enhanced Metafile (EMF) file format
template as the auxiliary concrete input. The template consists of a 64-byte
concrete prefix, the file header, and 4-byte concrete suffix, the file termina-
tor. An arbitrary number of symbolic bytes (in our case, 67 symbolic bytes)
was injected into the ”data” portion of the EMF template by ReadFile hooks
that intercepted the IStream::Read interface data buffering. The control flow
subsequently descended into gdiplus.dll, whereby KLEE attempted to in-
voke the external function int32_to_floatx80 with symbolic arguments.
Recall that S2E converts translation blocks that manipulate symbolic bytes into
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LLVM, for execution by KLEE. Vanilla KLEE does not support the invocation
of the external function with symbolic arguments and only had limited exper-
imental support for concolic data types. Thus, a few of KLEE’s Core modules
were patched to enable S2E to ingest x86 floating point operations with con-
colic floating point data types. This enabled the end-to-end construction of
exploit code for MS04-032. There is reason to suspect that future exploit sys-
tems for graphics-processing code with an S2E back-end will demand analo-
gous extensions. Exploit generation took 20 seconds in this case.
7.3.5. . Performance
All experiments were performed on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 with 8 GB 1600
MHz DDR3, running a Mac OS X 10.8.5 operating system. Table 7.10 shows
statistics of our experiment in finding vulnerable heap interaction sequences
(Interact). The unlink and lookaside techniques were found automatically
at length 4 and 7 of the interaction string (see Section 5.5.1).
In Section 7.3.4, we show statistics over time for executing the unlink
technique on Windows XP SP0 and the lookaside technique on Windows
XP SP2. The number of instructions (both concrete and symbolic) give a mea-
surement of the size of the heap manager; the number of queries estimates the
effort required for symbolic execution to pinpoint the exploit primitive. We
also list timingmeasurements for the time spent constructing queries and solv-
ing them (using the STP solver). If a system is faced with particularly complex
constraints then this will reflect in the increase in time that is spent generat-
ing and solving SAT queries. None of the heap managers we tested gave rise
to complex symbolic expressions, since in neither case did the symbolic bytes
go through any conversion process, e.g. a hash function. This is understand-
able, as being critical components of operating systems, heap managers strive
for best performance and simplicity. Therefore, the SAT queries produced by
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// An example exploit setup procedure.
//
// An inject_range struct must be prepared prior
// to invocation and write-4 data is assumed to






// Compute fixed byte ranges
RangeVector rVec = computeFixedBytes(
&irange, 0x90, read_state , apply_state);
// Prefix fixed ranges with jumps
prefixJumps(rVec, &irange, read_state ,
apply_state);
// Compute shellcode position
srange.begin = irange.end - shellcode_sp1_len;
srange.end = irange.end;
// Lay down shellcode (select correct SP)
if(!applyBytePattern(&srange, shellcode_sp1 ,
read_state , apply_state)) {
// Is this range available?




// Fill in with NOPs
fillByteRange(&irange, 0x90, read_state ,
apply_state);
// Computing valid landing ranges
// ...
// Solve exploit formula
produceTestCase(apply_state , apply_state ->getPc()
);
// Terminate search of target application
//exit(1);
}
Code Sample 7.8: Procedure for setting up exploit code
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Figure 7.12: Automatically generated exploit invoking calc.exe
shellcode-building code were straightforward to solve.
7.3.6. . Exception Handling
Unlike SEH exception handling, Vectored Exception Handling (VEH) is not
frame-based and will be called regardless of whether control is in a particular
call frame. The VEH dispatch routine is the first exception handler that is called
in the event of an access violation in ntdll.dll, having priority over, for ex-
ample, SEH. For this reason, VEH is commonly used in manual exploit writ-
ing. VEH handlers are called in the order in which they are added and the head
pointer can be ascertained by inspecting AddVectoredExceptionHandler in
ntdll.dll. To achieve arbitrary code execution, the pointer to the head VEH
node should be set as the destination address of the write-4 primitive and the
write value should be set to point to a fake VEH node. A subsequently raised ex-
ception will transfer control to arbitrary code (a fake handler) referenced from
the fake VEH node, as per exception handling procedures. It is commonly the
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case that a fake VEH node is constructed from a pointer on the stack that ref-
erences the shellcode buffer. However, this particular VEH method becomes
unreliable if the stack fluctuates unpredictably.
The VEH dispatch routine is, however, protected by a conditional guard.
Our system is unable to install a handler a priori until dispatch-like behaviour
is observed and the routine is recognised as transferring control indirectly. Fu-
ture work may focus on exploring such paths symbolically by injecting sym-
bolic bytes intomemory transfers. Thedefault exception handler is theUnhan-
dled Exception Filter (UEF), which is responsible for displaying the recognis-
able error dialog upon an application crash. The UEF, which can be observed in
Figure 5.3, is the last effort to run an exception handler and processes raised ex-
ceptions that otherwise no installed exception handler is defined to process. It
is common practice to use UEFwhen manually writing exploits for heap-based
vulnerabilities. UEF is considered a more reliable method of exploitation as it
can tolerate unpredictable stack fluctuations. In our evaluation, we have man-
aged to automatically produce a hijacking method that in fact corresponds to
the UEF method.
When exploiting a target application in practice, whether the control flow
is transferred to shellcode from the heap manager or from application-specific
code is irrelevant. If the Primitive and Hijack phases succeed for surrogates,
control would never return to the client application after being hijacked in the
heapmanager. If we choose to target application-specific data, such as writable
function pointers that are stored on the heap, the Primitive and Hijack may
fail on surrogates, but may succeed on real applications. This is due to the
fact that the execution trace is not terminated after control leaves the modules
associated with the heap manager, e.g., ntdll.dll. Thus, the algorithm could
be used in such a scenario but would only yield an application-specificmethod
of exploitation that is unlikely to be portable. However, in this thesis, we strive
186 Evaluation
to generate a heap exploit methodology that works on any application using
the vulnerable heap manager.
7.3.7. . Exploit Synthesis Countermeasures
To the best of our knowledge, there has been no research conducted intoapplication-level defences designed explicitly against AEG systems. How-
ever, due to their reliance on symbolic execution, existing techniques aimed
at complicating symbolic execution are promising candidates. We previously
mentioned a defence based on the principle of complexifying path constraints
in Section 3.2.3.
If a defence solution were to be implemented against a system adhering to
the strong notion of AEG, it would be possible for it to behave more softly with
respect to the semantics of the programunder consideration, as opposed to the
weak notion. For example, it is feasible to introduce constraint obfuscation that
hinders the AEG system from generating inputs that exercise a buggy path.
On the other hand, defending against the weak notion of AEG would be a
more challenging task - it implies a change must occur in the concrete run of
the program on a particular input. For example, defending against the weak
notion of AEG at the application-level could include closing a vulnerability.
When altering the semantics of the program, assumptions about the ”cor-
rect intentions” of the program must be made to fix what is perceived to be a
vulnerability. This requirement does not prevent existing tools from exercising
their judgement about what is and is not perceived to be a vulnerability. How-
ever, it will present a challenge to future bug-finding tools that intend on being
adaptive andmust reason, in an unassisted fashion, about the nature of vulner-
abilities. The development of such adaptive systems is one of the objectives of
the DARPA-run CGC challenge.
Hence, by making exploration more difficult under the strong notion of
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AEG , the semantics of the program under consideration are guaranteed to re-
main intact and less prone to potential problems.
While defenses against the weak notion of AEGmay include ASLR and DEP,
these measures are implemented on the OS-side and do not strictly qualify as
application-level defenses. It is also the case that a regular exploit can some-




Software vulnerabilities, such asmemory corruption errors, are stillprevalent in today’s cyber domain. They permeate the infrastruc-ture of modern society. The emergence of computing technologyhas been accompanied by the ever-present desire to automate ba-
sic, repetitive and time-consuming tasks. There is hardly an area of science or
social life that does not stand to profit from the benefits of automation. One
computer security activity that has been the subject of automation attempts in
recent years is that of exploit development. Whilst initial steps have been taken
in the direction of autonomous systems, automatic exploit generation as a com-
puter science problem is far from solved, both in terms of its tractability and
applicability to all vulnerability types and platforms. In this work, we sought
to continue the effort of learning about the requirements of exploit synthesis
and addressed some of its main challenges.
Specifically, the problem of synthesising exploits for the class of heap vul-
nerabilities has not been previously tackled. In introductory chapters, we pro-
vided a collection of cyberwarfare-related scenarios where security exploits,
such as those produced by our system in earlier chapters, might find real-world
applications. These real-world application, in turn, provide motivation for our
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work and for improving the degree to which exploit writing is automated.
Therefore, in this thesis, we have introduced and formalised the nature of
heap-based vulnerabilities, in the context of the automatic exploit generation
problem. We have presented a general framework for discovering granular ex-
ploit primitives in heap managers with varying heap layouts. Finally, we have
demonstrated that it is feasible to use our solution for popular implementa-
tions of both default and custom heap managers, from both UNIX-based and
Windows platforms, and to generate working exploits for large real-world tar-
get applications.
Chapter Organisation The remainder of this chapter is organised in the fol-
lowing manner:
• Section 8.1 recalls the practical uses and applications of security exploits
and motivations for automating the exploit development pipeline,
• Section 8.2 summarises the main contributions of this thesis,
• Section 8.3 provides concluding remarks about this project,
• Section 8.4 proposes potential next steps and promising future direc-
tions for exploit generation systems.
8.18.1 The Need for Exploit Generation
The benefits associated with automating the exploit development pipelinecan be split into the generic benefits of automation (8.1.1) and exploit-
specific capabilities (8.1.2).
8.1.1. . Generic Automation Benefits
We associate numerous generic benefits with the successful automation of any
exploit development pipeline. Namely:
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1. The generation of security exploits at computer speeds. Operating at
computer efficiency, we can maximise strategic technical advantage by
isolating the vulnerability quicker, and weaponizing it sooner than a
manual evaluation otherwise would.
2. Simplicity: Decreasing the system’s reliance on expert input would in
turn permit its use by non-expert operators. As such, it could become a
tactical point-and-shoot device by cyber warfare operators. It could also
have applications in time-critical scenarios.
3. Scale:
The ability to fully automate is then a prerequisite for scaling the sys-
tem ad infinitum to a distributed set of processors. Systems based on
symbolic execution would proceed along the lines of distributing and
balancing program exploration trees among nodes [15].
8.1.2. . Expoit Generation Benefits
One purpose of an automatic exploit generation system is to act as a classifier
for vulnerabilities according to exploitability; specificially, to seperate a set of
vulnerabilities into two sets: exploitable and non-exploitable. This would in
turn instantly inform defensive measures, such as patch prioritization.
Another metric a successful system can bring is that of severity. It may
be desirable to know whether a vulnerability can merely result in a denial of
service (DoS) or can enable an attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution.
The structure of a generated exploit may reflect what an attacker’s packet
either could ormight have to include. For example, a header field in the packet
may be necessarily malformed to trigger the underlying vulnerability. This
information could form the basis of a signature which is fed into intrusion de-
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tection and prevention systems that could then filter out malicious packets at
the network perimetre.
Since AEG systems based on symbolic execution collect path constraints,
the shellcoding portion of exploit construction is aware of the complete range
or state space of possible and acceptable values for inclusion in an exploit. If
this state space is systematically interrogated, an AEG system can produce all
possible exploit permutations, bounded by the model it employs. Such byte-
code variations may increase the probability of subverting a target filter.
8.28.2 Summary of the Contributions
The contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• Introduces the first formalisation of the heap exploit problem. It in-
troduces heap-based vulnerabilities in the context of the automatic ex-
ploit generation problem and explains the key challenges involved in the
manufacturing of any successful exploit in this class of attacks.
• Explains the automatic creation of working heap exploits. It proposes
a modular approach based on symbolic execution to automatically find
reusable attack patterns against heap managers and instances of these
patterns in real-world applications.
• Executes exploit synthesis procedures against large real-worldWindows
applications. It models existing and complex Windows APIs to achieve
symbolic exploration of real systems.
• Presents a systematic way to locate heap exploit primitives. By showing
how exploit primitives can be modelled and detected, it demonstrates
a method for systematically enumerating a target for exploit primitives
useful in heap attacks.
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8.38.3 Concluding Remarks
Oneof the orthogonal contributions of thiswork is to demonstrate that readily-
available tools, such as S2E, are capable of conducting attacks against popular
heapmanagers without running into problems with, for example, symbolically
executing parts of the heap-management code.
There is a debate to be had about the level of automation expected from
exploit-generating tools. Firstly, all automatic exploit generation systems [13,
42, 5, 11], including those with cross-platform support, have made use of op-
erating system-specific detail such as native file formats of executables. The
addition of support for a new file format would require manual programming
effort. Oncemanually implemented, the process of exploit generation can pro-
ceed in an automatic way. The issue of operating system-level differences is
less pronounced in previous work [13, 42, 5] as stack-based and string format
vulnerabilities do not involve testing an operating system component, such
as the heap manager. While the automatic exploit generation problem has
largely been about automating the exploit writing pipeline, we believe the heap
demonstrates that future systems will have a greater role to play in the com-
prehension and automatic deduction of exploitable heap configurations. It is,
at the time of writing, an open problem whether the techniques presented in
this thesis are sufficient to locate exploit primitives in more advanced heap al-
locators.
8.48.4 Directions for FutureWork
The following paragraphs outline some future research directions thatwereidentified as logical next steps during the development of our system:
1. Loop-Reasoning Techniques in Symbolic Execution: Symbolic execution en-
gines commonly opt to sacrifice completeness to make further progress in
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such cases. The ability to reason about loops will be necessary for tackling
real-world program analysis problems, like the AEG problem. The A-L2S is
based on dynamic test generation work on loops conducted at Microsoft
Research (MSR). In Appendix A, we propose a technique that addresses a
scenario in which symbolic execution performs very poorly, namely, the
handling of loops with symbolic bounds and non-induction variable (IV)
loop guards. These loops often result in fork explosions.
2. Honeypots as Attacker-driven Symbolic Execution: Symbolic execution suf-
fers from the path explosion problem, when exploring a target program in
an unguided fashion; in this work, we would attempt to identify vulnerabil-
ities in a program under consideration by exposing it to external attacker
input. The attacker input is used to seed a symbolic execution engine that
examines the path exercised by the input and also adjacent paths for vulner-
abilities. For example, a zero-day exploit that is sent by an attacker would
result in the discovery of the causal vulnerability in the program under test.
It raises a number of questions, including: how will the attacker be pro-
vided timely output to maintain a healthy interaction? If successful, it can
provide inputs for a range of systems.
3. Automatic Exploit Generation for Android: Automatic exploit generation
has thus far been conducted forWindows andUNIX platforms, by building
models for stack-based, string-format and heap vulnerabilities. Some of
these bugs may be present in the C/C++ portion of an Android system and
also in other embedded platforms that strive for high performance and use
unsafe languages. S2E is built for x86 systems, so the researcherwould either
test an x86 version of Android or extend S2E to handle ARM-based code
and adapt the exploitation techniques for that platform.
4. Obfuscation to Armour Binaries against AEG: In this work, we are inter-
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ested in providing an efficient obfuscation technique, e.g. an LLVM pass,
that introduces new constructs or transforms existing ones in a binary tar-
get. These constructs would exploit weaknesses of symbolic execution, such
as S2E’s consistency models, to reduce overall code coverage. A simple idea
to begin with is secure triggers that utilise hash functions and weaknesses
in SE engines’ ability to deal with loops (see Appendix A). This can protect
legitimate software from being automatically targeted by AEG systems. It
can also serve to protect covert backdoors in binaries that are camouflaged
as vulnerabilities for plausible deniability. While we have not previously
observed any such instances, it is conceivable to imagine a hardened heap
implementation that would pro-actively attempt to resist symbolic execu-
tion [76, 32]. Such a defence might not hinder manual efforts to construct
exploits for heap implementations, but might present a challenge to auto-
mated analysis and exploit-generating tools.
5. Static Analysis for Guided Symbolic Execution Finding a path leading to a
vulnerability is fundamental for solving the automatic exploit or patch gen-
eration problem. In this work, static analysis of binaries would give hints
as to the location of potentially buggy code. A full path to the buggy code
would then be developed using symbolic execution. The vulnerability will
then be dynamically shown to exist or be discarded as a false positive. Al-
ternatively, a variant of compositional symbolic execution that runs code
segments in isolation can generate such hints.
6. Thread-sensitive Exploit Generation: Threads introduce non-determinism
into the ordering of program events. S2E transparently serialises a multi-
threaded situation. Contemporary AEG systems assume that, given a pro-
gram and a corresponding input, the programwill always exercise the same
path, under that particular input. This discounts the possibility of non-
deterministic situations that result from race conditions between multiple
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threads. This work would look into developing thread-safe exploits. Op-
tionally, this can feed into detecting threading-specific vulnerabilities.
7. Floating-point Exploit Generation: Thisworkwould aim to extend S2E’s, and
thus in turn, KLEE’s support for symbolic floating point data types. Partial
support was determined to be necessary for the symbolic execution of vul-




In this appendix, we propose the loop summarization technique described
in [34] to include reasoning about abstract input lengths.
A.1.1 Motivation
We seek to gain the ability to generalize the effects of loops, such as memory
copying operations, to inputs of arbitrary length. Consequently, we seek to
detect buffer overflows whether or not the test input is of sufficient length to
actually overflow a given buffer. This overcomes a fundamental problem in
dynamic test generation - using a fixed-sized concrete or symbolic input of a
shorter-than-necessary length to overflow a vulnerable buffer. The KLEE [12]
symbolic virtual machine and current tools based on it, e.g. S2E [14], have no
support for variable-length symbolic strings or memory.
It is feasible to simulate a variable-length string γ up to some constant
lengthα using fixed-sized symbolic buffers, by imposing the constraint γ[β] =
ϵ for 0 ≤ β ≤ α, where ϵ is the string terminator character. However, regard-
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less of the value picked forα, a string of lengthα+1 cannot be simulated using
this method. Fixed-length symbolic buffers do not lend themselves well to de-
tecting buffer overflows. Generally, for any concrete or symbolic input of size
n that is meant to overflow a buffer, there might only exist a vulnerable buffer
of size n + 1, that accommodates the input without overflowing. A method
that relies on the program exhibiting undesirable behaviour when run with a
given test input is not sufficient to reveal such underestimations. Using length
abstraction, we can set the input length on an ex post facto basis to guarantee
an overflow.
One of the shortcomings of the algorithmdescribed in [34] is its inability to
detect loop counts in the presence of delimited fields in the input. These input-
dependencies are handled in [69] due to an a priori knowledge of a grammar
linking a trip count to some property of the input, such as an input length.
A common instantiation of a loop over a delimited field is the copying of a
null-terminated string from one buffer into another, for example, in a func-
tion akin to strcpy. Such memory operations that may depend entirely on
an untrusted bound, i.e., a user-supplied input of arbitrary length, are well-
known fertile ground for buffer overflows. Thus, more robust reasoning about
instances of such loops translates to a more efficient detection mechanism for
buffer overflow vulnerabilities.
A.2.2 Loop Summarization
Consider the code in Code Sample A.1. We say node n1 dominates n2 if every
path leading to n2 also contains n1. Thus, the header of a loop L is a node in a
control-flow graph that dominates all other nodes belonging to L, i.e. at every
iteration of the loop L, control returns to the first statement belonging to L.
Hence, n1 would always precede n2 in a linear execution trace.
In the following code sample taken from [34], variablex is input-dependent
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void main(int x) { // x is an input
int c = 0, p = 0;
while (1) {
if (x <= 0) break;
if (c == 50) abort1(); /* error 1 */
c = c + 1;
p = p + c;
x = x - 1;
}
if (c == 30) abort2(); /* error 2 */
}
Code Sample A.1: A simple loop with side effects
int i=0;
while (x <= 0) { // x is input-dependent
if (i == 5) abort(); // error
x = x - 1;
i = i + 1;
}
Code Sample A.2: An IV-dependent loop guard
and therefore marked as symbolic. The technique detects increments of vari-
able i by a constant amount at each iteration of the loop. Such variables are
recognised to be Induction Variables (IVs). IVs are defined as linear functions
of the number of loop iterations. Thus, the loop guard protecting the function
abort() can be reasoned about due to the fact that it is IV-dependent.
In the case of exploit generation, we are interested in forming a set of
constraints that describe the value that x must assume in order to trigger the
abort() call. Provided that the constraints along the path to abort() are col-
lected successfully and the resulting conjunction of constraints is satisfiable, a
decision procedure should return a valid value for x.
In [34], loops that involved non-IV guards presented a challenge to the
algorithm. It is noted that only 33% of loops containing non-IV guards that
were tested were guessed and summarised successfully. The loops typically
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for (j=0; j < x; j++) { // x is input-dependent




Code Sample A.3: Non-IV dependent loop guard
involved pointers, such as in the following scenario from [34]:
In the code sample above, x is symbolic and variable j is correctly recog-
nised as an induction variable. However, there is insufficient information re-
garding array to determine whether the non-IV guard condition can ever be
satisfied, and if so, at which loop iteration.
Consequently, it is not possible to determine the minimum or maximum
amount of iterations for any loop containing such a non-IV guard. A loop
always exits at the first loop guard that ”expires” [34] and so, for example, if
array[0] == NULL, then no statements in the loop’s body might execute at
all.
It follows that for null-terminated strings, the guard condition is satisfied
when j equals the length of the string in array. If run on a random input, e.g.,
”abc”, the loop would always exit at the 4th iteration. Without length abstrac-
tion, the exit condition could not be automatically related to the shape of the
input. Thus, there would be no systematic way of crafting an input to achieve
a certain number of loop iterations that are coupled with certain arbitrary, but
desirable, loop-dependent side-effects, such as a memory copy.
In particular, buffer overflow vulnerabilities might have a memory copy
operation as a side-effect. It follows that in order to exploit the vulnerability we
must infer the required loop iteration count to overflow a given buffer. There-
fore, in addition to summarising loops, it is also necessary to track the sizes of
allocated stack or heap buffers. The sizes form part of an overflow constraint
formula that when satisfiable, confirms the existence of a potential overflow.
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Finally, the iteration count can be imposed upon the loop bymeans of an input
that accurately exercises it.
A.3.3 Length Abstraction
Vanilla length abstraction that functions using annotated string handling func-
tions is unable to detect overflows that occur via custom loops, e.g. loops that
increment pointers and write byte-per-byte to stack memory. This is due to
the fact that the overflow formula is generated and checked only once a string
length-altering function is invoked. Combining the length abstraction tech-
nique with loop summarization permits us to reason about exactly such loops.
Our technique combines the loop summarization of [34] with the length
abstraction described in [88]. This permits us to extend the method of pro-
ducing on-the-fly summaries of loops to handle non-IV loop guards which
can only be reasoned about with the addition of a symbolic length. Our work
makes the assumption that once a fixed-size symbolic string is introduced, its
length ismanipulated only by designated string handling functions. For exam-
ple, in order to calculate a string length, the strlen function is used, rather
than a custom loop. This is done for the purposes of intercepting the string
handling functions and abstracting their operation to merely manipulate the
symbolic length. For example, strlen would return the symbolic length of a
fixed-size symbolic string instead of the concrete length. Operations that have
no effect on a string’s length, such as the assignment str[x]=y where str[x]
!= 0 and y != 0 are exempt from this assumption. In principle, string ma-
nipulation functions could be annotated automatically, potentially utilising
function or loop summaries. However, this would merely increase the practi-
cal applicability of the technique and so we leave such automatic recognition
for future work.
In [88], instrumentation is added to create amemory node each time a local
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void lookup(char *buf) {
char *wbuf = "blahblah";
if (strlen(buf) + strlen(wbuf) + 1 > 512) {
return;
}









Code Sample A.4: A simple off-by-one buffer overflow
variable is allocated on the stack, e.g. during the creation of a stack frame on
function entry. Similarly, the memory nodes are removed if local variables go
out of scope on a function return. The memory nodes are used to maintain
the state of a buffer, including its allocated size. The following slightly-adapted
example taken from [88] demonstrates the usefulness of a symbolic length:
Assume that the string in buffer buf has a symbolic length β and the buffer
itself is of size σ. The condition under which line 4 is reached is hence (β+8+
1 > 512). The largest value that β can assume while satisfying the condition
on line 4 is β = 503. If the constraint on line 6 is satisfied, then strcat
updates the symbolic length of buf to β + 1. Each abstraction of the strcat
function composes a constraint formula, using current constraints on buf and
size σ, under which an overflow may occur. In general, length-altering string
functions should check for overflows by producing a first-order logic formula
of the form
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(α0) ∧ (α1) ∧ ... ∧ (αn) ∧ (ϕ)
where α0, α1, ..., αn are a set of constraints under which the current path
is reachable and ϕ is the overflow condition. The strcat function on line 8
thus composes
(β + 8 + 1 ≤ 512) ∧ (buf [0] ̸= ′/′) ∧ ((β + 1) + 8 + 1 > σ)
which if found to be satisfiable means an overflow (of at least a single byte,
thus not necessarily exploitable), is feasible. A decision procedure is queried
with the formula above, returning SAT (to indicate satisfiability) and a value for
β (in this case, 503) for which the formula holds true. The procedure would
succeed even if, in practise, the actual length of the string in buf was 1 or 2
bytes long. Hence, it generalises the memory operations to strings of arbitrary
length. Note that a separate logic formula with additional constraints imposed
upon the input would be necessary to determine exploitability.
A.4.4 Summary
We believe an argument can be made for combining the loop summarisation
technique in [34] with the length abstraction described in [88]. The resulting
combination may yield desirable characteristics that exploit generation sys-
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